The Lebanese war is very complex and has many dimensions so it is not considered, as some have claimed, to be a 'civil war' as many non Lebanese nationals were very heavily involved, indeed armies of neighbouring countries took part in much of the fighting. It is unfortunate that there is reference to 'Christians' and 'Muslims' in the following account as this may cause those unfamiliar with the events to think that the war was one of religion. This would be unfair and simplistic as religion was just used as a convenient umbrella to stereotype and group the many factions and thus divide them between two opposing sides. There were many 'Muslims' on the 'Christian side' and vice versa. The opposing sides were not fighting each other simply because of their religion but as a result of major differences of opinion on matters such as who should run the country and how the country should be run. It was a war about ideology, identity, nationality, insanity, and stupidity.

The dimensions of the war comprised of a Lebanese-Palestinian war, a Lebanese-Lebanese, a Palestinian-Syrian, a Palestinian-Israeli, a Lebanese-Syrian, a Syrian-Israeli, and a Lebanese-Israeli war. Add to these dimensions Libyans, Iraqis, Americans and Russians, and the resulting chaotic soup of well over seventy groups fighting in Lebanon would confuse the most ordered of minds.

The War of 1958

After the National Front coalition of Kamal Jumblatt and Saeb Salam received major setbacks in the parliamentary elections of 1958 the coalition and its Druze and Sunni supporters decided to take to the streets and turned to violence through open rebellion against the government. With the aid of some Arab powers, these left wing forces which were inspired and encouraged by the February 1958 unification of Egypt and Syria, agitated to make Lebanon a member of the new United Arab Republic. The pro western government of Lebanon was disliked by the Syrians who plotted to destabilize the country and so encouraged and greatly assisted the rebels through mainly covert operations. Syrian covert action became so obvious and widespread that the Lebanese government lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council in June 1958. ("Speech of Dr Malik before the UN Security Council," 6 June 1958, S/823, 823rd Meeting, Security Council Official Records, 1958, p. 4) Press reports and government documents alike confirm a massive covert Syrian intervention that included supplying arms to the opposition, training paramilitary forces and using Syrian soldiers to carry out terrorist attacks.

Further confirmation came from a seemingly unusual source, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP). The SSNP believed that the leftist rebels wanted to liquidate them as part of a communist inspired plot because the SSNP opposed the plans of President Nasser of Egypt for union with Syria. In a press conference on May 19, 1958 Assad El Ashkar, the head of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party stated:

"As for the actual intervention of the United Arab Republic, our comrades at Idbil could clearly hear dialects of Syrians and Egyptians when they fought with the attackers face to face. The Syrian Army sent to Irsal (a Lebanese village on the borders near Nabi Osman) several mortars. Major Hassan Hiddaa of the Syrian Army entered the Lebanese town of Irsal in an armored car and stayed there for a couple of hours, where he inspected the forces of rebellion. The source of arms of all rebels in the Baalbeck-Hermel district is the Sarraj Deuxieme Bureau. Abdo Hakim, another Syrian officer at Homs is in charge of supplying the rebels with arms and amunitions. He himself lead some of the caravans which carried arms to Al-Kassr (another Lebanese village in the Hermel District)."

In a memorandum to Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations Organization the SSNP said:

"The arming of the rebel tribes in the Hermel district started on the 27th of March 1958, in the Syrian village of “al Hamam” on the Syrian frontier bordering the Hermel district in Northern Beqaa.....The Syrian Lieutenant Abdu Hakeem was personally in charge of arming the rebel tribes. He himself used to distribute arms and lead convoys into the Lebanese territory......The attack on Halba, Akkar, was launched from Al-Kasser in Hermel. Abdu Hakeem harangued the rebels, then before the attack was started many Syrian conscripts took part in the attack.....Another main centre of rebels and infiltration is Orsal (a Lebanese frontier village). It is the headquarters of the Syrian Major Hasssan Hiddah, In charge of the Orsal-Baalbeck area. Recent information point out that ex-Colonel Ali Hayyari, expelled from the Jordanian Army in 1957, is in charge with Major Hiddah, of military rebel operations in Beqaa. On June 1st, 1958, Major Hiddah held in Orsal, a general meeting for all Syrian conscripts participating in the rebellion. The meeting took place near the house of the Mukhtar Hujjeiry......Syrian arms were distributed to the village of Rassem Al Haddath, Shath, Younin, Makheh, Brital, Hour Takla, Al Ein, Al Labweh, Dar el Wassia.On May 31st, Tawfic Halo Haidar, received from Major Hiddah, through the Nabec - Orsal road, 300 machine guns and on June 8th, 1958, the rebel tribesmen, Tahan Dandash, Salih Nasser-el Deen, Khudur Saadoun, went to Damascus and came back with 900 guns. The number of guns smuggled through the Beqaa borders up till that date, reached approximately 3500 guns including machine guns, Bazooka guns and other varieties. Big sums of money were also paid by the Syrian authorities to rebel tribes."

The memorandum continues:

"Deir El Ashayer (a Lebanese village on the Syrian frontier) is the main center for arming and training of the rebels. Syrian officers are in charge of their military training. Major Tawfic Janial of the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau is in charge of arming the rebels of the Rashaya district. Naassan Zakkar, officer in the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau is in charge of the military operations. All of the above-mentioned officers work under the direct command of Captain Burhan Adham who is in charge of the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau. Syrian army squadrons are camping in Mankaa al Tuffah on the Syrian border where rebels are being trained. Route of infiltration in this area starts at Mankaa al Tuffah and continues through Deir el Ashayer, Khirbit Rouha (now a meeting center of infiltration and rebels), Baalool, Lala, Ain Zebdi and then to the rebel Shouf district; Jumblat forces mainly come from Houran (in the Syrian region)."

Although the war took a toll of some 2,000 to 4,000 lives, it was regarded by many as a comic opera, especially when 5,000 United States Marines were landed on the beaches near Beirut and waded ashore among sunbathers and swimmers. The Marines' role, in a situation described by the Department of Defence as "like war but not war" was to support the legal Lebanese government against any foreign invasion, specifically against Syria. The Marines were summoned because General Shihab, commander of the Lebanese Army, believing that units of the small Lebanese army would mutiny and disintegrate if ordered into action, had disobeyed President Chamoun's orders to send in the army against leftist rebels.

Although the crisis passed quickly, it was a sign of things that were soon to come.

(On the crisis in general, see F.I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 71-168. For specific Syrian covert operations, see for instance, "Verhaftung eines Syrischen Terroristen," Neue Züricher Zeitung, 27 June 1958; "Le Deuxième Bureau Syrien aurait équipé et énvoye des sommes à Mouktara pour soutenir les insurgés de M. Joumblatt," L'Orient, 13 July 1958; PRO, FO 371/134133/VL1015/602, Scott to FO, 2 September 1958.)

The 1975 - 1990 War

The Prelude to the 1975 War and the Cairo Agreement

Fouad Shihab became president after Camille Chamoun and although he built up the Lebanese intelligence service, called the Deuxième Bureau, the army was almost ignored and remained powerless, small, and was becoming weaker and weaker as time went on. The army's inactivity continued under Shihab's successor, Charles Helou, who became president in 1964. Helou and his army commander refused to commit Lebanese troops to the June 1967 war as an armitice agreement had been signed between the two countries in 1949 and the Lebanese Army was far too small and weak to get involved. This enraged many Lebanese Muslims as well as Syria, the mortal enemy of Israel. Immediately after the Arab defeat of 1967 Syria started sending Palestinian guerrillas into Lebanon to attack Israel. As soon as the PLO came to Lebanon, the violence that was to destroy the country began.

On October 20, 1969 large numbers of Palestinain guerrillas began gathering on the western slopes of Mount Hermon in the Arqub region of Lebanon a few days later on the 29th these Palestinians fired on a Lebanese army patrol which resulted in the deaths of three Lebanese soldiers and the death one guerrilla with two injured. Imediatley Voice of Palestine broadcasts from cairo started to warn the Lebanese not to interfere with Palestinain raids into Israel. Following the calsh a meering was held on 16 November to discuss the matter. The meeting included the Lebanese Army commader Emile Boustany, Cheif of Staff Yusif Shmayet, Intelligence Chief Gaby Lahoud and representatives of Palestinian organisations. Palestinian officials stated that their intention was to attack targets in Israel and that to achieve this they needed to pass through Lebanese territory. To that Boustany replied that Lebanon would not allow such infiltrations. He then stated the Lebanese position on such military activities and stressed the following:

• Lebanon signed an armistice agreement with Israel in 1949; it was still in effect and Lebanon could not violate it.
• Military operations between Israel and the Arab countries are part of military strategy under the United Arab Command. Lebanon cannot allow turmoil on the Lebanese-Israeli border without co-ordination with that military body.
• Attacks carried out by the Fedaeyin (guerrillas) from Lebanon would lead to violent Israeli retaliations against civilians in Lebanese villages.

The army and its Deuxième Bureau was not able to control the flow Palestinian guerrillas infiltrating Lebanon from Syria, an attitude that angered Christians who saw the Palestinian armed presence as a mortal threat to Lebanon. In December 1968, the Lebanese government was humiliated when Israeli commandos landed at Beirut International Airport and destroyed thirteen Middle East Airlines and TMA aircraft with impunity. The Israeli strike was in retaliation for a series of Palestinian hijackings. The Lebanese army did not interfere with Israeli attacks into Lebanon in retaliation against Palestinian terror forces, the army and the Deuxiéme Bureau, and the government were charged with collusion with Israel by the Lebanese left. Kamal Jumblatt led the anti government chorus and demanded that Lebanon supports the guerrillas.

A few months later, on 15 April 1969, fighting broke out again between the Lebanese Army and infiltrating guerrillas in the southern village of Deir Mimas. Disturbances were also recorded in several Palestinian camps. Four days later, another clash took place between army troops and armed Palestinians in the villages of Odeiseh and Khiyam, resulting in several casualties. Demonstrations also took place in Beirut and in other major cities. On 22 April 1968 clashes were renewed in the south in which several guerrillas were injured and others detained. Clashes became recurrent as the number of guerrillas operating in Lebanon increased. According to Lebanese security sources, the number of guerrillas based in the south by mid-1969 was approximately 4000. The majority belonged to Saeqa and Fateh.

Confrontations with government authorities were part of a Fateh strategy to establish a permanent military presence in Lebanon. According to George Hawi the head of the Communist Party, Arafat was uncertain about the precarious state of affairs that prevailed in Jordan in 1969 as well as about the PLO’s ability to take over Jordan, as advocated by some Palestinian leaders. New alternatives had to be explored. One such alternative was to strengthen Fateh’s presence in Lebanon and create 'new realities on the ground' especially since the situation seemed favourable both inside the camps and in the growing popular support for the PLO within the ranks of the Lebanese left wing parties.

The more serious clash, however, took place not in remote areas near the Lebanese-Israeli border but in Sidon and Beirut. No sooner had the country recovered from the Israeli raid than it found itself engulfed, in April 1969, in a crisis over the Palestinian problem in its Arab and Lebanese dimensions as opposed to the more predictable Israeli dimension. The occasion for turmoil was a demonstration called for by several Lebanese Leftist and Arab nationalist parties led by Kamal Jumblatt to protest against 'the reactionary policies of the Lebanese government towards Fedaeyin action' and to call for 'the opening of southern borders for guerrilla operations against Israel'. On the surface, the demonstration looked like yet another episode of arm twisting between government authorities and pro-Palestinian groups. In reality, however, what happened was a Fateh-instigated confrontation with the Lebanese government. Such a confrontation would provoke a crisis which, in turn, would bring the issue of PLO armed presence into the open.

On the 23rd of April in Sidon, armed demonstrators coming from Ain al-Helweh camp stormed the municipality building in the city and clashed with security forces. In Beirut, the clash started in the Barbir area as demonstrators tried to force their way through internal security forces deployed on the scene. According to a Leftist activist who took part in the demonstration, shooting started when a man in his early twenties in sportswear walked towards the front row of the demonstration, about fifteen minutes after it started, and opened fire at the security forces. He then ran away as the security forces started shooting. In the process, two people were killed and many others were injured. While the identity of the agent provocateur was not known, it was clear that the intention was to provoke turmoil. Clearly, the demonstration and the bloody confrontations that followed in Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli and the Beqaa were not an accidental show of force. Clashes resulted in 11 people dead, including five Lebanese security forces and more than 80 injured.

What made the demonstration qualitatively different was its political significance. It signalled, in the words of Mohsin Ibrahim head of the Organisation of Communist Action, 'the decision to open the battle' with the Lebanese government. Equally important was that it was viewed by the Left in Lebanon as a revolutionary event of unprecedented importance. For Lebanese Communist Party ideologue Mahdi Amil, the 'April 23rd uprising' (Intifada) was a political and ideological achievement of 'historic significance', with it, 'Lebanon's class struggle began' and a new political force was born 'to break the hold of the bourgeoisie-controlled' political system and 'to protect the Palestinian Resistance'.

Reacting to these events, the government imposed a four day nation-wide curfew. Several demonstrators were detained, including pro-Iraq Baath Party leader Abdul-Majid al-Rafi. On 24 April, the Sunni prime minister, Rashid Karame resigned in a show of support for the Palestinians and the search for ways to end the crisis began. It was to continue for the next seven months until a formula of 'coexistence' between the Lebanese state and the Palestinian revolution was found. The Lebanon was paralized as the President found it impossible to form a new government as the Sunni leadership refused to do so unless Lebanon started a policy of coordination with the PLO. That formula was the Cairo Agreement. The situation forced army commander General Emile Bustani to sign the an agreement in Cairo in November 1969 with Palestinian representatives. The Cairo Agreement granted to the Palestinians the right to keep weapons in their camps and to attack Israel across Lebanon's border and for their part the Plaestinians had to respect Lebanese laws and Lebanon's sovereignty. By sanctioning the armed Palestinian presence, however, Lebanon surrendered full sovereignty over military operations conducted within and across its borders and became a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Given the prevailing internal and regional considerations, the Cairo Agreement provided relief for all parties who regarded it as a face-saving arrangement and an expedient truce short of better alternatives. For most Christian leaders, the Cairo Agreement was the 'lesser of two evils'. For Camille Chamoun, what counted were Palestinian intentions and their willingness to abide by the agreement when put to the test. Another Christian response was that of Pierre Gemayel who saw the Cairo Agreement as 'a middle ground solution' between two divergent views on the PLO in Lebanon. While acknowledging that military operations would eventually lead to Israeli raids, Gemayel explained that it 'would still be easier to cope with such raids than with a civil war between the Lebanese'.

Raymond Eddé was the only Lebanese leader who had consistently opposed the notion of supporting the Palestinians and, subsequently, the Cairo Agreement. He never missed the opportunity to reiterate his position and to argue that such an arrangement hurt the interests of both Lebanon and the PLO. But Eddé’s views, and his call for the deployment of United Nations troops along the Lebanese-Israeli borders, went unheeded. Another strong reaction to the Cairo Agreement came from Maronite Patriarch Méouchy, who submitted a memorandum to the president in which he voiced concern over the military provisions of the agreement.

Those who stood to benefit most from the outcome of the events that marked the stormy year of 1969 were Kamal Jumblatt, Leftist parties and, in a different way, the Sunni political establishment. Indeed, the Cairo Agreement met the demands voiced by the Sunni political and religious leadership. On the eve of the Cairo talks, Sunni Mufti Hassan Khalid convened two meetings attended by Lebanon’s leading political and religious figures and issued a statement calling for the freedom of guerrilla action. An attempt tp convene a meeting by Shiite cleric Mousa al-Sadr in support of the guerrillas was not successful as the meeting was boycotted by leading Shiite figures.

For his role in forcing through the Cairo Agreement Jumblatt was rewarded with the post of interior minister by Rashid Karami. Jumblatt proceeded by replacing the army presence in the camps with internal security forces who were under his command and was therefore able to assist them in their arms build-up.

Nearly three weeks after the signing of the agreement clashes between the guerrillas and the Lebanese Army were renewed this time in the Nabatiyeh camp in the south. The Cairo Agreement was violated from the start and it became irrelevant.

The Troubled Years, 1970 - 1974

Despite Arab support for the PLO and the international attention it was able to generate, the PLO would not have been able to operate as an autonomous movement in the absence of the sanctuary it found in Lebanon. The autonomy it enjoyed in Lebanon could not be found in any other Arab country. In the years following the loss of its Jordan base, the PLO came to view its Lebanon base in strategic terms. As a result, Lebanon was no longer a place where the PLO would be content with limited political and military presence. In the early 1970s, Palestinian organisations displayed little willingness to abide by agreements, which in reality were no more than hasty deals mirroring the balance of power of the late 1960s.

Beginning in 1970, Palestinian-Israeli raids in the south intensified, as did the clashes between the Lebanese Army and the guerrillas. One of the early clashes after the Cairo Agreement occurred in March 1970 in the south, resulting in several casualties. Violence began to drive local inhabitants to seek shelter outside their villages, particularly in the suburbs of Beirut.

Demonstrations were held in Beirut to protest the policies of the Lebanese government towards Arab causes and the Palestinian revolution. The confusing setting of Arab politics was clearly apparent in the slogans the demonstrators raised, comparing President Helou to Nun al-Said, Iraq’s strong man under the Hashernite monarchy, and calling for his overthrow.

A serious confrontation involving PLO guerrillas occurred in March 1970. Clashes began in the Maronite town of Kahhaleh and spread immediately to the outskirts of Beirut. While disturbances lasted only three days, they had unprecedented confessional overtones.

The incident began on 25 March, following an exchange of gunfire between Palestinians escorting a convoy of cars passing through the Christian town of Kahhaleh (located on the major Beirut-Damascus road) on their way to Damascus to bury a Palestinian commando officer. On their way back, the Palestinian convoy, which was larger and more heavily armed than the previous one, came under heavy fire as it passed through the main road in the town. Gunfire went on for forty-five minutes and resulted in several casualties.

Immediately after the incident, attempts at reconciliation began. Jumblatt, in his capacity as minister of the interior, conferred with delegations representing the Palestinians and representatives of the inhabitants of Kahhaleh. Despite these efforts, fighting spread to other areas around Palestinian camps in the areas of Dikwaneh and Haret Hreik. In these two localities, largely populated by Christians of lower and middle class backgrounds the guerrillas had already begun to expand their military presence outside the camps where they would set up roadblocks and harass passers-by. In Dikwaneh, where the Tal al Zaatar camp was located, Palestinian guerrillas raided a local office of the Kataeb Party. But more importantly they kidnapped Pierre Gemayel’s younger son, Bashir, who, at the time, was not yet directly involved in party politics. Although Gemayel, along with his two companions, were released the same day from a Fateh office on Hamra street, the symbolic significance of the episode was clear. From that day Bashir Gemayel would get involved in politics.

In the summer of 1970 Sulayman Franjieh (also Frangieh) was elected president. Believing that the Deuxième Bureau was staffed with Shihab loyalists, Franjieh purged it and stripped it of its powers. But the Deuxième Bureau had been the only governmental entity capable of monitoring and controlling the Palestinians, and Franjieh's action unintentionally gave the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), commanded by Yasser Arafat, more freedom of action in Lebanon. Franjieh, who came from Zgharta in northern Lebanon, was accused of promoting his own power and catering to the interests of his clansmen instead of confronting Lebanon's growing security problems. Meanwhile, the PLO made a bid to topple Jordan's King Hussein, but it was crushed and evicted from the country after fierce fighting, an event known in the Palestinian lexicon as "Black September." Therefore, the PLO leadership and guerrillas moved their main base of operations from Jordan to Lebanon, where the Cairo Agreement endorsed their presence. The influx of several hundred thousand Palestinians including many tens of thousands of guerrillas upset Lebanon's delicate confessional balance, and polarized the nation into two groups, those who supported and those who opposed the PLO presence.

Public order deteriorated with daily acts of violence between Christians and Palestinians. To counter Christian political resistance the PLO set about isolating the Christian community and distorting Christian image and goals. The Christians were branded as isolationists, traitors, rightists, fascists, anti Arab, and Israeli collaborators. The PLO media machine which controlled most of the press activity of Beirut did such a fine job distorting the truth about their Lebanese opponents that to this day the Lebanese Christians are having difficulty in shaking off the isolationist label given to them by the PLO.

Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force launched raids against the Palestinian refugee camps in retaliation for PLO terrorist attacks in Western Europe. On April 10, 1973, Israeli commandos infiltrated Beirut in a daring raid and attacked Palestinian command centres in the heart of the capital, killing three prominent PLO leaders: Kamal Nasir, poet and the PLO's official spokesman; Muhammad al-Najjar, head of the Higher Political Committee for Palestinian Affairs in Lebanon, member of the PLO Executive Committee and Fateh Central Committee; and Kamal Udwan, also a member of the Fateh Central Committee. The absence of the Lebanese Army during the Israeli attack angered Lebanese Muslims. Prime Minister Saib Salam claimed that Army commander General Alexander Ghanim--a Maronite--had disobeyed orders by not resisting the Israeli raid, and he threatened to resign unless Ghanim were stripped of his rank. Because Ghanim was allowed to remain as army commander (until he was replaced by Hanna Said in September 1975), Salam did resign and was succeeded by a series of weak prime ministers.

Friction between the guerrillas and the security forces increased rapidly thereafter. On April 14 1973 the US-owned oil terminus at Zahrani was bombed, allegedly by the PFLP-GC; on April 27 three men were arrested with explosives at Beirut airport, where a bomb was found the next day; on April 30 several armed DFLP members were arrested as they drove past the US Embassy. In response, two Lebanese soldiers were kidnapped on May 1st which finally forced the Lebanese Army into action against the PLO. The refugee camps were then surrounded and attacked by the army. In response to Palestinian shelling of the airport, the Lebanese Air Force was ordered into action against the Burj al-Barajina camp in Beirut. A state of emergency was declared throughout the country.

As the fighting intensified, the PLO appealed to external allies for support. Algeria, Libya, and Syria promptly condemned the Lebanese government's actions. All three, together with Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and the Arab League offered to mediate. Egypt and Syria-now planning what would become the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War-were particularly anxious to contain the conflict, and exerted considerable pressure to that end. This included the closure of the Syrian-Lebanese border on May 8, and the movement of Fateh and Saiqa forces from Syria to a few kilometers inside Lebanon. Fearing a Syrian invasion, the Lebanese looked for a way to end the fighting.

On May 17, after some seventeen hours of negotiation, the two sides announced that they had reached agreement, the "Melkart Protocol". This Melkart Agreement, on the one hand obligated the PLO to respect the "independence, stability, and sovereignty" of Lebanon but on the other hard gave the PLO virtual autonomy, including the right to maintain its own militia forces in certain areas of Lebanon. These provisions of the Melkart Agreement differed greatly from the Cairo Agreement, which preserved the "exercise of full powers in all regions and in all circumstances by Lebanese civilian and military authorities."

Lebanese Muslims believed that under the Melkart Agreement Palestinian refugees in Lebanon had been accorded a greater degree of self-determination than some Lebanese citizens. Inspired by this, they organized themselves politically and militarily and encouraged by the Palestinians tried to wrest similar concessions from the central government. In 1974 Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt established the Lebanese National Movement (formerly the Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces), an umbrella group comprising antigovernment forces.

A military build-up was underway. Following the 1969 events, Kataeb Party members were involved in occasional military training. The turning point, however, occurred after the 1973 confrontations between the Lebanese army and PLO forces, when Christian-based parties began to acquire heavy weapons and were engaged in organised training. The most organised and disciplined Christian-based party was the Kataeb. With its para-military structure and large following in various parts of the country, the Kataeb Party was, as Frank Stoakes indicated, ‘a valuable auxiliary of the state’ and always ready to come to its defence in times of crisis.’ Other parties began to organise militarily, notably Chamoun’s National Liberal Party and a small elitist group of young professionals called al-Tanzim, headed by physician Fouad Chemali.

Lebanese parties, of all persuasions, Christian and Muslim, Left and Right, lagged behind the PLO. Not only did they lack a similar military and security infrastructure, they had limited financial resources. Leftist and Muslim-based parties operated closely with the PLO and received heavy financial and military support from Arab countries, notably Libya, Syria and Iraq. Christian-based parties, for their part, relied mainly on private financial support. They also received military assistance, beginning in 1973, from the Lebanese army, which consisted of training and light weapons.

On the eve of the war in 1975 the military balance in the country was largely in favour of the PLO. Of the eight PLO organisations, with a total strength of 22,900 troops, Fateh had the largest number of fighters (7,000) and was the best equipped, followed by Saiqa (4,500). The fighting force of other major organisations was of almost equal size, numbering about 2500 each. The distribution of armed men in seven major camps in October 1975 was as follows: al-Rashidiyeh (7,300), Ain al-Helweh (4,500), Tal al-Zaatar (3,225), Shatila (2,500), Nahr al-Band (1,700), al-Burj al-Shemali (1,625) and Borj al-Barajneh (1,300). Therefore, the largest concentration was in the south and the Beirut area.

The Lebanese army was 19,000 strong. Only about half that number was a fighting force. The largest number of militiamen was that of the Kataeb Party (8,000), followed by the Lebanese Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party (5,000 each) and by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the National Liberal Party (4,000 each). Leftist, nationalist and Muslim-based parties, which were part of the LNM, had a total number of 18,700 militiamen and with the PLO the anti government forces numbered some 41,600 while Christian-based parties had 12,000. The break up of the army made the ratio worse for the Christian based parties as the result was 46,600 left wing troops against 15,000 right wing troops.

The Opening Rounds, 1975

By the mid 1970s PLO conduct in Lebanon had reached incredible lows. Arafat's realm within Lebanon became known as the Fakhani Republic named after the district of Beirut where he had set up his headquarters, in large areas of Lebanon his authority was supreme. In a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty the PLO set up road blocks, issued passes and travel documents, took over entire buildings, operated extortion rackets, protected criminals fleeing Lebanese justice, stole cars, expelled residents, and opened unlicensed shops, bars, and nightclubs. They even raped and murdered at will. Despite repeated pleas from his old guard and from Lebanese Christian leaders, Arafat did nothing to control the behaviour of his Palestinians.

In a memorandum submitted to the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 7th November 1975 by the Standing Conference of the Superior-Generals of the Monastic Orders of Lebanon, they state:

'The Palestinian resistance interfere in Lebanese politics, in alliance with such groups as it believes can be of advantage to it, and openly try to bring them to power by calling upon them to cause disturbances even such as involve the use of arms, using external pressure on the Lebanese state through certain Arab countries when it seems to be in its interest to extract from the Lebanese authorities such privileges as have not been extracted before. The resistance also believes itself entitled to call openly upon the Lebanese to deny their political system, impeding the normal course of the constitutional and administrative institutions (the army, for example) by openly appealing to one or other of the Arab countries, which then pours in its money to direct the information media (and the press in particular) as it wishes, and, indeed, to mold them and to undermine their national role so as to suppress the expression of any opinion favorable to Lebanon in its own interest, providing a base and a refuge for international terrorism which can only be injurious to Lebanon."

A year later, on 14th October 1976 Edward Ghorra, the Lebanese AmbAssador to the United Nations described the actions of the Palestinians to the UN General Assembly:

"The Palestinians had transformed most, if not all, of the refugee camps into military bastions around our major cities. Moreover, common-law criminals fleeing from Lebanese justice find shelter and protection in the camps. Palestinian elements belonging to various splinter organizations resorted to kidnapping Lebanese and sometimes foreigners, holding them prisoner, questioning them, and even killing them. They committed all sorts of crimes in Lebanon and also escaped Lebanese justice in the protection of the camps. They smuggled goods into Lebanon and openly sold them on our streets. They went so far as to demand protection money from many individuals and owners of buildings and factories situated in the vicinity of the camps."

Even strong supporters of the PLO had been moved to comment on the behavior of the Palestinians. In his book, I Speak for Lebanon, written in 1977 shortly before his death, Kamal Jumblat the main ally of the Palestinians in Lebanon wrote:

"It has to be said that the Palestinians themselves, by violating Lebanese law, bearing arms as they chose and policing certain important points of access to the capital, actually furthered the plot that had been hatched against them. They carelessly exposed themselves to criticism and even to hatred. High officials and administrators were occasionally stopped and asked for their identity papers by Palestinian patrols. From time to time, Lebanese citizens and foreigners were arrested and imprisoned, on the true or false pretext of having posed a threat to the Palestinian revolution. Such actions were, at first, forgiven, but became increasingly difficult to tolerate. Outsiders making the law in Lebanon, armed demonstrations and ceremonies, military funerals for martyrs of the revolution, it all mounted up and began to alienate public opinion, especially conservative opinion, which was particularly concerned about security.... I never saw a less discreet, less cautious revolution."

It is interesting to note that throughout the war, and despite the close alliance between the Druze PSP and the Palestinians, the PSP would not permit the stationing of significant numbers of Palestinian troops in Druze-held areas of the Shuf Mountains.

Trouble began to brew very early in 1975 when a Lebanese Army barracks in Tyre was hit by 8 rockets fired from a nearby Palestinian camp on January 20th. Matters came to a head in February 1975 when the Lebanese Communist Party and other leftists organized violent demonstrations in Sidon on behalf of fishermen who were threatened economically by a state monopoly fishing company. The Lebanese Army was called in to restore order, but, in the volatile atmosphere, armed clashes erupted. Muslim politicians protested that the use of the army was a violation of the demonstrators' democratic liberties and asked why the army was shooting at civilians rather than defending Lebanon's borders against Israeli incursions. Sunni leaders also faulted the channels used for ordering the army into action. General Ghanim had assumed charge of the army's conduct and reported directly to President Franjieh, ignoring Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Rashid as Sulh (also seen as Solh). Meanwhile, thousands of students in mainly Christian East Beirut demonstrated in support of the army. These serious splits were exacerbated when Maruf Saad, a pro-Palestinian Sunni populist leader, died in March of wounds suffered during the Sidon clashes. Long-standing concerns that the army would disintegrate if it were called into action were vindicated when intense fighting broke out between Maronite and Muslim army recruits.

The various nationalistic, pro government, mainly Christian parties as they watched the authority of the Lebanese government collapse, organized themselves into militias in an attempt to counter the threat from the Palestinian presence. These various militias such as the Phalange, the Ahrar Tigers, and the Guardians of the Cedars, realizing that they were out numbered and out gunned combined politically under one central command, The Lebanese Front.

On April 13, 1975, unidentified Palestinian gunmen opened fire at a congregation outside a Maronite church in Ayn ar Rummeneh, a Christian suburb of Beirut. Later in the day, members of the Christian Phalange Party ambushed a bus filled with Palestinians that had overrun a check point, claiming 26 dead. According to the Phalange version of events, the bus contained armed Palestinian Arab Liberation Front guerillas, firing weapons. Some PLO accounts describe the passengers as civilians and other reports as guerrilla trainees. However, the Phalangist version was confirmed by Abd al-Rahim Ahmad of the Palestinian ALF who stated in an interview in Amman, 28th December 1986, that those on the bus were indeed armed Palestinian ALF members. That night, at 10 pm, mortar shells slammed into Ayn ar Rummanah catching the people by surprise. The next day saw hit and run raids against the Lebanese Army by Palestinian groups led by the DFLP and also fighting between the Phalangists and the Palestinians which resulted in around 35 deaths and by the April 15 a full artillery duel had started in Beirut. One of Lebanon's many cease fires was announced on April 16 but was not to last. Within the next couple of days heavy fighting resumed between the Palestinian forces and the Lebanese Front. Kamal Jumblatt and hs leftist allies voiced continuous support for the Palestinians. The war soon became an orgy of death.

In the first week of the war some hundreds of motorists, halted in a traffic jam in Beirut at a Palestinian check point, witnessed the execution of a man by the PLO. The captors and their victim stood on a piece of open ground at the side of the Avenue Sami al-Solh. Other captured Lebanese, probably Maronite, were guarded by Fedayeen armed with ‘klashens’ (AK47s). The captives’ hands were tied behind their backs. One was singled out for special attention. Round his neck the PLO militiamen tied sticks of explosives. People in their cars looked and waited uneasily for the arrival of the special police in red berets whose business it was to deal with violent incidents in the streets, but they did not appear. One witness amongst hundreds, Janet Wakin, the respected American wife of businessman George Wakin reported 'the victim stood still, with strange quietness and dignity’, while the fedayeen prepared literally to blow his head off. They set a fuse, and ran back from the man, who continued to stand where he was, quite still, until the explosion came. Not only was he decapitated, but the rest of his body was blown to pieces. The war rapidly took on a sectarian character.

Districts of Beirut became ‘no go’ areas for all but those whose religion let them in. A person’s religion was enough to condemn him or her to abduction, humiliation, rape, mutilation or murder. It was not long before a brisk trade in false identity papers was underway. A person moving through the city, and before long anywhere in the country, might depend for his or her life on correctly identifying which roadblock lay ahead, getting the right papers ready to show the militiamen (many of them boys in their early teens), and remembering whether to give a Christian or a Muslim name. Often those who made mistakes were killed on the spot.

While death and torture were suffered in the streets, the political battle went on, most heatedly between Pierre Gemayel and Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt drew up a list of fourteen demands. They included one that Lebanon be declared an Arab state, another that the Christians give an undertaking not to indulge in any ‘confessional provocation’, another that ‘full respect’ be paid to the ‘Palestinian movement’, and a yet another demand was that two Maronite ministers resign and it was to this demand only, Pierre Gemayel agreed. The result was that the government fell. Therefore, on May 23, Franjieh took the unorthodox and unprecedented step of appointing a military cabinet. Muslim Brigadier Nur ad Din Rifai, retired commander of the Internal Security Force, was named prime minister. Rifai selected the controversial Ghanim as his minister of defence; all other cabinet ministers except one were also military officers.

Franjieh's motives were difficult to discern. Some believed his move was part of a plot to cement Maronite dominance of the government. Others believed he was attempting to force the recalcitrant army to intervene in the fighting. Perhaps Franjieh sincerely thought that a strong inter confessional military government with unquestionable authority over the army could avert widespread conflict, although Lebanon's democracy would be sacrificed. Indeed, Syrian foreign minister Abdal Halim Khaddam reportedly warned Lebanese politicians that the Lebanese Army was capable of uniting its ranks, staging a coup d'état, and imposing a military dictatorship.

Nevertheless, Lebanon's first and last military government was short lived, resigning two days after its inception. Rashid Karame, the man who had forced the Cairo Agreement upon Lebanon became prime minister once again. Even when installed in the government, the army proved unwilling or incapable of exerting authority in Lebanon. The resignation of the military government demonstrated the power vacuum in Lebanese politics and served as the catalyst to conflict. From June to September a six-man cabinet ‘ruled’ by emergency powers. Officially a ceasefire prevailed, but there were constant outbreaks of fighting. Hundreds of acts of terrorism were perpetrated against the Christians, kidnappings, murders and mutilations. The Kataeb interpreted the terrorism as part of the plan to keep the hate, the desire for revenge, the sectarian hostilities alive and active. They believed that criminals were hired to do this work: by whom they could only conjecture, but their suspicions fell on Iraq and Libya.

By September fighting resumed and soon clashes erupted in the Christian city of Zahle in the Beqaa and in the northern city of Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city. In both places, clashes were instigated by skirmishes between armed individuals. By then, tension was so high that even the slightest verbal exchange between two armed individuals was sufficient to provoke violence which would quickly spread to various parts of the country. In Zahle, local armed men clashed with heavily armed Palestinian guerrillas who for some bizarre reason were trying to enter Zahle. The fighting continued for several days and resulted in the deaths of twenty-eight people and the injury of many others. The more serious confrontation occurred in Tripoli and spread to surrounding localities.

Tripoli-Zgharta Battles

Heavy fighting was soon to erupt between Tripoli and Zgharta. Clashes here were instigated by a car accident involving a driver from Tripoli and another from the neighbouring Maronite town of Zgharta. This led to the shooting of the Muslim driver from Tripoli. Soon afterwards armed men in Tripoli began kidnapping Christians from Zgharta. In retaliation, armed men from Suleiman Frangieh's Zgharta based militia Marada, commanded by his son Tony, set up roadblocks on the outskirts of Tripoli and did their share of kidnapping. This wave of violence was temporarily contained following the release of the detainees. The next day clashes erupted in Tripoli as Palestinians, seeking an escallation, attacked Lebanese army positions, a Lebanese army barracks in the city was even the target of direct shelling from Palestinian positions. Eighteen soldiers were injured. Three Greek Orthodox priests were also kidnapped that day in Tripoli, but were later released. Shelling and rumours of kidnapping and counter-kidnapping kept many armed individuals alert. Disturbances broke out in the nearby Kura region, where skirmishes took place between Zgharta armed men of Marada and supporters of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Lebanese Communist Party. As local leaders succeeded in containing the Kura feud, another violent incident occurred in Darayya, near Tripoli. A bus carrying kidnapped people back to Tripoli, as part of the exchange agreement made between Zgharta and Tripoli leaders, was fired upon by an armed man from the Frangiyeh family, killing twelve and injuring seven others. The assailant had just learned of the killing of his brother in Tripoli.

Heavy fighting spread to the outskirts of Tripoli as Palestinains tlaunched an assualt against Zgharta. Permanent demarcation lines separating the Palestinians attacking from Tripoli and the Marada defending Zgharta were now in place. Attacks and counterter-attacks in which Palestinians took part alongside leftists Tripoli militiamen continued for several days, as did the sectarian killings. Palestinian guerillas belonging to the factions of George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh entered the village of Beit Mellat (Millat) in north Lebanon and started killing civilians and the moved on to Deir Ayache on 3rd September 1975. Three old monks aged 60, 78, and 93, the only occupants of the monastery of Deir Ayache were ritually murdered, the Christian occupants of the village managed to flee but their village was destroyed. Two days later, the small Maronite village in ‘Akkar, Beit Mellat, was tacked again by Palestinian gunmen who went on the rampage, destroying property, killing several people. Further confrontations took place in the region, notably an attack on the Christian town of Qbayyat in ‘Akkar many of whose inhabitants served in the Lebanese army. The town was besieged. The siege of the town provoked a strong protests and a rebellion by officers and soldiers from Qbayyat based in an army barracks in Jounieh who wanted to deploy and halt the fighting.

Emergency cabinet meetings were held and when Christian ministers insisted on the army to be sent into action to restore order the Muslim ministers objected stating that they did not want the army to get involved in action against Lebanese citizens. Finally it was agreed that army would set up a buffer zone between Tripoli and Zgharta. Unhappy with the use of Lebanese army units, Kamal Jumblatt, who had emerged as the leader of the leftist alliance, called for nation wide Muslim protest strikes.

A few days later, on the night of September 14, 1975, army troops clashed with several armed followers of Faruq Muqaddam, the leader of a Tripoli-based Fateh-backed guerrillas. Fourteen guerrillas were killed. The incident occurred while armed men attempted to force the way through an army checkpoint on their way back to Tripoli after they had tacked a beach resort near Tripoli, owned by a man from the Frangieh family The next day several Christian-owned shops and houses in Tripoli belonging individuals from Zgharta were bombed and looted. At this stage, Karame, while still opposed to army intervention, called upon the Syria controlled Palestine Liberation Army to bring order to the city. Karame’s decision was taken at a meeting of cabinet ministers in the Sérail, without informing the president. Also upon Karame’s request three guerrilla battalions were transferred from the south to Tripoli. Far from restoring order, these units joined the assault against Christian Zgharta and as a result hundreds Kataeb troops were rushed from Beirut to help Marada in the defence of Zgharta. Offensives against Zgharta would be launched many times over the following months but Zgharta refused to fall.

Deeply divided, ineffective and weak, the government by now ruled only on paper. Christian leaders saw one last alternative to halt the process of disintegration: a forceful intervention by the army.

As a consession to Karame, Frangieh replaced army commander General Alexander Ghanim with a low-key officer, and having agreed to restructure the army command, Frangieh and other Maronite leaders hoped that Karame and other Sunni leaders would support a forceful army intervention, particularly in Beirut and Tripoli. But this was not forthcoming. But even if some Sunni leaders were willing to support a limited army intervention in Beirut, Jumblatt and the PLO-supported Left were categorically opposed to any kind of army action. Shiite leaders, for their part, were in favour of army intervention. For Musa al-Sadr, the army intervention in Tripoli was 'a natural and proper measure'.

Faced by a strong Sunni-Leftist opposition even to a limited army intervention, Maronite leaders took matters into their own hands and went on the offensive. Pierre Gemayel who for months had been asking the government to deploy the army to restore order, issued an ultimatum on 16th September. If the army did not immediately go into action, the Phalange would have to take matters into their own hands. The next day the Phalange launched an offensive into central Beirut in an attempt to restore order.

The Sacking of Downtown Beirut

Although over 1,000 people were killed in the early fighting, many Lebanese still viewed the nascent war as a transitory phenomenon that would soon abate, like past security crises. Up until now, the war had mainly been a Palestinian and Lebanese Front affair but events took a sudden turn for the worse when well organized leftist Muslim militias sided with the Palestinians and attacked the downtown Kantari (Qantari) district in late October 1975, causing heavy loss of life and massive property damage, many inhabitants of Beirut realized for the first time that the war was a serious affair. The Palestinians and leftists eventually took Kantari and occupied the forty story Rizk (Murr) Tower, the highest building in Beirut.

Now that the leftist National Movement openly joined Fatah; the carnage was massive. Deaths from the fighting averaged about fifty a day. National Movement fighters and youths from the camps looted and destroyed the stores in the heart of Beirut. Dead and mutilated bodies lay everywhere in public places: corpses of sexually violated women and children, and of men with their genitals cut off and stuffed into their mouths. Shop windows were shattered and their contents looted by a multitude of beggars, many of them small ragged boys out of the camps, who would offer the goods for sale on the streets, wildly setting their own prices on items whose value they could not imagine. Garbage piled up in the streets. Piped water and electric power were cut off more often than not. People were afraid to leave their apartments and seek safety elsewhere, knowing they would lose everything to the looters, who would even tear window frames and plumbing fixtures out of the walls.

To add to the terror and destruction, the Syrian PLO group, Sa’iqa, began its own campaign of bomb explosions in the commercial centre of the city. As this was a mixed area, its targets were indiscriminate. PLO offices and men were hit. It was the covert beginning of a direct Syrian assault on the weakening state. Before the end of 1975, President Assad had started to deploy the Yarmouk and Hittin brigades of the PLA as well as Egyptian based 'Ayn Jalout Bridage' in the Beqaa in support of the Palestinians and the LNM. Syria's role in the fighting was tipping the military balance even more in favour of the PLO. Syrian troops had already been active in fighting alongside PLO units in the north of Lebanon.

The next major event was on December 6, 1975, "Black Saturday". Four Christians were shot dead and one wounded in a car outside the Lebanese Electricity Company headquarters in east Beirut by a Muslim militia raiding party. These murders took place on the eve of Pierre Gemayel's visit to Damascus. For Phalangists fighters this was the least straw, they wanted retaliation for this and numerous other recent acts of terror against the civilians of East Beirut. Phalangists set up a roadblock on the ring road and killed the first 40 Muslims they caught. When news of this action reached west Beirut, Muslim militias along with their Palestinian allies set up road blocks and began killing Christians. In the hours that followed around 350 civilians from each side had been murdered. This was the first major massacre of civilians in the war and started a vicious cycle of kidnapping, revenge and retaliation. From this point on, after combatants of each faction conquered territory from their rivals, they routinely killed civilians.

The fighting in the mainly Muslim western side of the city intensified as the PLO and the LNM battled against the Kataeb. The commander-in-chief of the Kataeb, Pierre Gemayel’s son Bachir, moved his men into the tourists’ hotel quarter of the city near the sea front, to try to defend the harbour and the business centre against the LNM and the PLO. Therefore in late 1975 and early 1976, fierce fighting engulfed Beirut's high rise hotel district, this fighting was a logical consequence of the leftist sacking of the Kantari district.

At the same time fighting was going on between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Front in Dbayeh. The expanded scope and intensity of the combat increased casualties greatly, with over 1,000 killed in the first weeks of the new year, 1976. On January 14 the Dbayeh Palestinian camp falls to the Phalange and the Ahrar after a five day siege.

Cowboy Anarchy in West Beirut

The number of dead and maimed mounted in Beirut. Snipers on roofs or at high windows picked off victims in the streets, in their homes, in shops, and in Offices. A common site was an open truck bearing a Soviet heavy machine-gun known as a ‘Douchka’, the gunman holding its grips with both hands to keep his balance as the vehicle hurtled through the streets and careened round corners. (It reminded onlookers of bronco- riding, or water-skiing, and the gunmen came to be known as ‘water- skiers’.) Everywhere in the city ‘armed elements’ sauntered in public places wearing masks, balaclavas, or squares of cloth covering all their features, or carnival papier-mâché faces, comic or grotesque, under cowboy stetsons, helmets, or any kind of headgear. Feather boas were seen draped round necks and shoulders under masked faces, and bits and pieces of all kinds of uniforms were worn:jungle camouflage fatigues, jeans and T-shirts. Guns were carried as an indispensable necessity, even in restaur-ants and on the beaches, by women as well as men. The masking was done often out of a genuine need for fighters to conceal their identity and so avert possible vengeance. But a certain illicit excitement in the freedom to kill with impunity filled the streets, and the ‘adventure’ attracted adventurers from far beyond the shores of Lebanon.

Many a 'franc tireur' toted his gun in the ranks of the fedayeen and the Marxists. Also bourgeois idealists, youths from Europe, most of them die-hards of the New Left’s militant ‘peace-movements’ of the late 1960s and now playing at revolution, and some of them neo-Nazis, were drawn here from the safe societies of the West to revel in the ‘real thing’. The parasitic PLO state in Lebanon was a subversives’ honeypot. Here they had licence to shoot and kill in an alien world, with no consequence to themselves. Would-be heroes of ‘the Revolution’, playboys and playgirls of terrorism from West Germany, Italy, Scandinavia and the Netherlands, came to dress up, strut, blow up, and gun down. It was a masquerade with a cruelty all too real. The adventure required the suffering and dying of multitudes of helpless people. It was a carnival of death.

To add to the theatricality of the scene, convoys of cars with guns protruding from the windows, armoured vehicles and motorcycles would scream through the streets accompanying Arafat or Abu Iyad on their visits to politicians, foreign envoys, allied commanders of the revolution-ary forces. Then, in some office or apartment block or public building, dozens of men armed with ‘klashens’ would push down the corridors ahead of the great man: Arafat wearing his kafliyah pinned back from his face, dark glasses, a three-day growth of beard; or Abu Iyad, another short stout man dwarfed by huge bodyguards.

The Constitutional Document

For some weeks efforts for a negotiated settlement had been underway. The idea for a negotiated political settlement to end conflict through Syrian mediation had been on the mind of the Syrian leadership since November 1975. Damascus was using a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach with the Maronite leadership. Syrian support for Palestinian, Leftist and Muslim forces was intended to keep the Maronite leadership under pressure to reach a settlement that favoured Syrian interests. To pursue that course of action, Damascus called upon an associate of Frangiyeh, Lucien Dahdah, then the Chairman of the Board of the Intra Company. Dahdah, who had family ties with Frangiyeh and old acquaintances in Syria, was contacted in Paris, where he was staying. With Frangiyeh’s approval, Dahdah met with Syrian officials. Talks went on for about four weeks and resulted in a draft, which was the basis for the Constitutional Document. Dahdah held meetings with Syrian officials, including seven with Assad. When negotiations started relations between Assad and Frangieh had been strained for several months, following Syrian army intervention in the war. Frangiyeh had presented evidence to Damascus confirming Syrian troops’ involvement in the war, particularly in the north.

The Constitutional Document was a convenient balancing act. It stipulated a more balanced confessional representation in government office and provided a formula to contain the internal dimension of conflict. It addressed grievances though without undermining the confessional foundations of a political system. One such grievance was Lebanon’s Arabism. The document proclaimed Lebanon’s Arabism but stated that Lebanon is a sovereign, free and independent country.

Of the seventeen points stated in the Constitutional Document, five dealt with Muslim grievances. By and large, they were aimed at curtailing presidential power. They are as follows: (i) Seats in parliament would be distributed on a fifty-fifty etween Muslims and Christians, and proportionately within each sect; (ii) the prime minister would be elected by a 51 per cent majority of the Chamber of then the prime minister should hold parliamentary consultations and the list of ministers in agreement with the president; (iii) All decrees and draft laws should be signed by the president and the prime minister. This did not apply to the decrees appointing the prime minister, accepting his resignation, or dissmissing his government. The prime minister should enjoy all the powers custumarily exercised by him; (iv) The distribution of posts on a confessional basis be abolished, although the principle of confessional equality should be maintained at the level of senior posts; (v) The naturalisation laws should be amended.

By contrast, only one provision addressed Christian demands. It affirmed the distribution of the three presidential posts, which allocated the presidency of the republic to a Maronite, the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shiite and the premiership to a Sunni.

Kamal Jumblatt and the PLO were heavily opposed to this document as an end to the war did not suit them. Jumblatt saw in this document a re-enactment of the 'no victot, no vanquished' formula of 1958, something which he was not willing to accept. Compromise was not appealing to Jumblatt and the PLO at a time when the military balance was in their favour. Therefore they looked for ways to intensify the fighting.

The Break-up of the Lebanese Army

Syria’s increasing influence in Lebanese politics had now reached the Sunni leadership. To counter this, Arafat sought to promote Sunni and Leftist supporters of his own. One concrete manifestation of his policy was the announcement of the formation in early 1976 of the Beirut-based Sunni militia, al-Murabitun, led by Ibrahim Qoleilat. A former Nasserite activist, Qoleilat was implicated in the assassination of the journalist Kamel Mrouweh in 1966 and was very much a local Beirut thug (qabaday). Trained and armed by Fateh, al-Murabitun, which included Palestinian and Lebanese fighters, received Libyan money.

For Arafat, the formation of al-Murabitun met three objectives: (i) It gave Palestinian military operations in Beirut an internal Lebanese Muslim cover; (ii) It undermined the influence of the Sunni political leadership on the ‘street’, particularly in Beirut; (iii) It underlined Sunni opposition to Syrian policy in Lebanon. Being largely dependent on Fateh, al-Murabitun was a useful instrument of military operations used by Fateh for escalation of warfare in Beirut 1976.

Rather than seeking a direct military confrontation with the Syrian regime, Fateh opted for another move aimed at undermining Syrian influence in Lebanon. On 15th January 1976, the Palestinians entered Kab Elias, a mixed Christian-Muslim village located in Békaa. Ten days later, 16 Christian civilians were killed and 23 others wounded in an unprovoked attack causing a mass exodus of the Christians from the Bekaa towards Zahlé, Beirut and Jounieh. It was at this juncture that the Army Lebanese began to disintegrate completely. Palestinians, mainly of the PLA had for days poured across the border from Syria and attacked in force the Christian villages in the Bekaa, when the Lebanese Army was sent in to stop the fighting, Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib mutinied and with his men he joined the PLA and then surrounded and bombarded Zahlé. The main orchestrator of the rebellion was Fateh leader Abu Jihad. Libya, Iraq and Fateh provided financial support for the Khatib movement.

On January 16, 1976, Minister of Defence Chamoun called in the mostly Christian manned Lebanese Air Force to bomb leftist positions near Damour as the town was under heavy attack. In response, Muslim troops rallied to the side of Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib.'The Movement of Ahmad al-Khatib,' later known as the Arab Army of Lebanon (AAL) or the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), was announced on 21 January 1976. The rebellion began in the Lebanese army barracks at Hasbayya, and quickly spread to other barracks in various parts of the country, especially in the south and the Beqa. For Syria, the rebellion was directed against its 'stabilising role in Lebanon'.

Two days later the army underwent yet another split. This time it was led by Colonel Antoine Barakat, who declared loyalty to Frangieh. A Maronite from Frangieh’s hometown Zgharta, Barakat controlled a major army barracks near the defence ministry. Another officer, Major Fouad Malik, supported the Barakat-led faction, as did Major Saad Haddad, who took over in Marjeyoun in the south.

The Lebanese Army was ripped into sectarian pieces. Army officers and troops entered into combat alongside the warring factions, while others remained under the nominal command of Army Chief Hanna Said. The latter commanded little authority even before the break-up of the army. Still others went home and did not take part in the fighting. Officers of the LAA commanded units in various parts of the country, particularly in the south and the north (Tripoli and ‘Akkar), where two Sunni officers, Ahmad Butari and Ahmad Mamari, were in command. The LAA was involved in brutal acts of kidnapping and sectarian killing in areas under its control in the north, south and the Beqaa.

The intervention of the Khatib's Lebanese Arab Army on the side of the PLO was a disaster for the Lebanese Front. Ahmad al-Khatib was a cousin of a socialist deputy named Zahir al-Khatib, who was a friend of Kamal Jumblatt. (‘A patriotic young officer with a good sense of politics,’ Jumblatt said of Ahmad Khatib.) As a close ally of the PLO, he moved his units southwards, in pursuit of the Christians who had fled that way to join their co-religionists when the war was raging in Beirut and the north; he intended to hunt them to extinction. His men, most of them professional and well-equipped soldiers, emptied or besieged the Christian towns and villages. It cannot be told how many people they killed, only it is certain they amounted to thousands. And as thousands more fled the country, Lieutenant al-Khatib came near to satisfying his highly publicized ambition of wiping out the entire Christian population in that part of Lebanon.

In desperation, as more officers and troops joined the Khatib movement, on 11 March another army officer, the Beirut garrison Brigadier ‘Aziz al-Ahdab, staged a ‘television coup’ and demanded the resignation of President Frangiyeh and announced that the Lebanese Army was stepping in to take over the government and restore order. A Sunni from Tripoli, Ahdab was the military commander of the Beirut district. Ahdab’s troops numbered fewer than a hundred, and hardly controlled their own command headquarters in Beirut. Whether or not Ahdab had the tacit support of the army command to force the cabinet to resign and help reunite the army, he definitely went too far by demanding the resignation of Frangiyeh. Although initially seeking to halt the breakdown, Ahdab’s action had the opposite effect. His ill-conceived move hastened the disintegration of the army and confirmed Syria’s suspicion of Palestinian involvement in this show of force. Indeed, if Abu Jihad was the man behind Khatib, Abu Hassan Salameh, Arafat’s close associate, was behind Ahdab. According to Abu Iyad, Ahdab was supplied with a Fateh escort to the television building where he announced the ‘coup’. Ahdab's move came too late and with too little support, and he was derisively nicknamed "General Television" by militia leaders, who commanded far more men.

The Camps, Damour, The Great Bank Robbery, The Hotel District, and the Green Line

Karantina, a slum district named after the old immigration quarantine area, was the site of the another major episode in the war. Situated so that it controlled Christian access over the Beirut River bridge to the strategic port area, it became a military target. Karantina was populated primarily by poor Kurds and Armenians but was occupied and controlled by a large PLO detachment. On January 18, 1976, Christian forces took Karantina after battle in which the Palestinians held out for three days and fought to the last man in the Sleep Comfort furniture factory. Many Palestinian civilians were killed in the chaos of the assault and many in cold blood be the attackers who were enraged by the events the occurred four months earlier in the north of the country.

Two days later, January 20, 1976, Palestinians and their leftist allies attacked in force the Christian town of Damour which lay across the Sidon - Beirut highway about 20 km south of Beeirut. The relentless pounding the town received resulted in the deaths of many. In the siege that had been established on 9 January the Palestinians cut off food and water supplies and refused to allow the Red Cross to take out the wounded. Infants and children died of dehydration. A plan was devised to evacuate the civilians and fortunately the majority of the population of Damour was evacuated by sea but about 500 civilians defended by some 20 Phalangists did not make it out in time. Damour was captured, the Phalangists were executed, the civilians were lined up against the walls of their houses and shot, their houses were then dynamited. Many of the young women had been raped and babies had been shot at close range at the back of the head. 149 bodies lay in the streets for days afterwards and 200 other civilians were never seen again. In all about 582 civilians had been murdered. The horror did not end there, the old Christian cemetery was next, coffins were dug up, the dead robbed, vaults opened, and bodies and skeletons thrown across the grave yard. Damour was then transformed into a stronghold of Fatah and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The massacre and destruction of Damour is best described by Becker in the book "The PLO".

The massacre induced Muslims residing in Christian-dominated areas to flee to Muslim held areas, and vice versa. Whereas most Lebanese towns and neighbourhoods previously had been integrated, for the first time large-scale population transfers began to divide the country into segregated zones, the first step toward de facto partition.

At some point during March or April the Palestinians realized that they had gained effective control of Bank Street and so the stage was set for the biggest bank robbery in modern history. General looting of the banks was followed by disastrous attempts to dynamite the vaults causing serious injuries to the Palestinian thieves, so they decided to bring in professional safecrackers from Europe, possibly supplied by the mafia. Of the eleven banks robbed, the worst hit were those with safe-deposit vaults, the British Bank of the Middle East, Banca di Roma, and Bank Misr-Liban. The Guinness Book of Records claims the BBME alone lost a minimum of $20 million but probably $50 million, that is equivalent to $175 million today. Saiqa, the pro Syrian wing of the PLO were identified with the Banca di Roma thefts and marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was deemed responsible for the theft of the BBME. At one point a fire fight broke out between the two factions as Saiqa tried to steal the DFLP loot.

The fighting that had been raging on in the hotel district was reaching its climax. For months the Phalange had been perched defiantly in the twenty seven storey Holiday Inn hotel repelling attack after attack by Palestinian and leftist forces, giving the 'Battle of the Holiday Inn' legendary status. On 21st March 1976, a major assault by a special Palestinian commando units using armoured vehicles lent by the Khatib's Arab Army and supported by the leftist Muslim militias finally dislodged the Phalange. The leftist militias who had been handed the hotel by the Palestinians for propaganda purposes got so carried away celebrating that the Phalange was able to sneak back in at dawn the next day. The Palestinians therefore had to do the job all over again on the 22nd of March, and over the next few days the Phalange were pushed back to their defensive line at Martyrs Square.

As the weeks went by it was becoming apparent that the Lebanese Front were losing the war as the Palestinian-Muslim-leftist alliance forced them to retreat farther into East Beirut. The Lebanese Front had grossly underestimated the strength of the Palestinian forces in Lebanon and the support the Palestinians would receive from some Arab countries. The Christian militias of the Lebanese Front now began combining their military strength becoming known as the Lebanese Forces, the various component militias however maintained their own identity. The Christians felt it imperative to retain control of Beirut’s port district and constructed an elaborate barricade defence at Allenby Street. As the Christians tried to stave off the Muslim-Leftist-Palestinian assault on the port district, the Lebanese Army finally entered the fray. Christian officers and enlisted men from the Al Fayadiyyah barracks outside Beirut came to the aid of their beleaguered coreligionists, bringing armoured cars and heavy artillery. The left wing Muslim-Palestinian advance was stopped, and the front at Allenby Street evolved into a no man's land, dividing Christian East Beirut from Muslim West Beirut. Vegetation that eventually grew in this abandoned area inspired the name Green Line, and cut the city in two until the end of the war in 1990.

But in East Beirut, right in the Maronite heartland, was the Palestinian ‘camp’ of Tal al-Zaatar. For many months before the outbreak of hostilities, Maronite businessmen driving from their offices in the city to their homes in the mountains had been stopped on the road through the camp by armed Palestinian boys and forced to show their identity papers. And now, from their strongholds in Tal al-Zaatar, the PLO forces were shelling the factories and offices of the eastern Christian suburbs of the city. The Kataeb and their allies marked Tal al-Zaatar for destruction.

The Mountain Offensive

In March 1976, the leftist forces and the Palestinians launched an offensive across Mount Sannine to invade the Christian heartland. The PLO head strategist, Salah Khalaf, announced as Palestinian forces climbed the eastern flank of Mount Sannine to attack Christians in their historic mountain villages, that the road to Palestine lay through 'Uyun Al Siman, Aintoura, and even Jounieh itself'. These Christian areas are to the north of Beirut not towards Israel in the south, the Palestinians had declared war on the very nation that had given them refuge, Lebanon and the Lebanese Christians in particular.

The offensive, coinciding with the assault on the hotel distirct, began on 17 March and led to the capture of several villages in the Upper Metn region. These military operations, particularly the opening of a new front in the Mountain, were alarming developments not only for the Christian forces but also for Syria who started to fear that a Christian defeat and so a Palestinian controlled Lebanon would lead to an Israeli invasion.

According to George Hawi, military escalation in the Mountain was initially suggested by Palestinian leaders. In a meeting held in early March in the village of Souq al-Gharb and attended by Arafat, Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, in addition to Jumblatt, Hawi and Mohsin Ibrahim, Palestinian leaders advocated the opening of a new front in the Mountain. For them, the Mountain front had a dual purpose: to put military pressure on Christian forces especially in the central part of Mount Lebanon, to prevent an assault on the Tal al Zaatar camp, and to mobilise Arab and international support for PLO-Leftist forces.

As some of Ahmad Khatib’s forces surrounded and besieged the town of Zahlé in the Beqaa, other LAA troops along with the National Movement and the PLO advanced on the Maronites in Beirut, and came right to the Metn, the constituency of Pierre Gemayel’s elder son Amin, the Maronite heartland.

By March 25 the artillery of of the LAA led by Major Hussein Awwad, was scoring direct hits against Frangieh's residential quarters in the Presidential Palace and so the President was forced to leave the palace and seek residency for the rest of his term in Keserwan.

As fighting broadened, attempts were made, once again, to reach a political settlement. Views on the course of the war and its objectives between Arafat and Jumblatt began to diverge. While Jumblatt pressed for a 'military solution' Arafat was more cautious. Jumblatt went to Damascus hoping to get weapons from Syria, On his way to Damascus, Jumblatt made a statement to journalists that he hoped to receive them soon in Bekfaya and Jounieh. Ten days earlier Leftist forces had launched their first major offensive in the Mountain. At the meeting, Assad inquired about the statement and told Jumblatt that it would be better to deny it since the purpose of the meeting was to end the fighting. To this Jumblatt replied that fighting could be ended in a few days only if Syria would provide him with the weapons he needed to finish off the Christians.

Assad’s attempt to persuade Jumblatt to accept a political settlement failed. Jumblatt was determined to score a military victory and alter the political system. On no issue of substance were the two men in agreement. The divide between them could not be bridged. Assad, the head of state, had calculations to make and a strategy to follow. Jumblatt, seeking to rule a state, had a completely different agenda and, by extension, was not careful in weighing the outcome of his deed. Assad’s assessment of that stormy meeting was revealed in a highly publicised speech delivered on 20 July 1976. For Assad, Jumblatt’s socialist and progressive ‘masks’ had fallen; Jumblatt was not interested in political reforms but was rather settling a 140-year old sectarian vendetta. It had become obvious that Jumblatt was going to settle for nothing less than the total and unconditional defeat of the Christians.

As Jumblatt returned to Lebanon, an unsuccessful offensive by PLO-Leftist forces took place against the Christian village of Kahhaleh overlooking Beirut and the presidential palace in Baabda. The PLO advance against the palace had been halted but in other parts of the mountain the battles raged on.

Syrian Intervention

The government of Syria which had been backing the leftists and the Palestinians, although in theory a socialist regime, feared that a leftist victory and the installation of a radical government in Lebanon would undermine Syrian security and provide Israel an excuse to intervene in the area. Repeated diplomatic efforts between the Syrians and the leftist forces failed to quell the war, Syria's threat to ban all further arms shipments to the leftist militias and even the direct intervention of the pro Syrian Saiqa against the LAA in the Matn region did not stop the leftists advance and so on April 12, 1976 a small number of Syrian troops entered Lebanon and gained control over the strategic Dahr al-Baydar pass on the Beirut-Damascus highway. PLO forces in the Beqaa, controlled by Abu Jihad, mounted little resistance. This intervention against the Palestinians and their leftist allies was to prevent the Israelis, who had been massing troops on the border, from doing so themselves. The fighting in the mountain however did not stop and so in June 1976 Syria invaded Lebanon.

Although the Syrians had moved a small force into Lebanon in April 1976 mainly around the border crossing of Masnaa and at Dahr al-Baydar, this time on 1st June 1976 they entered Lebanon with two full divisions and advanced into the Beqaa valley relieving the pressure on the Lebanese towns and villages that had been besieged by the leftists forces. It had been reported that the Syrians had been asked to intervene by the Christian residents of Koubayat and Andakil as they were under LAA attack, other reports claim that Franjieh had requested the intervention, while other reports claimed it was under agreement with the United States and Israel. Reaction to the Syrian invasion was mixed. Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel did not object to the Syrian move and it was rumoured that the Lebanese Front militias were down to their last 72 hours of ammunition and were on the verge of total defeat. Kamal Jumblatt and Raymond Edde accused the Syrians of trying to annex Lebanon. Dany Chamoun and especially Bashir Gemayel opposed the Syrian intervention on the grounds that it would prevent settlement from being reached between the warring factions. Bashir Gemayel was so concerned that he actually met Kamal Jumblatt in Beirut during the advance on June 1st to discuss the issue.

The Lebanese Front decided to adopt a "wait and see" attitude to the Syrian advance into Lebanon as they felt that they had no other choice. Taking on the Syrians in a military confrontation would have been a disaster for the Lebanese Front and so they decided to let the Syrians enter without resistance. Etienne Sakr rejected this decision and so the Guardians of the Cedars blocked the Baabdat border crossing and delayed the entry of the Syrian forces for four days. To avoid armed conflict with the Lebanese Front who exerted enormous pressure on him to order his fighters to retreat, he moved his fighters to the mountains of Aqoura from where he conducted miltary operations against the Syrian forces.

In the following months, the Syrian presence grew to 27,000 troops. By November the Syrians had occupied most Muslim held areas of Lebanon, including West Beirut and Tripoli. Most leftist forces capitulated without firing a shot, overwhelmed by the Syrian show of force. In Sidon, however, Palestinian and leftist forces fought off the Syrians for nearly six months before relinquishing their stronghold.

On the surface, the LAA rebellion seemed spontaneous and reflected Muslim discontent within the army. In reality, however, the rebellion was orchestrated by Fateh and had well-defined objectives. For Fateh leaders, the Lebanese Army had always constituted a military threat to the PLO, not Lebanese militia forces. In early 1976, the situation seemed ripe for a large scale military action within the army. On that objective Palestinian leaders, notably Arafat, Abu Iyad, Abu Jihad, Abu Hassan Salameh, were in agreement. Fateh leaders Abu Jihad and Abu Hassan Salameh were in control of the LAA, and were assisted by military commanders. As the war intensified members of the LAA began to realize that they had been played and used by the PLO and so the LAA shrank from approximately 3,000-4,000 troops in March 1976 to a few hundred by the end of the year by the end of the year and the LAA was completely marginalised, as was the role of Ahmad al-Khatib (Syrian authorities detained Khatib on 18 January 1977).

Tal al-Zaatar

With the joint Muslim-Palestinian advance halted in Beirut and in the mountain, the Lebanese Front could focus more attention on Palestinian camps in the Christian areas. June 29, 1976 saw the camp at Jisr el Basha fall and then efforts were directed against Tal al-Zaatar, one of the largest Palestinian camps in the country and situated on the Christian side of the Green Line. The battle for Tal al-Zaatar was the final showdown between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Front in Beirut. Tal al-Zaatar contained about 2,000 Palestinian guerrillas intermixed with a civilian population of roughly 15,000 facing them were some 4,000 Lebanese Front militiamen. The Lebanese Front were supported and advised in the siege by the Lebanese and Syrian armies; Israeli advisers were also present.

Because Tal al-Zaatar was honeycombed with bunkers and tunnels, the PLO was able to defend the camp from persistent Christian attacks for about six months, despite a nearly constant barrage of artillery fire that took a large toll. Despite numerous calls for the Palestinians to surrender, Arafat felt that a large military defeat would result in a political victory and so he called upon those inside the camp to go on fighting regardless of being hopelessly surrounded. Arafat appealed to them to turn Tal al-Zaatar into 'a Stalingrad'. On August 12 Christian forces finally overran the camp. About 1,600 people died in fighting during the entire siege, and 4,000 were wounded. The surviving civilians were deported to Palestinian held areas and the PLO then settled them in Damour.

Despite the loss of Tal al-Zaatar, the PLO still had however a massive military machine in Lebanon.

The Riyadh Conference and the Arab Deterrent Force

In October 1976 a League of Arab States (Arab League) summit conference was convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to resolve the Lebanese crisis. The conference did not address the underlying political and demographic problems, only the security situation. The resulting multilateral agreement mandated a cease-fire and, at the Lebanese government's behest, authorized the creation of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to impose and supervise the cease-fire. In theory the ADF, funded by the Arab League, was to be a pan-Arab peacekeeping force under the supreme command of the Lebanese president. In reality, only about 5,000 Arab troops from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and Sudan augmented the existing Syrian forces. Moreover, Syria would not relinquish actual command over its soldiers. Therefore, the agreement in effect legitimized and subsidized the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. In the summer of 1977 Syria, the PLO, and the government of Lebanon signed the Shtawrah Accord, which detailed the planned disposition of the ADF in Lebanon and called for a reconstituted Lebanese Army to take over PLO positions in southern Lebanon.

The Red Line Arrangement

Meanwhile, Israel grew concerned over the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, particularly as the Syrian Army pursued retreating Palestinians and Muslim leftists into southern Lebanon. Israel believed that the Syrian forces, massed in southern Lebanon, might attack Israel across the unfortified Lebanese border and thus avoid the need to penetrate the heavily defended Golan Heights. Therefore, Israel enunciated its "Red Line" policy, threatening to attack Syria if it crossed a line identified geographically with the Litani River. Thus, Syrian forces were generally precluded from moving south of the Litani. The Red Line was a geographic line, but it was also more subjective than a line on a map. Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin identified the Red Line as a guideline for gauging Syria's overall military behavior in Lebanon, and he described several criteria Israel would use: the objectives of Syrian forces and against whom they were operating, the geographical area and its proximity to Israel's borders, the strength and composition of Syrian forces, and the duration of their stay in a given area.

Operation Litani

By time the Lebanese war had erupted the PLO had already created a quasi-governmental autonomy in Lebanon, a state-within-a-state which became known as Fatahland where the PLO ruled supreme and took the law into their own hands. In Fatahland, on the foothills of Mount Hermon, up to 15,000 guerrillas were trained to carry out attacks on Israel. Because it was skeptical about the willingness and capability of the Lebanese Army to implement the Shtawrah Accord by displacing the PLO in southern Lebanon and securing the border area, in 1977 Israel started to equip and fund a renegade Christian remnant of the Lebanese Army led by Major Saad Haddad. Haddad's force, which became known as The Free Lebanon Army, and later as the South Lebanon Army (SLA), grew to a strength of about 3,000 men and was allied closely with Israel. Haddad eventually proclaimed the enclave he controlled "Free Lebanon." The insulation provided by this buffer area permitted Israel to open up its border with Lebanon. Under this so-called "Good Fence" policy, Israel provided aid and conducted trade with Lebanese living near the border.

On March 11, 1978, PLO terrorists made a sea landing in Haifa, Israel, commandeered a bus, and then drove toward Tel Aviv, firing from the windows. By the end of the day, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had killed the nine terrorists, who had murdered thirty-seven Israeli civilians. In retaliation, four days later Israel launched Operation Litani, invading Lebanon with a force of 25,000 men. The purpose of the operation was to push PLO positions away from the border and bolster the power of the SLA. The IDF first seized a security belt about ten kilometers deep, but then pushed north and captured all of Lebanon south of the Litani River, inflicting thousands of casualties.

The operation had failed to break the power of the PLO in the south and soon the PLO was able to rearm and fortify its bases in southern Lebanon to the point where Fatahland could boast the equivalent of five infantry brigades.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the United Nations (UN) Security Council with Resolution 425 on March 19, 1978, "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." Subsequent Resolution 426 defined UNIFIL's rules of engagement and instructed it to "use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting" and to ensure that its area of operation would not be used for hostile activities of any kind. UNIFIL consisted of approximately 7,000 men from 14 UN member states and between 30 and 90 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, headquartered in the town of An Naqourah.

UNIFIL, however, encountered difficulty in performing its mission. Resolution 425 made "full cooperation of all parties concerned" a prerequisite for UNIFIL's deployment. Although Israel had agreed formally to take the necessary steps for compliance with the resolution, it did not believe that UNIFIL could stop PLO incursions across the border. Therefore, when Israel started to withdraw in late March, it refused to relinquish all of the territory it had conquered in southern Lebanon to UNIFIL. Instead, Israel turned over an enclave to its proxy force, the SLA, increasing the area under Major Haddad's control. This area included not only the ten-kilometer-deep security belt adjacent to the Israeli border but also a vertical north-south corridor running from the border to the Litani River and splitting the UNIFIL area into two noncontiguous zones.

Other parties frustrated the UNIFIL peacekeeping efforts. Although the PLO also had promised to cooperate, it argued that the 1969 Cairo Agreement entitled it to operate in southern Lebanon, and it attempted to reoccupy areas after Israel withdrew. Furthermore, on the grounds that the IDF had not occupied Tyre, the PLO refused to allow UNIFIL to police the city, and Palestinian patrols attempted repeatedly to pass through UNIFIL lines. For its part, the SLA did not even make a pretense of cooperating with UNIFIL. Instead, it attacked UNIFIL personnel and encroached on UNIFIL's perimeter. Nevertheless, UNIFIL restored order to the areas under its control and served as an effective buffer force insulating Israel from the Palestinians. It set up roadblocks, checkpoints, and observation posts, interdicting approximately ten guerrilla patrols per month heading toward Israel. When UNIFIL apprehended Palestinian guerrillas, it confiscated their weapons but usually returned them later to PLO leaders. UNIFIL paid a price for performing its mission, however; between 1978 and 1982, thirty-six UNIFIL members were killed in action.

In late 1987 the future of UNIFIL was in doubt. Ironically, Israel, which had long considered it a hindrance to its operations, changed its policy and in 1986 praised the positive role UNIFIL played in stabilizing the region. For its part, the government of Lebanon requested that UNIFIL be expanded to police almost the entire country. But at the same time, the Shias in southern Lebanon, who had traditionally supported UNIFIL, turned against the organization. In September 1986, Shia extremists started attacking UNIFIL's French contingent, and in five weeks of combat they killed four and wounded thirty. UNIFIL's casualty toll mounted and by mid-1987 stood at 139 killed and over 200 wounded. In 1986 the United States Congress cut the annual United States appropriation to UNIFIL from US$40 million to US$18 million, while France announced that it would withdraw its troops from UNIFIL in 1987.

UNIFIL however did survive and although it has been prevented from fulfilling its mandate, its contribution to stability in the region and the limited protection it has been able to provide to the local population remained important. The Force has recently been streamlined in order to achieve savings without affecting its operational effectiveness. The mandate has so far been renewed every six months.

The Israeli Connection

Israel had cultivated a relationship with Lebanon's Christian community almost from the advent of the Zionist movement. Some Zionist politicians had envisaged a Jewish-Maronite alliance to counterbalance Muslim regional dominance. After Israel's independence in 1948, some Israeli leaders advocated extending the northern border to encompass Lebanon up to the Litani River and to assimilate the Christian population living there. In 1955 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and General Moshe Dayan conceived a plan to intervene in Lebanon and install a Lebanese Christian president amenable to improving bilateral relations.

The patriarchs of Lebanon's Christian community, particularly Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun, were tempted by Israeli offers of assistance, but they nevertheless resisted entrusting the security of the Maronites to Israel and abjured close contact with Israel. But in 1976, threatened by the escalating War, a new generation of Lebanese Christian leaders turned to Israel for military support against the ascendant PLO and the Muslim left. After a series of clandestine meetings between Mossad, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency, and militia leaders Bashir Gemayel and Dany Chamoun, Israel began supplying US $50 million per year to arm and equip the Christian fighters.

Syrian Occupation and Clashes with the Lebanese Army

Covert Christian-Israeli co-operation tapered off after Syria intervened in June 1976 and quelled the sectarian fighting. When the Syrians began to act like an occupying army, however, the Maronites' fear of Palestinian dominance was replaced by fear of Syrian dominance. It was becoming clear by 1978 that the Syrians had come into Lebanon to stay as for years they had dreamt of annexing Lebanon. Instead of just separating the various sides the Syrians began to slowly occupy vast areas of Lebanon and stationed troops in areas that were of no strategic importance and that had seen no fighting. As contributing Arab states withdrew their contingents from the ADF Syrian dominance of the force increased dramatically, by mid 1978 all Arab troops except the Syrians had withdrawn. Syrian troops that had entered Christian areas in 1976 had not left and had become a great concern, furthermore the Syrians had started to rearm and train the leftist factions. The Lebanese Forces now looked upon the Syrians as an army of occupation and needed to act, they began to confront the Syrians. Gemayel, recognizing that only Israel was powerful enough to expel the Syrians, renewed contact with Israel; his initiative coincided with the victory of the Likud Party in Israel's 1977 elections. The new prime minister, Menachim Begin, was more inclined to support the Christians than his predecessor, both for ideological and for tactical reasons. Begin empathized with the Christians as a kindred, embattled religious minority and promised to prevent their "genocide." At the same time, he perceived the Maronites as a fifth column in Lebanon to check the power of the Palestinians. Arms shipments were stepped up, hundreds of Phalangist and Tiger militiamen were trained in Israel, and Israeli intelligence and security advisers were dispatched to East Beirut.

The beginning of 1978 was marked by a series of bloody incidents between the Syrians and the Lebanese Forces and at one point Bashir Gemayel was arrested at a Syrian Army check point in Ashrafieh. February 7, 1978 saw a clash take place between the Lebanese Army and the Syrian Army in Fiyadieh, the site of the Lebanese Army barracks and the military command of Mount Lebanon. Near the Lebanese Army barracks the Syrians set up a check point to which the Lebanese Army objected and when the Syrians tried to seize Lebanese Army military vehicles stationed at Fayadieh fighting breaking out between them. 20 people were killed and a detachment of another 20 Syrians were captured and taken prisoner by the Lebanese Army, the next morning the bodies of two murdered Christian civilians had been found close by. The Syrians then surrounded and heavily bombarded the barracks, fighting spread to nearby districts and the Ahrar Tigers where drawn into the action against the Syrians, that afternoon the shelled Ashrafieh and attack the Ahrar HQ, but were repelled with the loss of five men. Fighting carried on into February 9th, Camille Chamoun accused the Syrians of having become an army of occupation and although Pierre and Bashir Gemayel did not order the Phalangists to engage the Syrians, many became involved voluntarily. By nightfall on February 9th fighting died down and the death toll was put at 100 Syrians and 50 Lebanese. On the 13th, hundreds of Lebanese in the south held a protest accusing the Syrians of inciting Palestinians to shell their villages and on the 16th the 20 Syrians taken prisoner were released.

Hostilities broke out again on 9th April 1978 between the Lebanese Front and the Palestinians. This latest round began after the Syrians failed to restrain the Palestinians who were firing on the Lebanese Christians. As fighting intensified the Syrians went finally into action, but against the Christians in east Beirut. On 12th and 13th they launched an extensive artillery attack on east Beirut. On the 14th a ceasefire was declared but for the Lebanese Front it was the last straw. The Lebanese Front asked and then finally ordered the Syrians to leave Beirut and the surrounding regions but to no avail. Bashir Gemayel decided to take on the Syrians, possibly emboldened by what he thought was Israel's willingness to intervene militarily in Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel launched a series of direct attacks against the Syrian army occupying Lebanon.

Marada and the Assassination of Tony Franjieh

Tension was building between members of the Lebanese Front in May 1978 due to what many felt was Sulayman Franjieh's pro Syrian stance, and his intention to break away from the Front. At the start of the war Franjieh had been obliged to call on the Phalange for help in the north of Lebanon where before the war the Phalange had not been a major force especially in Zgharta, Franjieh's home town. By 1978 the Phalange had become well established in the region and where picking up recruits and threatening Marada's protection rackets particularly around Chekka. Marada was Franjieh's militia commanded by his son Tony.

By the spring of 1978 Franjieh had asked the Phalange to pull out of the north so as to leave Tony in charge of the area. By now the Phalange were losing men daily as they were picked off by Marada, and Phalange members were denied basic goods and services in the north after being black listed by Marada. Attempts to reconcile the two factions at Bkerke were not successful and in May Franjieh had stopped attending Lebanese Front meetings and began courting the Syrians. Matters came to a head on June 8 1978 when a local Phalange leader, Joud el Bayeh, was murdered by six armed men sent by Tony Franjieh. Bashir Gemayel decided to strike back.

On June 13, 1978, Gemayel launched a surprise attack that decimated the Marada Brigade, Tony Franjieh was killed in the attack. The operation was lead by Samir Geagea and it was claimed by him and by Gemayel that its purpose was to arrest the killers of Bayeh and to take and hold the town of Ehden, the Franjieh summer residence, until Marada withdrew from Chekka. The Phalangist force assembled at Qnat and were in position at Ehden at 4:00 am, the main assault force struck the Franjieh residence first which was also a communication centre and weapons storage facility. During the fighting Geagea was seriously wounded in the shoulder and lost consciousness. In the assault, Tony, his wife, baby daughter, maid, dog, and some 35 of his men were killed. Withdrawal proved difficult with Syrian check points everywhere, Syrian planes also strafed the raiders. With the Marada on the streets in large numbers, many of the Phalangists had to wait until nightfall and make their way back to their lines on foot. Seven of the raiding commandos were killed.

The exact circumstances of Tony's death remain vague with accounts of Tony and his family being already dead when the Geagea strike force arrived, while other accounts claim that there were two raiding parties with Elie Hobeika leading one of them.

The '100 Days War'

On 28th June 1978 Syrian gunmen kidnapped and then killed thirty Lebanese Christians from four villages in the Bekaa Valley, the Lebanese Front claimed that this act was part of a Syrian goal to weaken the Christian community by forcing the Christians out the Bekaa. Fighting broke out and Syria rushed forces to Beirut and on July 1st 1978 unleashed a devastating artillery attack across Christian East Beirut, particularly the Phalangist stronghold of Ashrafieh, in preparation for taking over the area, and for a hundred days the Syrians pounded Ashrafieh. On 4th July Camille Chamoun called again for the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Beirut insisting that only the Lebanese Army should be responsible for security in the capital. Syria stated its conditions for a ceasefire which included further deployment of Syrian troops in the region, restrictions on the Lebanese Front, and that Lebanon cease all criticism of the Syrian media and of Syrian government policies.

On July 6th, President Sarkis announced his resignation saying that the Syrians had been carrying out operations behind his back entirely without his approval and that the Syrian conditions for a ceasefire were without logic and not acceptable. The Israelis accused the Syrians of trying to annihilate the Christian population of Lebanon and said they would not allow this to happen. Under pressure from the Americans, Sarkis withdrew his resignation on 15th July but on the 27th all US embassy personnel and their dependants were evacuated from Lebanon causing much alarm in east Beirut.

Syrian shelling was merciless and it was reported that just about every building in east Beirut was hit, causalities were in the thousands. The Lebanese Forces fought back and even though the Syrians managed to break through into Ashrafieh, a Lebanese Forces counter attack ejected them with the Syrians taking heavy losses. Large street battles also took place around the Murr tower where the Syrians had been dug in. In pitting his meagre force of a few thousand fighters against three divisions of the Syrian Army, Gemayel was taking a calculated gamble that Israel would come to his rescue and evict the Syrians. Gemayel's brinkmanship was vindicated. The IDF massed forces on the Golan Heights and threatened to go to war to preserve the Maronite community. To emphasize the point, Israeli jets overflew Syrian positions. The threat worked, and Syria withdrew its troops.

The Extinction of the Tigers

On Monday, July 7, 1980, the Phalangists launched a surprise attack against Chamoun's Militia, the Tigers. The attack was aimed against their barracks, ports, and offices in a villa next door to Safra Marine in Keserwan with the aim of assimiliting the Tigers into the LF under one command. Bashir had originally planned the attack for 4:00 am but because of the events at Ehden the attack was put back to 10:00 am so as to spare Dany Chamoun who by then would have left his office for an appointment in the mountains.

Contrary to most accounts found in the popular books regarding Lebanon there was no battle or massacre at Safra Marine. Dany had moved out of East Beirut and taken over a villa that used to border Safra Marine immediately to its south. Dany kept a boat at Safra Marine and would walk through the grounds of the villa and across Safra Marine to get to his boat. As a result it was thought by some that he resided at Safra. Some weeks before the operation a couple of LF agents had successfully applied for jobs at Safra so as to assess the situation.

On the day of the attack LF fighters hidden in a civilian truck were let into Safra Marine by their agents and deployed around Dany's villa. Tracy Chamoun who was inside the villa saw the deployment and opened fire. After a very brief gun-fight it was explained that no harm was going to come to the residents of the villa and that they were free to leave. Some one hour later, after some negotiation, the villa was vacated. The only injury at Safra was a wounded Sri Lankan worker hit by a stray bullet.

Heavy fighting did however break out around Tabarja Beach and at Rabiyeh Marine which were both popular resorts with the Tigers and it was here where there were civilian casualities. At Rabiyeh Marine where some Tiger militiamen had fallen back, a few captured Tigers were thrown to their deaths from the upper floor balconies of the complex.

The Tiger barracks at Amchit were captured after holding out for most of the day. The 'Day of Long Knives' as it became to be called claimed around 200 lives around half of which were civilians who had been caught during indiscriminate shooting. After the operation Bashir Gemayel emerged as the dominant Maronite military leader and by the end of October 1978 the main bulk of the Tiger militia was totally absorbed into the Lebanese Forces and lost their separate command and identity. Bashir Gemayel then announced that all of the individual militias of the various parties of the Lebanese Front would disband and their troops combine as one fighting force under his command in the Lebanese Forces.

Gemayel persevered in his plot to embroil Israel in a full scale war with Syria. In late 1980, after a series of meetings with Begin, he reportedly obtained a secret Israeli pledge to provide a defensive umbrella against a potential Syrian air attack. This pledge virtually committed Israel to fight Syria at Gemayel's behest, although Israel admonished the Lebanese Forces not to attack the Syrians.

The Battle of Zahlé

Zahlé, the capital of Beqaa Province in eastern Lebanon, had a population of some 150,000 which was primarily Greek Catholic, and it was in the heart of the Syrian occupied zone of Lebanon and lay on the vital Beirut-Damascus highway. Throughout the war Zahlé suffered many sieges and attacks by leftist and Palestinian forces but its people always managed to hold out, fighting alongside the small contingent of Lebanese Front militia that were based there.

The location of Zahlé made it of such importance that the Syrians felt they had to control the city and needed a reason to station their troops there. In December 1980, the Palestinian forces around Zahlé were incited by the Syrians to shell the city and on the 19th heavy fighting broke out between the Syrians and the Lebanese Forces after the Syrians sent a patrol down the Zahlé Boulevard, the patrol was attacked and five Syrian soldiers and one Syrian Major were killed. During the fighting two Syrian helicopters were also hit as they tried to bring in reinforcements. A ceasefire was quickly imposed and fighting soon died down but blood had been drawn and the Lebanese Forces moved into Zahlé in some strength.

Not wanting Zahlé to be cut off from Mount Lebanon and to reduce its vulnerability to siege, the Lebanese Forces began constructing a road linking Baskinta to Zahlé so as to avoid passing through Syrian held territory. The Syrians responded by surrounding Zahlé with 2600 troops and on April 2nd they began bombarding the city. On the first day of battle the Syrians tried to seize the high ground above the city but were repelled with the loss of three armoured vehicles and the death of over twenty soldiers and so the next day the Syrians retaliated with an artillery barrage on east Beirut which inflicted heavy civilian casualties. With the Syrians unable to breach the defences of Zahlé it was decided that they would force it to submission through siege.

At the start of 1981 Syria had launched its "Program of National Reconciliation," which was designed to install Sulayman Franjieh as president. Bashir Gemayel found the proposition unpalatable, but he was impotent to oppose it politically. Therefore, it has been suggested, that he staged an incident in Zahlé deliberately calculated to flare into a major crisis and that Gemayel infiltrated approximately 100 Lebanese Forces militiamen into the city to attack Syrian positions and to shell the Syrian headquarters in the adjacent town of Chtoura. At the start of the battle however the Syrian commander announced that his troops had moved to evict the Lebanese Forces from Zahlé as it was vital for Syrian security to prevent the construction of the road between Mount Lebanon and Zahlé.

As the fighting intensified Gemayel called an urgent meeting with Begin and convinced him that the Syrians intended to follow through on the siege with an all-out attack on the Christian heartland and urged Israel to launch an air strike against the Syrians. On April 28, the Israeli cabinet convened and authorized a limited air strike, but it did so over the strident objections of Israel's intelligence chiefs, who suspected that the crisis was a Lebanese Forces ploy. Israeli fighters carried out the raid and downed two Syrian helicopter troop transports on Mount Sannine, a strategic mountain overlooking Zahlé. The siege of Zahlé and heavy fighting continued throughout May and reached its formal end on 30th June when it was agreed that both sides would withdraw and the Syrians would leave check points around Zahlé to prevent the Lebanese Forces form returning. During the siege many hundreds of civilians died many because of a lack of medical supplies and also as a result of the water being purposely cut off causing epidemics to break out.

The Missile Crisis

The Israeli attack caught Assad by surprise. Syria had adhered to the so-called "Red Line" agreements by deliberately refraining from deploying antiaircraft missiles in the Beqaa Valley and by not impeding Israeli photoreconnaissance overflights. Assad responded to the Israeli attack by stationing SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the vicinity of Zahlé. Other SAMs and surface-to-surface missiles were deployed on the Syrian side of the border.

Begin vowed publicly that the IDF would launch an attack on the missiles. In response, President Ronald Reagan dispatched to the Middle East Special Ambassador Philip Habib, who averted the imminent Israeli strike. Meanwhile, the LF abandoned Zahlé, and Syria reasserted its control over the Beqaa Valley. The net effect of the crisis was that Syrian air defense missiles were deployed in Lebanon. Israel was forced to tolerate this situation in the short run, but it still regarded the missile deployment as an unacceptable shift in the balance of forces that could not be endured indefinitely. Therefore, Israel had reasons of its own for a future attack on the Syrians in Lebanon.

The Two-Week War

As the tension in the Beqaa Valley subsided, IDF chief of staff Rafael Eitan urged Begin to mount an artillery bombardment of Palestinian bases in Lebanon. Israel routinely conducted preemptive artillery attacks and air strikes to deter PLO terrorist attacks against Galilee settlements in northern Israel. Then, on July 10, 1981, the IDF commenced five days of air strikes and naval bombardments against PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon.

The PLO fought back by shelling the Israeli resort town of Nahariyya on the Mediterranean coast. The conflict escalated as Israel launched a devastating air raid against the heavily populated Palestinian neighborhood of Fakhani in West Beirut, killing over 100 people and wounding over 600. By Israeli estimates, only thirty of those killed were terrorists. For ten days, the PLO then unleashed artillery fire against the upper Galilee. Although only six Israeli citizens were killed, many Israelis were shocked and stunned by the PLO's capability to sustain such an attack.

On July 24, Ambassador Habib returned to Israel to negotiate an end to the artillery duel. Because the PLO was almost out of ammunition and most of its guns had been silenced, the IDF wanted to prolong the fighting until it could win a clear-cut victory. But the Israeli cabinet was eager to comply with Habib's cease-fire proposal, and Israel entered into a truce with the PLO.

PLO leader Yasser Arafat was determined not to break the ceasefire. On a political level, the truce enhanced the PLO's diplomatic credibility. Tactically, it allowed the PLO time to reinforce its military strength in southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union refused to provide the PLO with weapons, but PLO emissaries purchased arms from East European countries and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), acquiring Grad and Katyusha artillery rockets and antiquated but functional T-34 tanks. More significant, Arafat reorganized the command and control structure of his forces, transforming the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) from a decentralized collection of terrorist and guerrilla bands to a disciplined standing army. By 1981 the Kastel, Karami, and Yarmuk brigades were established, and seven new artillery battalions were organized.

But on June 3, 1982, terrorists of the Abu Nidal Organization, a group that had split off from the PLO, attempted to assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambAssador to Britain. Israel seized on the attack as the pretext for launching its long-planned offensive. On June 4, IDF aircraft bombed Palestinian targets in West Beirut, and the PLO resumed artillery fire on Israeli settlements in the northern Galilee.

The Israeli cabinet convened and voted to authorize an invasion, named Operation Peace for Galilee, but it set strict limits on the extent of the incursion. The IDF was to advance no farther than forty kilometers, the operation was to last only twenty-four hours, Syrian forces were not to be attacked, and Beirut was not to be approached.

The 1982 Israeli Invasion (Operation Peace for Galilee)

Because of the limits imposed by the Isaraeli cabinet, the IDF implemented its attack in increments, neither openly recognizing nor acknowledging its destination and objectives. Had it been ordered from the outset to secure Beirut, it could have done so in an effective and efficient manner. Instead, the IDF advance unfolded in an ad hoc and disorganized fashion, greatly increasing the difficulty of the operation.

When IDF ground forces crossed into Lebanon on June 6, they pursued a battle strategy that entailed a three-pronged attack conducted by five divisions and two reinforced brigade-size units. On the western axis, two divisions converged on Tyre and proceeded north along the coastal road toward Sidon, where they were to link up with an amphibious commando unit that had secured a beachhead north of the city. In the central sector, a third division veered diagonally across southern Lebanon, conquered the Palestinian-held Beaufort Castle, located a few kilometers southwest of Marj Uyun, and headed west toward Sidon, where it linked up with the coastal force in a classic pincer movement. The IDF advanced rapidly in the first day of the war, bypassing and enveloping pockets of PLO resistance. Most PLO military officers fled, abandoning their men, who split into small roving guerrilla bands. Moreover, it became clear that the PLO was fighting alone against the Israeli onslaught. The Shia Amal guerrillas had been ordered by their leaders not to fight and to surrender their weapons if necessary. South Lebanon's Shias had long suffered under Palestinian domination, and Shia villagers welcomed the advancing Israelis by showering them with rice and flowers. This traditional form of homage, later repeated by the Druze and Christian populations, lent credence to the Israeli claim that it was "liberating" Lebanon.

But Palestinian resistance proved tenacious, particularly in the sprawling refugee camps in the vicinity of Tyre and Sidon. Staging hit-and-run operations and fighting in house-to- house and hand-to-hand combat, the Palestinians inflicted a high number of casualties of the IDF and impeded the progress of the Israeli advance. The IDF was further hampered because the refugee camps were inhabited by large numbers of civilian noncombatants who harbored the Palestinian fighters. Although the IDF made significant initial efforts to evacuate the civilians, it ultimately resorted to saturation bombing to subdue the camps. Palestinian resistance was especially fierce in the Ain al Helwi camp near Sidon, where several hundred Palestinian fighters fought to the last man, delaying the IDF advance for seven days. After the camp was leveled, the IDF stood poised to move against Beirut.

Two days later in the central combat zone, two divisions thrust directly north on parallel courses into Syrian-held territory with the mission of severing the strategic Beirut-Damascus highway. On June 8, the IDF evicted the Syrian Army from Jezzine and proceeded north.

The IDF could not proceed further against the entrenched Syrian positions without close air support, but Syria's air defense systems threatened Israeli control of the skies. On June 9, the Israeli cabinet gave permission for an air raid against the Syrian antiaircraft missile batteries in the Beqaa Valley. The Syrians, caught by surprise, sustained severe losses; of the nineteen missile batteries, only two were left intact by the Israeli attack. The Syrian Air Force made a desperate bid to protect the air defense system by sending up scores of interceptors and fighters, resulting in what both sides described as the biggest air battle in history, with over 200 aircrafts engaged in supersonic dogfights over a 2,500 square kilometer area. The Israeli Air Force shot down twenty-nine Syrian aircrafts in the first encounter of that day, and later about fifty more. In fact, during the entire operation, the Syrians would lose a total of 90 aircrafts in air to air combat without a single Israeli loss. The devastation of the Syrian air defense system and the decimation of the Syrian Air Force provided the IDF with total air superiority in Lebanon and left the Syrian infantry exposed to air attack.

All did not go so smoothly however for the Israelis. On the 10th of June an Israeli battle group of M60 tanks was leading the push to the highway when they ran into serious trouble between Ain Zhalta and Ain Dara. The Syrians had been shelling the road so the Israelis advanced at night. The going was slow and just outside of Ain Dara they were ambushed by a brigade of Syrian commandos, artillery, and armour approximately five kilometres short of the highway. The Syrian commandos came in so close that at one point they were actually climbing onto the Israeli tanks to ensure their kills. The commander of the supporting artillery battery had to fire anti personnel rounds on top of his own takes so as to dislodge the attacking Syrians. Gradually a corridor was opened to enable the Israelis to pull back around dawn. With day break on the 11th June the Israeli Air Force was able to go into action and destroyed the Syrian tank and gun positions with the aid of another tank column. Syrian reinforcements were caught en route by Israeli ground attack aircraft. At the same time, the IDF continued to maul 1st Armoured Division of the Syrian army in a battle that started on 9th June north of Lake Qaraoun and raged on for three days. By the afternoon of the 11th about half of the Syrian 1st Armoured Division had been destroyed and the rest were on the retreat.

The IDF had broken the last line of Syria's defence but owing to political pressures, however, on June 11 Israel and Syria agreed to a truce under United States auspices and the Israeli advance stopped just a couple of kilometres short of the Beirut-Damascus highway.

The Siege of Beirut

The cease-fire signaled the start of a new stage in the war, as Israel focused on PLO forces trapped in Beirut. Although Israel had long adhered to the axiom that conquering and occupying an Arab capital would be a political and military disaster, key Israeli leaders were determined to drive the PLO out of Beirut. According to the original plan, the LF were to move into West Beirut under the covering fire of Israeli artillery and reunite the divided capital. Bashir Gemayel concluded, however, that such overt collusion with the IDF would prejudice his chances to become president, and he reneged on the promises he had made.

Israel maintained the siege of Beirut for seventy days, unleashing a relentless barrage of air, naval, and artillery bombardment. At times, the Israeli bombardment appeared to be random and indiscriminate; at other times, it was targeted with pinpoint precision. Israeli strategists believed that if they could "decapitate" the Palestinian movement by killing its leaders, Palestinian resistance would disappear. Therefore, the Israeli Air Force conducted what has been called a "manhunt by air" for Arafat and his top lieutenants and on several occasions bombed premises only minutes after the PLO leadership had vacated them.

If the PLO was hurt physically by the bombardment, the political fallout was just as damaging to Israel. The appalling civilian casualties earned Israel world opprobrium. Morale plummeted among IDF officers and enlisted men, many of whom personally opposed the war. Meanwhile, the highly publicized plight of the Palestinian civilians garnered world attention for the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, Arafat was negotiating, albeit through intermediaries, with Ambassador Habib and other United States officials. Negotiating with Arafat was thought by some to be tantamount to United States recognition of the PLO.

The Expulsion of the Palestinians

Arafat had threatened to turn Beirut into a "second Stalingrad," to fight the IDF to the last man. His negotiating stance grew tenuous, however, after Lebanese leaders, who had previously expressed solidarity with the PLO, petitioned him to abandon Beirut to spare the civilian population further suffering. Arafat informed Habib of his agreement in principle to withdraw the PLO from Beirut on condition that a multinational peacekeeping force be deployed to protect the Palestinian families left behind. With the diplomatic deadlock broken, Habib made a second breakthrough when Syria and Tunisia agreed to host departing PLO fighters. An advance unit of the Multinational Force (MNF), 350 French troops, arrived in Beirut on August 21. The Palestinian evacuation by sea to Cyprus and by land to Damascus commenced on the same day. On August 26, the remaining MNF troops arrived in Beirut, including a contingent of 800 United States Marines. The Palestinian exodus ended on September 1. Over 11,000 Palestinian fighters including some 8,000 Fateh guerrillas, 2,600 PLA regulars, as well as 3,600 Syrian troops had been evacuated from west Beirut. However there were still some 10,000 Palestinian fighters in Lebanon mainly in the northern section of Beqaa valley north and around Tripoli.

Taking stock of the war's toll, Israel announced that 344 of its soldiers had been killed and over 2,000 wounded. Israel calculated that hundreds of Syrian soldiers had been killed and over 1,000 wounded and that 1,000 Palestinian guerrillas had been killed and 7,000 captured. Lebanese estimates, compiled from International Red Cross sources and police and hospital surveys, calculated that 17,825 Lebanese had died and over 30,000 had been wounded.

On August 23, the legislature elected Bashir Gemayel president of Lebanon. On September 10, the United States Marines withdrew from Beirut, followed by the other members of the MNF. The Lebanese Army began to move into West Beirut, and the Israelis withdrew their troops from the front lines. But the war was far from over. By ushering in Gemayel as president and evicting the PLO from Beirut, Israel had attained two of its key war goals. Israel's remaining ambition was to sign a comprehensive peace treaty with Lebanon that would entail the withdrawal of Syrian forces and prevent the PLO from reinfiltrating Lebanon after the IDF withdrew.

The Assassination of Bashir Gemayel

At 4:10 pm on September 14, 1982, President-elect Gemayel was assassinated in a massive radio-detonated explosion that leveled the Phalange Party headquarters in East Beirut where he was delivering a speech to party members. The perpetrator, Habib Shartouny, 26, was soon apprehended. Shartouny, a member of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), was a Syrian agent. Mossad, the CIA, and Israeli military intelligence, pooling their resources with the Lebanese intelligence community established that Chartouny had installed a long range electronic detonator to a bomb made of Semtex-H which had been smuggled into the building where Chartouny's sister lived. Her apartment was directly above the Phalange offices. Chartouny's case officer was a captain in the Syrian intelligence service called Nassif, who reported directly to Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Ganen who was in charge of Syrian intelligence operations in Lebanon. Both the Syrian Army and Air Force intelligence had knowledge of the bombing as did Hafez al-Assad's brother Rifaat al-Assad, head of Syria's security forces. President Assad would have probably given the order himself but there was no proof.

Bashir Gemayel's brother, Amin, who was opposed to the Israeli presence in Lebanon, was elected president with United States backing.

Sabra and Shatila

On Wednesday 15 September 1982 shortly after 6:00 a.m. the I.D.F. began to enter west Beirut. During the first hours of the I.D.F. entry, there was no armed resistance to the advance because the guerrillas that were in West Beirut had been taken by surprise. Within a few hours, the I.D.F. encountered fire from guerrillas in a number of places in west Beirut, and combat operations began. The resistance caused delays in the I.D.F.'s taking over a number of points in the city and caused a change in the route of advance. In the course of this fighting three I.D.F. soldiers were killed and more than 100 were wounded. Heavy fire coming out of Shatilla was directed at one I.D.F. battalion advancing east of the camp. One of the battalion's soldiers was killed, 20 were injured, and the advance of the battalion in this direction was halted. Throughout Wednesday and to a lesser degree on Thursday and Friday (16-17.9.82), R.P.G. and light-weapons fire from the Sabra and Shatilla camps was directed at the Israeli forward command post and the battalion's forces nearby. Fire was returned by the I.D.F. forces.

It was not possible to obtain exact details on the size of the population in the refugee camps in Beirut. An estimate of the numbers in the four camps in west Beirut (Burj el-Barajneh, Fakahni, Sabra and Shatilla) was about 85,000 people. The war led to the flight of the population, but when the fighting subsided, a movement back to the camps began. According to estimates, in mid-September 1982 there were about 56,000 people in the Sabra and Shatila camps in total.

Over the previous few months, as the number of I.D.F. casualties mounted, public pressure for the Lebanese Forces to participate more in fighting increased. It was agreed at that a company of 150 fighters from the Lebanese Forces would enter the camps and that they would do so from south to north and from west to east to rout the remnant of the Palestinian forces and search for arms dumps. The IDF ordered its soldiers to refrain from entering the camps, but IDF officers supervised the operation from the roof of a six story forward command post building overlooking parts of the area.

On Thursday, 16.9.82, at approximately 6:00 pm, the Lebanese Forces entered the Shatilla camp in two groups from the west and south. The militiamen were mostly LF under the command of Elie Hobeika, a former close aide of Bashir Gemayel, but militiamen from the Israeli supported SLA were rumoured to have been present. With the entry of the Lebanese Forces into the camps, the firing which had been coming from the camps changed direction; the shooting which had previously been directed against the I.D.F. now shifted in the direction of the Lebanese Forces' liaison officer on the roof of the forward command post.

According to the report of the Kahan Commission established by the government of Israel to investigate the events, the IDF monitored the Lebanese Forces radio network and fired illumination flares from mortars and aircraft to light the area as the LF were operating in the dark.

At approximately 8:00 p.m., the Lebanese Forces' liaison officer, said that the Lebanese Forces who had entered the camps had sustained casualties, and the casualties were evacuated from the camps. Around this time the liaison officer also told various people that about 300 persons had been killed by the Lebanese Forces among them civilians, but shortly after, he amended his report by reducing the number of casualties from 300 to 120.

On Saturday, 18.9.82 at dawn the LF forces started to leave the camps and the last of their forces left the camps at approximately 8:00 a.m. By now reports had been circulated about a massacre in the camps and many journalists and media personnel arrived in the area. At about 17:00 hours, the Israelis met with a representative of the Lebanese army and appealed to him to have the Lebanese army enter the camps. Between 21:30 and 22:00 hours a reply was received that the Lebanese army would enter the camps. Lebanese army entry into the camps was effected on Sunday, 19.9.82. Red Cross personnel, many journalists and other persons also entered, and it then became apparent that in the camps, and particularly in Shatilla, civilians had been massacred. It was clear from the spectacle that presented itself that a considerable number of the killed had not been cut down in combat.

Over a period of two days, the militiamen massacred some 700 to 800 Palestinian men, women, and children. Accurate figures are not available but according to Robert Fisk, the total number of deaths in the camps given by the Director of Israeli Military Intelligence is 700, the International Committee for the Red Cross put the figure at 313 writes Jonathan Randal, with another 43 being counted by civil defence organizations and at least another 146 being buried by friends and relatives. Thomas Friedman, who won a Pulitzer price for his coverage of the massacre quotes an official Red Cross figure of 210 and an unofficial estimated death toll of between 800 and 1,000.

Shortly after the massacre a startling discovery was made. The Lebanese Army units that had entered the camp discovered a large network tunnels and bunkers. During the 12 years of Arafat's control of the heavily populated camps of Sabra and Shatilla he used them for storage of massive amounts of explosives and weapons. With Swiss made tunnel borers he carved out miles of tunnels and loaded them with rockets, ammunition, explosives, missiles, bombs and more. They also found extensive documentation detailing plans for a full scale invasion of Israel. The PLO along with the surrounding Arab states would commit their full armed forces to a future invasion. Having this munitions dump prepared in advance would offer quick re-supply and a very short supply line. It took weeks and hundreds of trucks to empty the tunnels. The Isreali advance into Lebanon had put an end to any such plan.

At the end of the war an official Lebanese government report was released which breaks down the casualty figures from 1975 to 1990, this put the total number of dead in Sabra and Shatila massacre at 857 and the number of wounded at 1,124.

The Multinational Force

At the behest of the Lebanese government, the Multinational Force (MNF) was deployed again in Beirut, but with over twice the manpower of the first peacekeeping force. It was designated MNF II and given the mandate to serve as an "interpositional force," separating the IDF from the Lebanese population. Additionally, MNF II was assigned the task of assisting the Lebanese Army in restoring the authority of the central government over Beirut. The United States dispatched a contingent of 1,400 men, France 1,500, and Italy 1,400. A relatively small British contingent of about 100 men was added in January 1983, at which time the Italian contingent was increased to 2,200 men. Each contingent retained its own command structure, and no central command structure was created. The French contingent was assigned responsibility for the port area and West Beirut. The Italian contingent occupied the area between West Beirut and Beirut International Airport, which encompassed the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The 32d United States Marines Amphibious Unit returned to Beirut on September 29, where it took up positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport. The Marines' positions were adjacent to the IDF front lines.

The Marines' stated mission was to establish an environment that permit would the Lebanese Army to carry out its responsibilities in the Beirut area. Tactically, the Marines were charged with occupying and securing positions along a line from the airport east to the Presidential Palace at Babda. The intent was to separate the IDF from the population of Beirut.

The key to the initial success of MNF II was its neutrality. The Lebanese government had assured AmbAssador Habib in writing that it had obtained commitments from various factions to refrain from hostilities against the Marines. The United States reputation among the Lebanese was enhanced when a Marine officer was obliged to draw his pistol to halt an Israeli advance, an event sensationalized in the news media. And, in the same month, Marines conducted emergency relief operations in the mountains after a midwinter blizzard.

At this juncture, the prevalent mood in Lebanon was one of cautious optimism and hope. The Lebanese Army was pressed into service to clear away the rubble of years of warfare. The government approved a US $600 million reconstruction plan. On October 1, President Gemayel declared Beirut reunited, as the army demolished barricades along the Green Line that had been standing since 1975. Hundreds of criminals and gang leaders were rounded up and arrested. In the first months of 1983, approximately 5,000 government troops were deployed throughout Greater Beirut. Most important, the government began to build a strong national army.

Lebanese optimism was bolstered by changing Israeli politics and policies. Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, the architect of Israel's war in Lebanon, had resigned in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila investigation, although he remained in the cabinet as a minister without portfolio. He was replaced by the former ambAssador to the United States, Moshe Arens. Although Arens was considered a hawk in the Israeli political spectrum, he was not committed to Sharon's ambitious goals and wanted the IDF to withdraw promptly from Lebanon, if only to avoid antagonizing the United States, with which he had cultivated a close relation. Accordingly, Israel withdrew its forces to the outskirts of the capital.

But the IDF had no clear tactical mission in Lebanon. Its continued presence was intended as a bargaining chip in negotiations for a Syrian withdrawal. While awaiting the political agreement, the IDF was forced to fight a different kind of war, which Israeli newspapers compared with the Vietnam War. The IDF had been turned into a static and defensive garrison force like the Syrians before them, caught in the cross fire between warring factions. When Phalangist forces tried to exploit the fluid situation by attacking the Druze militia in the Chouf Mountains in late 1983, the IDF had to intervene and separate the forces. In southern Lebanon, the IDF had to protect the many Palestinian refugees who had streamed back to the camps against attacks by Israel's proxy force, the SLA. In one of the bigger ironies of the war, the IDF recruited and armed Palestinian home guards to prevent a repetition of the massacres in Beirut.

The Rise of the Shiites

Imam Mousa as Sadr, an Iranian-born Shiite (Shia) cleric who had founded the Higher Shia Islamic Council in 1969, also created Amal in 1975. Amal, which means hope in Arabic, is the acronym for Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Resistance Detachments), and was initially the name given to the military arm of the Movement of the Disinherited, an organization created in 1974 by Sadr as a vehicle to promote the Shia cause in Lebanon.

Sadr, at first established this militia with the help of the PLO, but refused to engage Amal in the fighting during the first years of the war. This reluctance discredited the movement in the eyes of many Shias, who chose instead to support the PLO or other leftist parties. The 1979 Iranian Revolution galvanized Lebanon's Shiite community and inspired in it a new militancy. Iran sought to export Shiite revolution throughout the Middle East, and so it provided material support to Amal, and to a Shiite terrorist campaign. From 1979 until the 1982 Israeli invasion, Shiite terrorists hijacked six airliners, attempted to bomb several others, assassinated the French ambAssador to Lebanon, blew up the French and Iraqi embassies, and committed numerous other violent acts.

The Israeli invasion served as a catalyst for a further upsurge in Shia militancy. In July 1982 Iran dispatched an expeditionary force of volunteer Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon, ostensibly to fight Israeli invaders. The approximately 650 Pasdaran established their headquarters in the city of Baalbek in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in 1982 and icreased to some 2,000 over the next few years. There they conducted terrorist and guerrilla training, disbursed military matériel and money, and disseminated propaganda.

The political fission that characterized Lebanese politics also afflicted the Shia movement, as groups split off from Amal. Husayn al Musawi, a former Amal lieutenant, entered into an alliance with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard stationed in Lebanon and established Islamic Amal. Other Shia groups included Hizballah (Party of God), Jundallah (Soldiers of God), the Husayn Suicide Commandos, the Dawah (Call) Party, and the notorious Islamic Jihad Organization, who many analysts say is the terror wing of Hizbollah, reportedly headed by Imad Mughniyah (Mugniyah).

Bombing of US Embassy in Beirut

At 1:00 pm on April 18th, 1983 a van carrying a 2,000 pound load of explosives, slammed into the US embassy forecourt in West Beirut. The entire through the front portion of the sea side seven story building was destroyed. The blast as so powerful that half the embassy simply collapsed and a passing Lebanese military vehicle was blasted off the Corniche and into the sea by the force of the explosion. The van was reportedly stolen from the Embassy in June 1982. The driver had blown himself up along with bomb. The suicide bomb was unseen before in Lebanon. The explosion killed 63 occupants of the building, 17 of whom were Americans including one Marine - Corporal Robert V. McMaugh, an embassy guard, one journalist - Janet Lee Stevens, several State Department officials were, including three USAID employees and the entire U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Middle East contingent were killed including Robert Ames, the CIA station chief. Several Army trainers were also killed. In the visa section, where dozens of Lebanese men and women had been waiting for permission to enter the US, every living soul had been burnt alive.

Ten minutes after the explosion Islamic Jihad called AFP and claimed responsibility for the attack. The caller said:

"The operation is part of the Iranian revolution's campaign against the imperialist presence throughout the world. We will continue to strike against the imperialist presence in Lebanon including the multi-national force."

In the investigation that was launched into the attack, the NSA, which had been breaking and reading coded messages from the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran to the Iranian embassies in Beirut and damascus reviewed all the intercepts and scraps of intelligence available before the bombings. The intercepts showed that an operation was being planned against the Americans. One intercept showed that a $25,000 payment had been made for an operation. This information had been passes to the ambassador but there were no specifics, no target and no date. News of this was leaked to CBS who reported that Iranian communications were being intercepted by US intelligence. Immediately the Iranian communications stopped. The Americans had lost a valuable and vital source of information.

The May 17 Agreement

Although the terrorist attack of April 18 1983 destroyed the United States embassy, the ambassador moved diplomatic operations to his official residence carried on work as usual. The United States persevered in its efforts to broker an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, and Israel announced its willingness to negotiate. Although Israel had envisaged a treaty like the Camp David Agreements with Egypt, entailing full bilateral diplomatic recognition, it settled for mere "normalization." The military and security articles of the May 17 Agreement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments called for an abolition of the state of war between the two countries, security arrangements to ensure the sanctity of Israel's northern border, integration of Major Haddad's SLA into the regular Lebanese Army, and Israeli withdrawal.

The Israeli withdrawal was made contingent upon concurrent Syrian withdrawal, however. The United States had decided not to seek Syrian participation in the negotiations for the May 17 Agreement for fear of becoming entangled in the overall Syrian Israeli imbroglio. Instead, the United States intended to seek Syrian endorsement after the agreement was signed. But Syria vehemently opposed the agreement, and because implementation hinged on Syrian withdrawal, Damascus could exert veto power. Although President Gemayel made conciliatory overtures to Damascus, he also notified the Arab League on June 4 that the ADF was no longer in existence.

Syria responded by announcing on July 23, 1983, the foundation of the National Salvation Front (NSF). This coalition comprised many sects, including the Druzes led by Walid Jumblatt; Shias led by Nabih Berri; Sunni Muslims led by Rashid Karami; Christian elements led by Sulayman Franjieh; and several smaller, Syrian-sponsored, left-wing political parties. These groups, together with Syria, controlled much more of Lebanon's territory than did the central government. Therefore, the NSF constituted a challenge not only to Gemayel but also to his patrons, the United States and Israel. To emphasize their opposition to the May 17 Agreement, Syrian and Druze forces in the mountains above the capital loosed a barrage of artillery fire on Christian areas of Beirut, underscoring the weakness of Gemayel's government.

By mid-1983 the mood of optimism that had flourished at the end of 1982 had disappeared. It became clear that the tentative alliance of Lebanon's rival factions was merely a function of their shared opposition to a common enemy, Israel. Terrorist activity resumed, and between June and August 1983, at least twenty car bombs exploded throughout Lebanon, killing over seventy people. Lebanon's prime minister narrowly escaped death in one explosion. Targets included a mosque in Tripoli; a television station, hospital, and luxury hotel in Beirut; and a market in Baalbek.

The May 17 Agreement had significant implications for the MNF. As a noncombatant interpositional force preventing the IDF from entering Beirut, the MNF had been perceived by the Muslims in West Beirut as a protector. As the Israeli withdrawal neared, however, the MNF came to be regarded as a protagonist in the unfinished War, propping up the Gemayel government. In August militiamen began to bombard United States Marines positions near Beirut International Airport with mortar and rocket fire as the Lebanese Army fought Druze and Shia forces in the southern suburbs of Beirut. On August 29, 1983, two Marines were killed and fourteen wounded, and in the ensuing months the Marines came under almost daily attack from artillery, mortar, rocket, and small-arms fire.

Arafat's Last Stand

As a result of their defeat at the hands of the Israelis, many Palestinians had become dissatisfied with Arafat's command, some within the PLO ranks wanted an investigation into the disastrous plans and command structure during the fighting. Syria was also concerned with Arafat's political gestures towards other Arab states and even the United States. Syria worried about being sidelined by a potential Jordanian-Arafat alliance and was not willing to entertain an independent PLO, especially one under the leadership of a man that they felt had let them down by not fighting the Israelis to the bitter end. Therefore in the first few months of 1983 the Syrians began to support those factions within the PLO that wanted to remove Arafat from power.

On May 9 1983, an order issued by Fateh's Colonel Said Mousa Muragha (Abu Mousa) called upon all Fateh units in the Beqaa to disregard future orders from the Fateh leadership. At first, the Fateh Central Committee belittled the disobedience but later, when some 2,000 of the 10,000 guerrillas that had were in Lebanon joined the rebellion, it became apparent that the mutiny was gaining strength, it cut funds and logistical support to rebellious units. The rebels then seized Fateh supply depots in the Beqaa on May 25, and in Damascus on May 28. In late June, fighting erupted between loyalist and rebel units in the Beqaa, with the latter taking control of the town of Majdal Anjar and hence the Beirut-Damascus highway from Chtoura to the frontier.

When the rebellion erupted, Syria and Libya tacitly, then openly, supported the rebels. When the Fateh leadership condemned this, Arafat himself was deported from Syria to Tunis on June 24, surviving an assassination attempt on his way. On June 27, the Syrians assassinated Saad Sayel, the commander of pro-Arafat forces in Lebanon. Pro-Syrian units of al-Sa'iqa, the PFLP-GC, PLA, and even Syrian Army units, backed Abu Mousa's forces.

With the failure of Palestinian and Arab mediation efforts, loyal Fateh units were gradually forced out of their positions in the Beqaa northwards to the Nahr al-Barid and Baddawi refugee camps near Tripoli. By this stage just over 4,000 guerrillas remained loyal to Arafat. In late September Arafat himself returned to Tripoli to face his opponents. He sneaked in under the nose of the Syrians, shaving off his beard for the first time in years and wearing a smart suit and sunglasses. In October, fighting erupted around the two refugee camps. On November 3, the rebels backed by Syrian and even Libyan forces launched a major offensive against Arafat, capturing Nahr al-Barid on November 6. After a brief lull in the fighting, a second offensive captured Baddawi on November 16. Loyalist forces retreated to Tripoli. Syrian artillery that had been bombarding the camps and the civilian population of Tripoli now focused all of its efforts on destroying the city. Anti Arafat forces also bombarded Tripoli and threatened to storm the city.

The military pressures on Arafat were combined with intense Lebanese pressures to leave the city from Rashid Karami and Walid Jumblatt, as well as from the Lebanese right. Only local Sunni fundamentalist leader Said Shaaban and his Islamic Unification Movement militia supported the PLO leader. At the same time, Arab pressures on Syria to halt the attacks were also building from states anxious to prevent the PLO from completely falling under Syrian sway. As a result, Arafat, Syria and the rebels agreed to a Saudi mediated ceasefire agreement on November 25. Under its terms, 'Arafat would evacuate the city. It was not until December 20, however that the withdrawal took place. Some 4,000 Arafat loyalists evacuated the city by sea to North Yemen, Algeria and Tunisia in Greek ships under the UN flag and with a naval escort provided by France.

The Israeli Defense Forces Withdrawal and the Mountain War

The Lebanese Forces took advantage of Israeli advances and deployed troops in areas where they had not been present before. This territorial expansion was focused on where there were large Christian rural poplations such as the Chouf.

Sporadic fighting soon broke out between the Lebanese Forces and the Druze PSP who viewed the LF as intruders on their territory. East Beirut was also occasionally shelled. Amin Gemayel made plans to deploy the Lebanese army in the Shouf as a buffer between the LF and the PSP but Walid Jumblatt objected and accused the army of being agents of the Kataeb and so he prepared for warfare by aquiring war materials from the Syrians. The Israelis did nothing to stop this.

By the end of August the Druze had started attacking Christian villages in the Chouf. On September 3, 1983, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began to evacuate the Chouf Mountains region and within twenty-four hours had completed its redeployment to south of the Awwali River. The Lebanese Army was told of Israel's intention to withdraw that morning and so were not at hand to take over the IDF positions. Lebanese Forces troops realised at the last minute that a large scale Druze assault was about to take place and began evacuating Christian civilians to Dier Al Qamar. The Lebanese Forces, were completely caught by surprise and vastly out numbered. They decided to put up a defence at Bhamdoun, an elegant Christian mountain town of beautiful villas located where the Beirut-Damascus highway touches the edge of the Chouf Mountains. Simultaneously, the Lebanese Army sought to guard the town of Souq al Gharb and Khaldeh to prevent Druze forces from invading Beirut.

Palestinian guerrillas, Shia militia, Communist Party and SSNP gunmen and Druze militia, supported by Syrian artillery, tanks and plain clothes gunmen assaulted Bhamdoun. After several days of combat, Bhamdoun was captured by the morning of September 7, with the Lebanese Forces loosing over 150 men on the 6th, a very large number for the Lebanese Forces to lose in a single action. Some of those defending Bhamdoun fought a rear-guard action so as to allow enough time for their fellow Phalangists to retreat to the stronghold of Deir al Qamar to join the rest of the Christian population there. Some 200 civilians had remained at Bhamdoun believing that they would be unharmed, but they, along with captured Lebanese Forces troops were murdered, many by having their throats cut.

The Druzes surrounded and besieged Dier al Qamar, which held 40,000 Christian residents and refugees and 1,000 Lebanese Forces fighters. With the Chouf Mountains undefended, the Druzes went on a rampage reminiscent of the 1860 massacres. The first few weeks of September saw a rising number of massacres being committed against Christian civilians:

• 31 August 1983 36 Christians had their throats cut in Bmarian
• 7 September 1983 200 people massacred in Bhamdoun
• 10 September 1983 64 slaughtered in Bireh, several victims were executed in the village church, some of them on the altar.
• 10 September 1983 30 in Ras el-Matn
• 11 September 1983 15 in Maasser Beit ed-Dine
• 11 September 1983 36 in Chartoun
• 12 September 1983 3 in Ain el-Hour
• 12 September 1983 12 in Bourjayne
• 12 September 1983 11 in Fawara
• 13 September 1983 84 in Maasser el-Chouf

On 11th September 1983 Walid Jumblatt announced his policy while making a speech in Damascus:

"With the help of our Syrian allies we have removed the Christians and only the Druze villages will remain from now on. Such is our objective."

During the fighting the mixed Christian and Druze village of Kfar Matta whose Christian population had been expelled was attacked and briefly held by the LF. 58 Druze civilians were killed by the LF.

The Catholic Information Center in Beirut reported that 1,500 Christian civilians were killed and 62 Christian villages demolished. Bhamdoun was stripped of everything over the next few months and systematically demolished. The defeat of the Phalangists was expensive for the Christian community, which lost a large amount of territory.

The cost in political currency was even higher, however. Not only did the fighting deal a blow to Amin Gemayel's credibility and authority in his dual role as chief of state and leader of the Christian community, it destroyed the myth shared by many different Lebanese factions that the Lebanese War had been settled in 1976. Admittedly, Christians and Muslims had continued to fire on each other's neighborhoods on occasion, but this was perceived as part of Lebanon's environment, like the weather. In all the significant fighting between 1976 and 1982, the Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians had been belligerents on either or both sides of the conflict. The Mountain War, as the 1983-84 fighting in the Chouf Mountains came to be called, dashed the hopes harbored by many that the withdrawal of foreign forces would end the War.

In Souq al Gharb and Khaldah, it was the Lebanese Army rather than the Lebanese Forces that confronted the Druze militias. On September 16, 1983, Druze forces massed on the threshold of Souq al Gharb. For the next three days the army's Eighth Brigade commanded by an officer called Michel Aoun (who would become in 1988 the Lebanese prime minister) fought desperately to retain control of the town. The tiny Lebanese Air Force was thrown into the fray, losing several aircraft to Druze missile fire. United States Navy warships shelled Druze positions and helped the Lebanese Army hold the town until a cease-fire was declared on September 25, on which day the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey arrived on the scene.

Although the Lebanese Army had beaten the Druze forces on the battlefield, approximately 900 Druze enlisted men and 60 officers defected from the army to join their coreligionists. The Lebanese Armed Forces chief of staff, General Nadim al Hakim, fled into Druze territory, but he would not admit he had actually defected.

The September 25th cease-fire briefly froze the situation. The Gemayel government maintained its jurisdiction in West Beirut, the Shia Amal movement had not yet involved itself in the fighting, and Jumblatt was landlocked in the Chouf mountain. The Lebanese regime and opposition personalities agreed to meet in Geneva for a national reconciliation conference, under Saudi and Syrian auspices, to discuss political reform and the 17 May pact. For a while things looked a bit better.

For its part, the United States had clearly inherited Israel's role of shoring up the precarious Lebanese government. On September 29, 1983, the United States Congress, by a solid majority, adopted a resolution declaring the 1973 War Powers Resolution to apply to the situation in Lebanon and sanctioned the United States military presence for an eighteen-month period.

The Multinational Force Bombings and their Withdrawal

On Sunday morning 23 October at 06:22, just after dawn, Shia Islamic radicals shook the already-reduced resolve of the Americans and their MNF partners by simultaneous suicide bombings of the U.S. and French compounds in West Beirut.

In the Marine attack an explosives loaded 5 ton truck was driven at some 50 mph into the U.S. Marine compound killing 220 Marines and 21 other U.S. service members. A Lebanese man who also ran a small shop in the building was also killed. The large yellow Mercedes truck crashed into the ground floor lobby of the four-story concrete building where approximately 300 service members were quartered. Before crashing into the compound the truck circled a couple of times in the car park to gather speed.

The sofistication of the attack and the explosives used pointed directly to the involvement of intelligence agencies. The explosives were composite-shaped charges built to have a "directed-enhanced" blast so that their impact on the building above would be greater. The bomb consisted of 300 kilograms of Hexogen reinforced by PETN this is equivalent to about 12,000 pounds of TNT. The explosives were mixed into a complex of gas and other substances. The difficult and delicate task of gas-enhancement requires the sort of specialized skills and wealth of experience possessed by a state, not an outlaw organization. Further, the use of highly controlled explosive materials as Hexogen and PETN indicates the involvement of intelligence agencies.

Intelligence analysis showed that the actual preparations for the bombing began in September of 1983. Iran played a central role and operational coordination was conducted from the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Syria was responsible for the technical aspects of the attack as only they and their allies had the intelligence assets and the technical expertise to determine the requirements and design of the bomb. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members were in charge of operational security. Intelligence also showed that the Iranian embassy in Damascus paid $50,000 to a financial emissary named Hassan Hamiz to cover associated costs. Futhermore it was shown that a Syrian intelligence lieutenant colonel was involved in the planning several days before and that Sheikh Mohammed Fadlalla attended a meeting in the Soviet-Palestinain friendship house in Damascus to discuss the attacks three days before the bombings.

After studying the U.S. compound, the Syrians decided to use a truck identical to the trucks delivering cargo to the Beirut airport. Those trucks passed routinely in front of the Marine barracks. The Mercedes truck used for the bombing was delivered to Beirut from an assembly plant in Syria or Iran, and the explosives used for the bomb were shipped from Bulgaria and delivered via Damascus.

The day became the Marine Corps' bloodiest since February of 1945, when Marines fought to secure Iwo Jima. October 23, 1983 surpasses even the Corps' bloodiest days of the Vietnam and Korean wars. The explosion was determined by FBI forensic investigators to be "the single largest non-nuclear explosion on earth." The Long Commission Report into the attack stated it was "the largest conventional blast ever seen by the explosive experts community." So massive was the blast, the Report states, it would have caused major damage and many casualties even if it had exploded on the open road 330 feet away from the building. Untill the September 11 2001 this had been the largest terrorist attck in the history of the United States.

The Department of Defense Statement read:

“At approximately 0622 on Sunday, 23 October 1983, the Battalion Landing Team headquarters building in the Marine Amphibious Unit compound at Beirut International Airport was destroyed by a terrorist bomb. The catastrophic attack took the lives of 241 Marines, sailors and soldiers and wounded more than 100 others. The bombing was carried out by one lone terrorist driving a yellow Mercedes Benz stake-bed truck that accelerated through the public parking lot south of the BLT headquarters building, where it exploded. The truck drove over the barbed and concertina wire obstacle, passed between two Marine guard posts without being engaged by fire, entered an open gate, passed around one sewer pipe barrier and between two others, flattened the Sergeant of the Guard's sandbagged booth at the building's entrance, penetrated the lobby of the building and detonated while the majority of the occupants slept. The force of the explosion [12,000 pounds] ripped the building from its foundation. The building then imploded upon itself. Almost all the occupants were crushed or trapped inside the wreckage.”

Just 20 seconds after the Marine explosion another bomb was rammed into the French headquaters 2 miles from the Marine compound killing 58 French Paratroopers. The explosion at the French barracks blew the whole nine story building off its foundations and threw it about 20 feet westward, while breaking the windows of almost every apartment house in the neighborhood. This small bomb was driven at speed into the underground garage of the building. More than 20 Lebanese civilians were injured in the blast. A Lebanese family lived on the ground floor of the French-occupied structure. According to neighbors, the father who was the concierge had just gone out to buy bread when the blast ripped through the building, trapping his wife and three children inside, the youngest was 3 months old. Their bodies were recovered some 8 days later.

Although the MNF remained in Lebanon after the October 1983 suicide truck bombings, the situation of the United States and French contingents was precarious. As the security environment in Lebanon deteriorated, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States decided to withdraw their MNF contingents in February 1984.

The Switzerland Conferences

The attacks against the the Marine and French compounds seemed timed to coincide with the start of Lebanon's long-awaited national reconciliation conference but the conference went ahead. At the Geneva conference in early November Saudi influence achieved a limited consensus between the Maronite, Muslim, and Druze participants and it was agreed to delegated Gemayel to approach the Americans for revision of the 17 May pact, to make it a purely military arrangement.

On 13 November, at a critical time for Syria in dealing with both Arafat and Gemayel, Hafiz al-Asad suffered a heart attack, precipitating a leadership crisis in Damascus. The crisis lasted for almost six months, until the Syrian president fully recovered and could fend off his insubordinate brother, Rifa’at. In Beirut, Gemayel had a last chance to save his presidency, by taking advantage of the common ground between moderate reform proposals from West and East Beirut and the breathing space offered by the American naval build-up immediately after the bombing of the U.S. marine compound. The U.S. however rebuffed Gemayel's attempt to revise the 17 May pact, and after some hesitation the U.S. backed Israel’s insistence on ratification of the original documents. Gemayel failed to reconvene the Geneva conference for the necessary consultations on the matter. In the meantime, military exchanges punctuated the cease-fire: the Americans lost two aircraft in a raid on the well-prepared Syrians in the Upper Matn, and Walid Junblatt was impatient to extend his new Shuf canton to the sea.

Although the MNF remained in Lebanon after the October 1983 suicide truck bombings, the situation of the United States and French contingents was precarious. In early February 1984, Shia Amal militiamen clashed with the Lebanese Army in the southern suburbs of Beirut and after four days of heavy fighting gained control over Beirut International Airport, evicted the army from West Beirut, and reestablished the Green Line partitioning the capital. The decisive defeat of the army on two key fronts led to its gradual disintegration, as demoralized soldiers defected to join the opposition. United States Marines stationed near Beirut International Airport were surrounded by predominantly Shia militia groups. The day after the Lebanese Army was forced out of West Beirut and as the security environment in Lebanon deteriorated, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States decided to withdraw their MNF contingents.

The most significant feature of the February 1984 was that for the first time Shia organizations, with Amal in the lead and the Iranian-backed Islamists of Hizballah (“Party of God”) not far behind, imposed themselves on Lebanese politics. West Beirut came under local militia control, principally Nabih Berri’s Amal and Jumblatt’s PSP, with the Sunnis and Palestinians subordinatede. This was a different situation from that of 1975-82 in West Beirut, although Syria made a major strategic advance courtesy of the Lebanese opposition parties, Amal understood the scale of their achievement. With West Beirut evacuated by both the MNF and the Lebanese army command, Syria acquired a leading influence in that part of the city.

Hafiz al-Asad decided that the best way to gain maximum capital out of the changes in Beirut was to bring the hapless Amin Gemayel to Damascus for a public submission. Abrogation of the Israel-Lebanon pact would be the token of submission but Asad’s real purpose was to use the Lebanese president to dominate the Maronite community, which would also increase Syria’s weight in dealings with West Beirut. Gemayel dithered for a few weeks while he made last-ditch appeals to the Americans and Israelis. However, the Americans were already looking afresh at Syria as a factor for stability in Lebanon and the Israelis answered only with a contemptuous dismissal. Syria tightened the screws by hinting at military action by “allies” against Zahleh, encircled by the Syrian army, and Gemayel’s home town of Bikfaya in the Upper Matn. On 29 February, Gemayel and an Lebanese delegation unofficially traveled to Damascus. In Damascus Gemayel agreed to a new inter-Lebanese conference, this time to be sponsored exclusively by Syria.

The withdrawal of the MNF left Syria as the dominant force in Lebanon, and Syria acted rapidly to consolidate its grip on Lebanese affairs. It pressured Gemayel to abrogate the May 17 Agreement, and he did so on March 5, 1984. This event led to the resignation of the Council of Ministers and its replacement by a new government of national unity headed by Rashid Karami. Under pressure from Syria Gemayel invited the miltia leaders to join the cabinet.

On March 6, 1984 was Amin's first official visit to Damascus. It was agreed that six days later, on March 12, 1984, the Lebanese traditional political leaders, both Christians and Muslims, as well as Druze and Shia militia commanders were to meet in Lausanne, Switzerland. All except the Lebanese Forces were to be represented. Walid Jumblat and Nabih Berri, self assured due to their Syrian backing believed for a moment they had it made and so Lebanon’s warlords assembled in Lausanne in late March to see if they could reach a compromise.

The conference got off to a bad start when Druze warlord Walid Jumblatt insisted on having the Lebanese flag in front of his seat removed and replaced with a Druze flag. This went quickly down hill from there. Jumblatt spent most of his time in his suite giving an interview to Playboy magazine. After nine days of fruitless talks interrupted only by banquets of smoked salmon and lobster bisque the conference collapased. Ironically, the conference finally collapsed because ex-president Frangieh, Assad's principal Christian ally rejected any erosion of the Maronite presidency. The Amal leadership, unhappy about the sectarian nature of the compromise, which benefited Sunnis rather than Shia, were grateful to Frangieh for sparing them a possible contretemps with Syria.

The Lebanese Forces were not amused with the new Gemayel-Syria realtionship and Gemayel's gestures towards Syria. The election of Amin Gemayel to the presidency of Lebanon had far reaching consequences for the Lebanese Forces. Amin Gemayel had been a leading candidate in pro-Syrian Muslim eyes, although he was also supported by the Israelis. Bashir was elected President against the wishes of the Syrians and Muslims. Amin however often declared that Israel’s objective was to destroy Lebanon’s role in the region. He had always recommended pacification, compromise and dialogue with the Syrians.

The Commander of the Lebanese Forces, Fadi Frem, considered Amin’s election as President a serious setback in Bashir’s political line and he regarded Amin to be more open reaching some kind of agreement with the Syrians. However Frem was paralyzed by family ties and could do little. Frem was married to Fouad Abou Nader’s sister, who was Amin’s niece. Frem had been in the Lebanese Forces from the start, he was previously Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Lebanese Forces in 1978 and in 1981, he became Chief of Staff, a post he had handed over to Samir Geagea when he was promoted Commander by Bashir before his assassination in 1982. Frem was good friends with Bashir and had always viewed Amin with suspicion.

Amin Gemayel was a shrewd politician and aware of the Lebanese Forces feelings towards him, and so Amin decided to try to set their minds at ease, and gain Christian support through them. Amin’s first move upon taking office on September 23, 1982, was to pay a visit to the Lebanese Forces War Council. At the meeting Amin pledged to the War Council that he would follow in Bashir’s footsteps. The meeting did not go well, suspicion prevailed and soon arguments erupted. Bashir’s wife, Solange had to intervene personally to contain the hot-heads at the meeting. The fears of the Lebanese Forces were being realized.

In Beirut, fostered and stimulated by popular support, and frustrated to be blatantly ignored, the Lebanese forces announced they were unconcerned with the discussions and results of the conference, for it only aimed at consolidating Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. They confirmed they were ready for war against the Syrian forces and their allies, whatever the price.

Military exchanges between the LF, hostile to Gemayel’s new relations with Syria, and Syria’s West Beirut allies continued until the end of April when Syrian maneuvers produced a “National Unity Government" under the veteran Tripoli politician Rashid Karami. In this way Syria’s allies were brought into the official apparatus and eight months of hostilities around Beirut finally gave way to an uneasy truce between the Christian and non-Christian sectors. Syria moved from playing spoiler against the Lebanese regime, the U.S., and Israel to the more difficult task of stabilizing its primacy. That the new government was “united” only in the sense that its members occasionally assembled at the same table limited its value for Syria.

The Bekfaya Accord

Syria hammered out yet another security accord, the Bikfaya Agreement of June18. Muslim and Druze cabinet ministers had insisted on the creation of a military command council to replace the post of commander in chief of the armed forces, a proposal that was opposed by Christian cabinet ministers, who perceived it as a dilution of their control over the military. A compromise was reached providing for the continuation of the post of commander in chief, to be held by a Maronite as before, but also the establishment of a multiconfessional six-man military command council to have authority over appointments at the brigade and division levels. Major General Ibrahim Tannus, the army commander, was replaced by Major General Michel Aoun, who was somewhat more acceptable to Muslims. Furthermore, a new intelligence agency, the National Security Council, was established, with the stipulation that it be headed by a Shia Muslim. A Shia general, Mustafa Nasir, was named as the first director of the new agency. Nevertheless, the Maronite-commanded military intelligence apparatus remained intact as a separate but parallel institution. The agreement also called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy artillery and militiamen from the streets of East Beirut and West Beirut, the dismantling of barricades along the Green Line, and the reopening of the airport and port. The agreement formally took effect on June 23 and was implemented by July 6, 1984.

Optimistic predictions that the Bikfaya Agreement would end Lebanon's chronic conflict were dashed as sporadic battles and terrorist attacks resumed. The accord was criticized vehemently by elements among the Maronites as Druze, Shia, and Sunni militia fought one another in West Beirut. Armed Shias stormed and burned the Saudi Arabian embassy on August 24. On the same day, the Lebanese National Resistance Front, an umbrella organization fighting Israel in southern Lebanon, fired two rocket-propelled grenades at the British embassy. The mounting tension in Lebanon was exacerbated by Israeli air raids against Palestinian guerrilla camps of the Abu Musa faction. The Bikfayya Agreement suffered another blow on August 23, when General al Hakim, the newly appointed Druze chief of staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, died in an accidental helicopter crash. And, on August 30 Maronite patriarch and Phalange Party founder Pierre Gemayel died of a heart attack, setting the stage for a power struggle in the Christian community.

Syria, determined to implement the security plans it had sponsored, attempted to restore order. It curbed the activities of the Iranian Pasdaran and Hizballah in Baalbek in the Biqa Valley, and it quelled the fierce fighting in the northern port city of Tripoli between the pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Party and the Sunni fundamentalist Tawhid (Islamic Unification Movement).

The Bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex

In September 1984, William Casey, head of the CIA, was spending lots of time at Langley raising consciousness about a possible terrorist attack in the closing weeks of the US presidential campaign. He made it clear that the entire U.S. intelligence community was on terrorist alert. He dreaded that a strike again by suicide bombers would show the impotence of the United States. The political repercussions could be substantial. Reagan’s presidency stood for strength. Nothing in the last years had demonstrated weakness more than an inability to stop these attacks.

For seventeen months Casey had been throwing assets at the problem, training, information exchange, the development of a network involving some one hundred countries. There had been significant upgrading in forty countries of CIA capabilities in paramilitary training, hostage rescue and VIP protection. The CIA had just trained sixty Lebanese agents. Nearly fifty people at CIA headquarters worked exclusively on terrorism, as well as dozens more at the NSA and in the military intelligence services. Casey demanded results, and there had been some success. Intelligence had determined that Spain’s ambassador to Lebanon was being tracked, and the CIA had suggested he leave Lebanon. He did not and was later kidnapped.

Some of the most concrete intelligence that was coming in classified reports showed that explosives and timed fuse bombs were being moved by Iranians operating out of their embassy in Damascus under the protection of diplomatic immunity. In August, reports had shown that explosives had been moved into Lebanon, where the trail was lost. With the Marines gone, the U.S. ambassador’s residence and the American Embassy annex in the relative security of Christian East Beirut were the remaining major targets. The CIA and other intelligence agencies cranked out reports but not much exactness to the warnings.

At 11:40 A.M. Thursday, September 20, in a replay of the April 1983 attack, a van with diplomatic license plates pulled into the U.S. Embassy annex in East Beirut, zigzagging and threading its way around the staggered row of concrete dragon’s teeth designed to slow all vehicles. One guard’s M16 jammed. The security guard for the British ambassador, who was visiting the embassy, opened fire, pumping five shots into the van, he hit the driver and the van headed into a parked vehicle some thirty feet short of the ramp leading to the garage underneath the embassy. The van detonated, leaving a crater twenty-six feet in diameter. At least twenty-four people were killed, including two American servicemen. Another ninety were wounded, including U.S. Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, who was buried in the rubble but emerged with only minor injuries.

Overhead photography later showed that the van, or one just like it, had been practicing outside a mock-up of the embassy annex in the Beqaa Valley. American intelligence concluded that Hizbollah and Sheikh Fadlallah were behind this attack, just as they had been behind the 1983 bombings at the embassy and the Marine barracks. The attack could not have occured without Syrian knowledge and assistance.

Lebanese Forces Coup

For some time friction had been mounting between the Lebanese Forces and Amin Gemayel. Not willing to tolerate a Lebanese forces which was hostile to him Amin had to remove Fadi Frem and so throughout 1984 he used his base in the Phalange to undermine Frem with a view to replacing him as soon as Frem's mandate as head of the LF expired. In November 1984 Fouad Abou Nader, a member of the Phalange party, was elected as head of the Lebanese Forces. Nader was a 28-year-old medical doctor and Amin’s nephew. He was appreciated and respected by the troops for his courage on battlefields and had distinguished himself on various fronts. He had been Chief of Operations and Chief of Staff from 1982 to 1984. Amin, hoped he could influence Fouad Abou Nader and as a result control the Lebanese Forces.

Soon Amin began to press the Lebanese Forces to disarm and to hand over the Port of Beirut. This port was a massive source of revenue for the LF. Amin also asked them to hand over the LF pension fund and all the assets they managed. The clincher was the dismantling of the Barbara checkpoint, another huge soucre of income for the LF. This checkpoint was held by Samir Geagea. After weeks of prodding, the Lebanese Forces agreed to truck their men and weapons out of East Beirut, into the mountains, but they adamantly refused to comply with the other demands. Trouble was brewing and tension mounted to breaking point in early 1985 when the Kataeb leadership visited Damascus in February.

Geagea's militiamen continued to refuse the government's repeated requests to dismantle the checkpoint and toll station and so the commander of the Lebanese Forces, Fouad Abu Nader, finnaly removed Geagea from his post on March 11th 1985. Geagea's ouster, supported by Syria, quickly stirred dissension within the Lebanese Forces. For the Lebanese Forces this was the last straw but Abu Nader tried to end the rift by announcing that in the future the Lebanese Forces would function independently of the Phalange Party, but his move came too late. The next day, on March 12th, the Lebanese Forces reacted.

At dawn, a military force led by Samir Geagea moved forward from Byblos and rolled down the coastal line to Nahr el Kalb Tunnel, hatch to Beirut and barely a few kilometers from the outskirts of the Northern Matn. Northern Matn was under the control of Amin Gemayel’s Force 75. On his way, Geagea took over all of the Kataeb and Lebanese Forces’ barracks, posts and checkpoints formerly held by Fouad Abu Nader’s men. At the same time, Hobeika and his forces stormed the Baabda district and Achrafieh. The coup was bloodless without resistance and without human nor material losses. The only serious opposition came at Nahr Ibrahim late in the night of the12th. A post held by Joseph el Zayek, Elias’s brother, fought a battle despite the odds against him. He was a fervent and loyal supporter of the Kataeb Party. Fouad Abu Nader maintained control of his own birth place, Ghazir in Kesserwan but agreed to step down peacefully. Syria massed troops around the Christian heartland north of Beirut, but agreed to give Gemayel time to neutralize the revolt before resorting to armed intervention but as the LF did not directly threaten Gemayel's rule or attempt to tople him, the Syrians decided not to interfere.

With the stunning success of the coup, the Lebanese Forces laid their hands on and secured the Kataeb Party’s properties, real estate, businesses and media. Radio Voice of Lebanon and Al Amal newspapers both organs of the Kataeb Party were seized. The radio station, situated in Sassine in Achrafieh, fell without any resistance. From this point the Phalange Party became solely a political party and had lost its influence and control on the Lebanese Forces. Amin Gemayel's authority was greatly undermined. Samir Geagea became the new head of the Lebanese Forces.

Israeli Pullback

Some Israeli policymakers considered South Lebanon's Shias natural allies, especially because both Israel and the Shias wanted to prevent the PLO from returning to the area. Some Israelis envisioned a Shia buffer state modeled after "Free Lebanon," controlled formerly by Saad Haddad (Haddad died of cancer in January 1984 and was replaced by retired Lebanese general Antoine Lahad). Indeed, about 10 percent of the SLA was Shia, and the IDF armed and supported several Shia groups.

These hopes, however, were never realized. The Shias, in fact, turned out to be implacable foes, vehemently resisting the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon. Concerned about the growing number of casualties inflicted on the IDF by Shia militants, on February 16, 1985, the IDF implemented the first stage of a withdrawal from Lebanon, evacuating its troops from the northern front at the Awali River to south of the Litani River, thus removing Sidon from Israeli control. Sidon's feuding factions, determined to avoid a flare-up of internecine violence in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, formed a special committee to organize the smooth entry of Lebanese Army troops into the city. On February 17, a 3,000-man detachment of the army's predominantly Shia Twelfth Brigade took over the Israeli positions as the populace celebrated in the streets.

Yet Israel's withdrawal gave it no respite from guerrilla attacks. On the contrary, the guerrilla campaign escalated into full-scale warfare, with most of the attacks occurring in the vicinity of Tyre. Frustrated by its inability to curb the resistance fighters, Israel resorted to what it called the "Iron Fist" policy, which entailed retaliatory and preemptive raids on villages suspected of harboring Shia guerrillas. On March 4 1985, an explosion devastated a mosque in the village of Marakah--only hours after the IDF had inspected the site--killing at least twelve people, many of whom were Shia guerrilla commanders. On March 11 1985, a large Israeli armored force wreaked vengeance on the village of Az Zrariyah, killing 40 people and detaining 200 men.

The IDF hastened its withdrawal from southern Lebanon, adhering to an accelerated deadline voted by the Israeli cabinet, and pulled its troops back to a 9 mile deep security zone along the Lebanesei-Israeli border. Israel also closed its detention center in Ansar and freed 752 of the inmates. But, in violation of the Geneva Conventions, which forbids transporting prisoners of war across international boundaries, 1,200 prisoners were transferred to Israel. Israel preserved a security zone approximately five to ten kilometers wide, which it handed over to the SLA. Some 150 Israeli combat troops and 500 advisers remained within the security zone.

Events in Southern Lebanon

Celebrations of Israeli pull-out were short lived. In March and April of 1985, a new round of Christian-Muslim fighting putting a Palestinian-Druze-Shia coalition against the Lebanese Forces engulfed Sidon. The army was dispatched but appeared powerless to stop the combat.

The Christian villages east of Sidon began to fall to the Leftist pan Arab and Palestinian forces at the end of April, soon after several hundred Lebanese Forces troops pulled out of the heights above Sidon. Less than 48 hours later, Palestinians along with Muslim militiamen stormed up the hills and captured several Christian villages. A few days later, Druze militiamen struck at other Christian villages in the region just north of Sidon and the Awali River. The operation was necessary according to Walid Jumblatt, to ''cleanse the area of the Lebanese Forces.'' The Druze, however, have long sought to control the territory north of Sidon in order to give them access to the sea. United Nations refugee officials estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 Christians were made homeless by the fighting. It was the Christians' worst setback since the Chouf Mountain war in 1983.

Throughout the first two weeks of May, as militiamen from at least three different factions took over the region, residents of West Beirut and Sidon drove into the Christian villages to join in the looting. They loaded their cars and pickup trucks with furniture and clothing, raided vegetable gardens and stripped an entire banana plantation before returning home. Some shawled women were seen squatted in doorways, laying claim to the possessions inside and, in some cases, even the house itself. Most of the Christians had fled inland to the stronghold of Jezzine where they were protected by Lahad's SLA while others fled south to the Israeli security zone before the advancing militias swept into their villages. The civilains that stayed behind were murdered. United Nations refugee officials estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 Christians were made homeless by the fighting. It cannot be known for certain how many hundreds of civilians were slaughtered.

This defeat was a very serious blow to the Lebanese Forces and particularly to Geagea who had only recently taken over command. With Geagea disgraced, Elie Hobeika, head of LF intellignece division, called for a meeting of the Lebanese Forces Politbureau and forced Geagea to step down. Hobeika was elected the new head of the LF on May 9th 1985, Geagea became Chief of Staff. Almost as soon as Hobeika took over the LF he started singing the praises of Syria and he even visited Syria on 9th September. Many in the LF started to smell a rat, they felt something had gone terribly wrong and began to look at Hobeika with suspicion.

The Tripartite Accord

In late 1985, Syria sponsored yet another agreement among Lebanon's factions aimed at ending the ongoing war. On December 28, the leaders of Lebanon's three main militias, Nabih Berri of Amal, Walid Jumblatt of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and Hobeika of the LF, signed the Tripartite Accord in Damascus. Although this agreement resembled many previous failed Syrian initiatives to restore order in Lebanon, it was more comprehensive. It provided for an immediate cease-fire and an official proclamation of the end of the state of war within one year. The militias would be disarmed and then disbanded, and sole responsibility for security would be relegated to the reconstituted and religiously integrated Lebanese Army, supported by Syrian forces. More broadly, the accord envisaged a "strategic integration" of the two countries in the spheres of military affairs, national security, and foreign relations. The accord also mandated fundamental, but not sweeping, political reform, including the establishment of a bicameral legislature and the elimination of the old confessional formula, which was to be replaced by majority rule and minority representation. The accord differed considerably from others inasmuch as the these signatories were the actual combatants in the war, rather than civilian politicians. This factor engendered considerable optimism in some quarters but great trepidation in others where it was viewed as an attempt to reconstruct Greater Syria. The most vehement protests came from the Sunni community, which was prominent in politics but had little military strength after its militia, the Murabitoun, had been crushed earlier in the year.

Gemayel refused to endorse the agreement, however, and solicited the support of the Lebanese Forces Chief of Staff Samir Geagea, who had been demoted only eight months earlier for his anti-Syrian, Christian supremacist stance. Fierce fighting raged within the Christian camp between partisans of Hobeika and Geagea. Hobeika was defeated and it then transpired that Hobeika had been collaborating with the Syrians for some time. On January 16 1986, Hobeika fled to Paris, and then to exile in Damascus. Hobeika's defeat was a major blow to Syrian prestige, and Syria retaliated by urging the militias it controlled to attack Christian areas. The Presidential Palace and Gemayel's home town of Bekfaya were shelled, and a series of car bombs were detonated in East Beirut. But the Christians closed ranks around their beleaguered president, and the Tripartite Accord was never implemented. Geagea, emboldened by his restored power, then challenged Gemayel and the Phalange Party directly. In July he announced the creation of the Free Lebanon Army, which was to be under his sole command and was to serve as his personal power base. But LF loyalists fought this plan.

Pax Syriana

On July 4, 1986, Syrian troops entered West Beirut for the first time since being expelled during the 1982 Israeli invasion. Approximately 500 Syrian troops, working with the Lebanese Army and police, cleared roadblocks, closed militia offices, and collected weapons. In mid-February 1987, however, a new round of fighting broke out in West Beirut, this time between Druze and Shia militias, both of which were regarded as Syrian allies. The combat was described by witnesses as being of unrivaled intensity in twelve years of war, with the militiamen using formations of Soviet-made T-54 tanks that Syria had supplied to both sides. Five days of combat caused an estimated 700 casualties and set much of West Beirut aflame.

Syria acted decisively to stop the chaos in West Beirut, and it seized the opportunity to reimpose its hegemony over the areas in Lebanon from which it had been evicted by Israel in 1982. On February 22, 1987, it dispatched 7,500 troops, configured in two brigades and a battalion, from eastern Lebanon. The Syrian troops, most of whom were veteran commandos, closed down some seventy militia offices, rounded up and arrested militia leaders, confiscated arms caches, deployed troops along the major roads and at Beirut International Airport, established checkpoints, and sent squads on patrol in the streets.

The Syrian Army did not shy away from violence in its effort to restore order to the Lebanese capital. In the first two days of its police operation, Syrian troops shot some fifteen Lebanese of various militias. Then on February 24 a dozen trucks full of Syrian commandos entered the Basta neighborhood, a Shia stronghold, and attacked the Fathallah barracks, the headquarters of the Hizballah organization. There, Syrian troops killed eighteen Hizballah militants.

In mid-April the Syrian Army deployed troops south of Beirut. Approximately 100 Syrian commandos, fighting alongside soldiers of the Lebanese Army's Sixth Brigade, occupied key positions along the strategic coastal highway linking Beirut with southern Lebanon and took control of the bridge over the Awwali River, near Sidon.

By mid-1987 the Syrian Army appeared to have settled into Beirut for a protracted stay. Lebanon's anarchy was regarded by Syrian officials as an unacceptable risk to Syrian security. The government of Syria appeared prepared to occupy Beirut permanently, if necessary. The senior Syrian military commander in Lebanon, Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan, said that militia rule of Lebanon had ended and that the Syrian intervention was "open-ended," implying that Syria would occupy West Beirut indefinitely. Meanwhile Syrian officials indicated that thousands of additional Syrian troops would probably be sent to Beirut to ensure stability. Kanaan declared that Syria would take full responsibility for the security of foreign embassies in West Beirut, and he invited foreign missions to return. Kanaan also promised that Syria would expand all possible efforts to secure the release of Western hostages held by Lebanese terrorists.

The Attack on Achrafieh

On September 27 1986, a 3,000-man force loyal to Hobeika launched a surprise attack across the Green Line from Muslim West Beirut against East Beirut. The night before a small group of Hobeika's men had taken the LF by surprise at Sodeco and captured the crossing point across the Green Line. Hobeika's men, supported by Syria and their leftist allies, surprised and forced back Geagea's militiamen and managed to get as far as Sassine Square. The LF counter attacked and things started to go badly for Hobeika. At 10:30 am the Lebanese Air Force flew over Achrafieh and the Lebanese Army's Tenth Brigade entered the fray on the side of Geagea's LF. By noon the invasion of East Beirut was halted and the Syrians urged Hobeika's men to hold out for a few hours to enable a Syrian army battallion to come to their rescue, however a retreat was already underway. Lebanese Army had by then deployed commandos throughout Achrafieh and closed off the escape roots. Less than half of Hobeika's men made it back to West Beirut, the majority were captured.

The End of the Murabitoun and the War of the Camps

By the end of 1984, numerous Lebanese sources reported a substantial resurgence of the Palestinian political and military presence in the capital. The following year, Israel's withdrawal from Sidon (February) and Tyre (March-April) initiated a similar reemergence of Palestinian guerrilla groups in local camps there.

Such developments were viewed with concern by Syrian who did not want to threaten the Israelis with a reestablishment of a semi-autonomous Palestinian base of operations in Beirut and the south, particularly one loyal to the PLO. At first it encouraged its own Palestinian clients to compete in the process, facilitating the entrance of Saiqa, PFLP-GC, and Abu Mousa's Fateh-Provisional Command into these areas. In camps under direct Syrian control, Nahr al-Bared and Baddawi in the north, and Wavell in the Beqaa, these groups quickly gained the upper hand. But in areas beyond Syria's writ it soon became apparent that the independent Palestinian organizations Fateh, the PFLP and DFLP had far stronger popular support.

Amal also viewed the reestablishment of a Palestinian political and military presence in Beirut and the south with concern. Hostility towards the Palestinians stemming from Shi'ite-PLO conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s was reinforced by fears that a resurgent Palestinian presence would threaten the powerful political position that Amal had established for itself in post-1982 Lebanon. When Amal and the PSP seized control of West Beirut in February 1984, Amal established military posts in and around the camps. As the IDF withdrew, it did the same in Tyre and Nabatiyeh in the south.

Just as relative calm was restored to Christian East Beirut, fighting broke out again in West Beirut. Under Syria's aegis, Amal attempted to consolidate its control over West Beirut. Amal struck first in an April 15 with a joint PSP assault that routed the once-formidable Sunni Murabitun militia of the Independent Nasserite Movement in a matter of days and sent its leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat, into exile. The Murabitun was one of few groups in Lebanon to still support a Palestinian armed presence. Shortly thereafter, encouraged by Syria, Amal turned its attention to the Palestinians in the camps of Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al Barajneh. The first round of what was to become known as the "war of the camps" began 19 May 1985, with an incident between Palestinians in the Sabra camp and Amal militiamen.

Heavy fighting quickly erupted between the approximately one thousand armed Palestinians in the Sabra, Shatila and Burj al-Barajineh camps and Amal's more than three thousand fighters, the latter supported by over a thousand soldiers of the predominately Sh'ite Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese Army and even some units of the predominately Christian Eighth Brigade stationed in East Beirut. Syria labeled the fighting an "Israeli-US plot being implemented by Yasser Arafat" declaring that "Lebanese nationalists have the right to refuse to allow Arafat and others to restore the anomalous state of affairs that previously existed."

On May 30 1985, much of Sabra fell to its attackers. Amid Arab and Soviet political pressures on Syria and an emergency meeting of Arab League foreign ministers scheduled to discuss the issue June 8, Amal declared a unilateral ceasefire the next day.

Despite this, small-scale fighting continued for weeks. In Shatila, Palestinian defenders retained control of a small area around the camp's mosque, despite repeated efforts to dislodge them. Burj al-Barajneh was not penetrated at all, but nevertheless remained under siege as Amal prevented supplies from entering or its population from leaving. Finally, after fighting that had claimed more than six hundred dead and two thousand wounded, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Amal and representatives of the Palestine National Salvation Front in Damascus on June 17.

Yet the tensions which had sparked the camps war had not been resolved, and they would soon be manifest elsewhere. In Sidon, Palestinian and particularly Fateh, reorganization attracted stern warnings from Amal, the local Popular Nasirite Organization, and influential Sidon Deputy Dr. Nazih Bizri. Clashes between Amal and Palestinians in the camps erupted again in Beirut briefly in September, and once more for a week from 29 March 1986. Then, on 19 May 1986, one year to the day after the first round of the camps war, a second round began. Once again Amal was unable to penetrate the camps, despite a supply of T-54 tanks provided it by Damascus after the previous fighting. After the failure of more than a dozen ceasefires, the fighting finally died down with the deployment of Lebanese Army units and Syrian military observers around the Beirut camps June 24 1986.

This set the stage for the third and most severe round of the camps war. It began with an incident September 29 at the Rashidiyya refugee camp on the outskirts of Tyre in which Palestinians allegedly fired on an Amal patrol. Amal immediately surrounded the camp, demanding the surrender of all arms inside it. The demand was refused. By late October, the fighting had spread to Sidon and Beirut. In an effort to relieve pressure on Rashidiyya, Palestinian forces in Sidon broke through Amal lines November 24 to seize the strategic hilltop village of Maghdusha, overlooking the coastal highway south of the city. As Amal's military weaknesses became evident, Syrian special forces reportedly aided it in the battle for Shatila. In Sidon, Israel launched multiple air-strikes against Palestinian positions around the city.

As before, the clashes led to an emergency session of Arab League foreign ministers, and diplomatic intervention to halt the fighting. Iranian mediation secured a partially effective ceasefire between Amal and the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) on December 15 1986. But while pro-Syrian groups withdrew from around Maghdouché, Fateh who was excluded from the negotiations refused. It insisted that it would not turn over its positions around Maghdouché without a ceasefire in Beirut, guarantees of security in the Sidon area, and the lifting of Amal's siege around the Tyre refugee camps.

Some of these positions were subsequently vacated to Hizballah and Popular Nasirite Organization militiamen in January, and some supplies allowed into the beleaguered camps. But for the most part the sieges continued, and new fighting soon erupted. In Beirut, the shelling of the camps was compounded by a blockade of food and medical supplies that resulted in sickness, starvation or death for thousands of trapped residents.

Finally, on February 21, 1987, the first of seven thousand Syrian troops were deployed in West Beirut. On April 7, following an agreement with the PNSF, Amal lifted the siege as Syrian forces took up positions around the camps. That same month, negotiations between Amal and the PNSF took place with the aim of achieving a ceasefire in the south.

Throughout the two years of fighting, the Palestinians, with indirect support from the Druzes, put up stiff resistance against the Amal attacks, and so Amal was weakened. Although many Palestinians were killed in the battles and about 25,000 took refuge in Druze controlled areas, the Palestinians managed to retain control of the camps. At the end of the war an official Lebanese government report was released which breaks down the casualty figures from 1975 to 1990. The total number of causalties was put at 3,781 dead and 6,787 wounded in the fighting between Amal and the Palestinians. Futhermore the number of Palestinians killed in internal power struggles in the camps was around 2,000.

General Michel Aoun

As the end of President Gemayel's term of office neared, the different Lebanese factions could not agree on a successor and compromise candidates were rejected by the Syrians. Consequently, when his term expired Gemayel appointed in the first minutes of September 23, 1988, Army Commander General Michel Aoun as interim Prime Minister, until new elections could be held. Salim al-Hoss with Syrian backing objected to this and continued to act as de facto Prime Minister based in West Beirut saying that he was the prime minister.

There can be no doubt about the constitutionality of the Aoun government. Article 53 of the Lebanese constitution states that the president appoints the ministers, 'one of whom he chooses as prime minister'. The current premier does not have to resign; the president can dismiss him and appoint a new prime minister. Moreover, the Aoun government kept the rules of the National Pact. If the presidency is vacant, the cabinet is the sole executive . . . There was a precedent for this: in 1952, President Beshara al-Khoury appointed the commander of the army, Fouad Chehab, who was a Maronite, Prime Minister of an interim government until elections could be held.

Lebanon was thus divided between an essentially Muslim pro-Syrian government in west Beirut and an essentially Christian government in east Beirut. The working levels of many ministries, however, remained intact and were not immediately affected by the split at the ministerial level. Any attempts to hold new elections were blocked by the militias or by the Syrians repeated efforts to reason with the Syrians proved fruitless. Aoun felt that the power of both of these interfering forces, the militias and the Syrians had to be reduced. Aoun felt that the authority of the state had to be exerted throughout the country and so Aoun tried to find political solutions the reduce militia power and loosen Syrian grip on the country. International campaigns were launched to apply pressure on Syria.

The War of Liberation

In February 1989, General Aoun ordered the Lebanese Army to close illegal ports run by the LF. On 14 February 1989 Aoun struck at the LF in the Matn and in East Beirut and after two days of fighting the army gained the upper hand. The LF surrendered the Port of Beirut which was thus removed from LF control for the first time since the early days of the war, the LF also gave up its major taxes and acknowledged Aoun's military council's supremacy.

From the Syrian point of view Aoun had made a huge and worrying public relations advance in Syrian occupied areas as pro Syrian politicians welcomed Aoun's assault on the LF and moved for similar measures in their sectors. Syria became enraged when on 24 february 1989 Aoun ordered the closure of all illegal ports to compel shipping to use the Port of Beirut and so the Syrian controlled militias refused to comply with Aoun's orders. On March 6 Aoun activated the army's 'Marine Operations Room' and started a blockade of West Beirut militia ports. The attempt by Aoun to close illegal militia ports in Syrian controlled and mainly Muslim parts of the country resulted in the shelling of east Beirut by pro-Syrian militias and the Syrian Army.

On 14th March 1989 Aoun had no choice but to declared a 'War of Liberation' against the Syrian Army in Lebanon. This led to a 7 month period of shelling of East Beirut by Muslim pro-Syrian militias and by Syrian forces and the shelling of West Beirut and the Chouf by the Lebanese Army with some support from the LF. Aoun answered Syrian shelling of East Beirut with unprecedented targeting of Syrian military installations across Lebanon from Beirut to the central Bekaa. The shelling during the war of Liberation was very heavy and caused nearly 1,000 deaths, several thousand injuries, and further destruction to Lebanon's economic infrastructure, the Syrian forces also imposed a land and sea blockade. Shipping entering ports under Lebanese Army control was fired upon by Syrian artillery based in West Beirut and the Koura.

Events in July impelled both Aoun and the Syrians toward military escalation. Aoun wanted to break the maritime constriction of East Beirut, which now threatened his political viability, and Syria felt pressed by financial costs and rising international concern. In early July reports of a large Iraqi consignment to Aoun, including Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles which could be used against the Syrian capital, led Syria to impose a gunboat blockade on Jounieh. Using Tripoli as a base, up to six gunboats at any one time cruised 10—15 kilometres offshore, shelling and arresting incoming vessels. By late July the civilian population of East Beirut faced strangulation, raising doubts in Baabda for the first time as to whether Aoun could continue. At this point LF chief Samir Geagea finally agreed with the army to co-ordinate artillery fire to help ships enter, and Aoun, who had shown relative restraint since May, energetically pursued escalation, including commando raids against Syrian army positions, to force immediate internationalization of the war.

Numerous attempts to defeat Aoun through repeated pro Syrian militia assaults on the Lebanese Army defending strategic town of Souq el-Gharb failed and so it was decided that a larger scale Syrian attack was required. The morning of 10th August 1989 saw extremely heavy bombardment of Souq el-Gharb which was to last for until the morning of 13th August 1989, when units of the Syrian Army, Syrian Special Forces troops, Jumblatt's PSP militia, Palestinians guerrillas, and Communist Party troops launched a general assault on the town. Despite the attackers breaching the perimeter early in the battle, and Lebanese army counter attack dislodged the Syrians and their allies. During the battle Walid Jumblatt announced that Souq el-Gharb had been 'liberated from the occupation of the Lebanese Army' and called for a press conference to be held at Souq el-Gharb. Upon their arrival, the international press was surprised to see that the Lebanese Army in Souq el-Gharb had won a decisive victory in the face of overwhelming odds.

Casablanca Arab summit

Some months earlier, in January 1989, the Arab League had appointed a six-member committee on Lebanon, led by the Kuwaiti foreign minister. At the Casablanca Arab summit in May, the Arab League empowered a higher committee on Lebanon - composed of Saudi King Fahd, Algerian President Bendjedid, and Moroccan King Hassan - to work toward a solution in Lebanon.

The Casablanca committee issued a report in July 1989, stating that its efforts had reached a "dead end" and blamed Syrian intransigence for the blockage. After further discussions, the committee arranged for a seven-point cease-fire in September, bringing an end to the War of Liberation, followed by a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia.

The Taif Accords

After a month of intense discussions, in October 1989, the deputies informally agreed on a charter of national reconciliation, also known as the Taif agreement.

Muslim MP Nazim Qadri was assassinated two days before the Ta'if conference convened after making public statements calling for a Syrian withdrawal. During the Ta'if negotiations, a Sunni MP from Tripoli, Abdel Majid al-Rafei, told reporters that "the presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese territory is a contravention of the Arab league charter" and that "since 1976, the Syrian regime has not only interfered in Lebanon, but also massacred and destroyed cities." Within 24 hours, Syrian forces had arrested around 200 of his followers in and around Tripoli.

The Syrians were not willing to tolerate any resistance to their occupation. Some months earlier, in May 1989, the Grand Mufti of the Lebanese Sunni community, Hassan Khalid, who had expressed his support for Aoun was assassinated just days after meeting with officials from Aoun's administration.

The deputies returned to Lebanon in November, where they approved the Taif agreement on November 4, and elected Rene Moawad, a Maronite Christian deputy from Zghorta in north Lebanon, President on November 5. General Aoun, claiming powers as interim Prime Minister, issued a decree in early November dissolving the parliament and did not accept the ratification of the Taif agreement or the election of President Moawad.

General Aoun's main objection to it was that Syria had committed itself neither to rapid nor complete withdrawal. To the contrary, he complained, Syrian forces were to stay in place for a full two years, ostensibly "assisting the Lebanese government extend its authority." After that, Syrian forces were to be redeployed only as far as the Beqaa valley. The Agreement gave no timetable for any further Syrian withdrawal, merely stipulating that "such withdrawals would be negotiated at the appropriate time by the governments of Lebanon and Syria." Furthermore, General Aoun charged that the political reforms were unacceptable because they simply shifted power from the office of the President to that of the Prime Minister without solving any fundamental political problems.

Fearing a Syrian assault, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese flocked to the presidential palace in late December 1989 to form a "human shield" around the compound after Syrian military forces surrounding the free enclave began massing for an imminent invasion. The presence of thousands of Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim Lebanese at these demonstrations illustrated the multi-confessional appeal of Lebanon's first popular nationalist movement. Sunni religious leaders in West Beirut sent a "Muslim Solidarity Delegation," led by Sheikh Hassan Najar, who gave numerous rousing speeches during the demonstrations.

The Assassination of René Moawad

As the days passed Moawad was becoming embarrassed with heavy handed Syrian desires to push through the accords and Syrian press even went so far as to invent aggressive anti Aoun interviews which Moawad felt obliged to disclaim. As Moawad found himself to be unable to win over army officers and men who all remained loyal to Aoun, Moawad refused to replace General Aoun with a new armed forces commander, preferring negotiation to confrontation and he would not allow the Syrians to dislodge Aoun militarily. President Moawad was assassinated on November 22, 1989, by a bomb that exploded as his motorcade was returning from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. 550lb (250kg) of remote controlled explosives destroyed the president's Mercedes in the heart of Syrian held west Beirut. The enormous amount of explosives used, were placed over a period of some days, inside a sweet shop on the road along which the car would pass. The explosives were detonated as the car passed the shop and it has been suggested that the device used also triggered a secondary bomb hidden inside the car. The occupants were vaporized, the rear section of the vehicle was tossed onto the roof of a local building with the front half being thrown 200 yards away into a parking lot. No investigation was carried out into the murder.

The parliament met on November 24 in the Beqaa Valley and elected Elias Hrawi, a Maronite Christian deputy from Zahlé in the Beqaa Valley, to replace him. The results of the election were broadcast on Syrian radio ten minutes before the vote actually took place. President Hrawi named a Prime Minister, Salim al-Huss, and a cabinet on November 25. Despite widespread international recognition of Hrawi and his government, General Aoun refused to recognize Hrawi's legitimacy, and Hrawi officially replaced Aoun as army commander in early December. The vast majority of the Lebanese Army, however, again remained loyal to General Aoun.

The Beginning of the End, The War of Elimination

General Aoun's attempt to break the power of the militias and his standing up to the Syrians made him extremely popular with a cross section of the Lebanese population, this was manifested by large demonstrations in his support around the Presidential Palace. Samir Geagea and the LF were now rapidly loosing prestige and control of the Christian enclave. Geagea was becoming seduced by the Taif agreement which could open the way for him to receive a high government posting should he side with Hrawi and the Syrians. The LF hoped that siding with the Taif agreement would give the militia international respectability and that once Hrawi was bought into power the LF could detach him from Syria and use him as a cover to restore its domination of the enclave. The LF, in January 1990, made no secret of its option of linkage with Hrawi “if things don't work out with the general” or its derision for the “circus” of pro-Aoun demonstrations. Syria, which was well aware of the LF scheme, encouraged Hrawi to entice the militia.

Also in January 1990, rumours surfaced in East Beirut about alleged LF contacts with American officials and Syrian officers regarding an LF ditching of Aoun. Whether these reflected reality or disinformation, they certainly raised tensions. The daily al-Safir later quoted a reference by Christian deputies to “the capitals that were behind encouraging the LF to go into the battle with Aoun.” Only Washington and Damascus could have had this interest. By this point the LF was probably already plotting a surprise military strike to paralyse army communications to coincide with a “security plan” proposed for West Beirut in early February. On 30 January, Aoun intervened after army and LF mobilizations in a clash over LF use of school buildings in a Beirut suburb, he announced a compulsory “uniting of the rifle” in East Beirut, meaning absorption of the LF into his army brigades. For the LF this was a declaration of war. Immediately after Aoun’s “unification of weapons” speech, the LF stormed, captured, and held the Lebanese army barracks of Amshit, Sarba, Safra, Halate and the naval base at Jounieh, spread through the urban area and secured the Achrafieh hill, adjacent to the militia “war council”. The unthinkable had happened. The LF had gone to war against Aoun who had been concentrating his forces against Syria was not prepared for a flare up within his base area. The army had taken no precautions with regard to its scattered barracks, ammunition dumps, and other assets in the LF heartland. The big Adma base which was exposed to LF encirclement had limited ammunition and no provision had been taken for the dispersal of the helicopter fleet which was destroyed by the LF on the first day of fighting.

The ferocity of the army-LF war of February-May 1990 was determined by the fact that the army started from a much eroded geographical position, the Matn, and faced the task of “conquering” more than 80% of the East Beirut enclave. A new Iraqi arms shipment in early 1990, “to be divided equally between the army and the LF” and intended by Iraq for trouble-making against Assad, meant East Beirut’s weapons stocks were at an all-time high. The Maronite community could thus blow itself apart in grand style. The LF’s arsenal was not much more inferior to that of Aoun and it had a less arduous task of holding ground in urban and mountain terrain favouring the defence, especially in winter weather. Awareness of its unpopularity merely made the militia more ruthless.

Through the first month the army launched attacks with increasing desperation to crack the LF. In early February Aoun cleared the LF from the coastal Matn, seizing the militia barracks at Dibyé. This almost brought a morale collapse in the militia, but the destruction in the battle zone, which in three days matched the landscape created by years of shelling in old central Beirut, deterred Aoun from marching into Jounieh. Instead the army tried to outflank Jounieh and split the Kisrawan in a mountain push, a much longer distance in worse terrain and weather. This gave the LF time to recover its balance.

The army push petered out and Aoun turned to Beirut. He drove the LF out of its Ayn al-Rumana pocket in an artillery firestorm. For each of these assaults the army used about 1,000 men and 40 to 100 armoured vehicles. Finally, on 1 March, Aoun tried to overcome the LF’s defences around its “war council,” to bring the surrender of Ashrafieh and shatter the LF’s apparatus. However, the army had to break off the engagement, the 400 commandos who had spearheaded successive battles were exhausted and an ammunition shortage silenced the army’s American howitzers. Aoun had to fall back on inferior Iraqi supplied Soviet artillery pieces.

Military loss were heavy, by 1st March the Army had lost 32 officers and 251 soldiers dead; 40 tanks, 10 APCs, and 11 helicopters destroyed; 20 tanks and 15 APCs damaged.

The two groups that were best able to resist the Syrians were now fighting each other, and many soldiers on the opposing sides either knew each other or were even related and so refused to fight and simply went home. Aoun was reduced by the end of April to half of his original military capability. He had lost his air and naval bases, major stocks of 155-mm shells, and 25% of his tank force. The initiative now passed out of his hands permanently. Syria aimed to have the LF and Aoun reduce each other to a point at which the LF would have to submit to the Taif arrangement without a quid pro quo, and Aoun would be so emasculated that he would either have to surrender or suffer a swift military blow.

The second phase was a stand-off, with shelling exchanges continuing until late May when an Iraqi-sponsored truce brought an uneasy calm. The population had faced intolerable disruptions and over 320,000 people had fled the enclave by the time the fighting stopped. The old East Beirut, where power centres had cohered against strategic challenges, was gone for good. In its place was a shell containing two entities, each anxious to blot out the other but unable to do so.

The final blow came on 9th April 1990 when the Lebanese Forces announced their support for Taif and their readiness to hand over the institutions under their control to the rival government in west Beirut. The fighting continued and over 900 people died and over 3,000 were wounded during these battles called the 'War of Elimination' by Samir Geagea.

The Gulf War and the Syrian-American alliance

At the end of the 1980s, as superpower bipolarity faded and the U.S. became the dominant world power, the administration of President George Bush sought to buttress the Western position in the Middle East, to guarantee secure access to the Persian Gulf oil reservoir. Two important goals were to reduce instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, by quietening the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to restrict the influence of the Islamic regime in Iran. Also, the U.S. wished to assist conservative authoritarian regimes friendly to the West to maintain themselves. The U.S. might push for limited “democratization,” but appeared sympathetic to the view that Middle Eastern societies did not provide a suitable basis for popular participation in politics.

One of the prominent new features of Middle Eastern politics after the Cold War was Syria’s enhanced importance for the U.S. even while Syria’s strategic position deteriorated. On the one hand, Syria’s partnership with Iran allowed it to be a “go-between” with Tehran for the West and the Gulf oil states; Syria had become the major Arab state confronting Israel; and Syria was seen as the key to quietening Lebanon. Syria thus appeared to be critical to post-Cold War American plans for a Western-oriented order in the Middle East. On the other hand, Damascus had effectively lost Soviet patronage by 1989, meaning it had no superpower backing and little hope of weapons replacement in case of war with Israel, and the Syrian economy was hobbled by its military burden and the inefficiencies of a mafia-style dictator-ship. The situation seemed to increase the prospects for drawing Syria into a cooperative relationship with the West and whetted American expectations; a shrewd operator like Hafiz al-Assad could use this to improve Syria’s bargaining position.

Syria expected the U.S. and Israel to commit themselves to a pack-age of regional rewards before it shifted its posture. The package would include full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, acknowledgement of a Syrian free hand with the Lebanese regime, an appropriate financial payoff, and widened access to Western aid and technology. On its side the U.S. indicated friendly intentions, but would not oblige Damascus on Arab-Israeli matters, or on a relaxation of the official American view of Syria as a state that supported “terrorism,” until Assad committed himself to full peace with Israel.

General Aoun’s 1989 campaign against the Syrians inconvenienced the U.S. In the American outlook, Aoun distracted attention from Israeli-Palestinian issues, was trying to create complications between the West and Syria at a time when the U.S. wanted to bring Syria into its new “order,” and was behaving in a way likely to make Lebanon even more attractive to disruptive forces, particularly Shi’ite Islamic radicalism. For their part, Lebanon’s Shi’ite militants enabled Iran to affect Middle Eastern affairs far beyond its own borders. In short, Lebanon’s Christian and Shi’ite communities each presented a serious challenge to U.S. policy for “stabilizing” the Middle East. The fact that Aoun and Hizballah both represented populist upsurges left the Americans cold, this only made it more imperative that both be curbed.

In 1989-90, a degree of U.S.-Syrian collaboration was established as the best means, according to the Bush administration, of putting a lid on Lebanon’s turbulent affairs. The U.S. worked with Syria and Saudi Arabia to have General Aoun removed in favor of a new Taif Lebanese regime, the function of which was not to satisfy the aspirations of the Lebanese people, but to ensure that Lebanon ceased to be a distraction.

Iraq’s 2 August 1990 seizure of Kuwait, the Iraqi-American confrontation, and the infusion of Western forces into the Persian Gulf transformed Middle Eastern political calculations. The U.S. now needed or, more accurately, imagined itself as needing the broadest possible Arab military participation, and Syria suddenly found itself the object of the most flattering Western attentions. Assad tested the winds of the world for a week or so, calculated that his Iraqi enemy was headed for catastrophe, and offered himself as a partner in the American-led coalition. By mid-August, as the daily al-Safir noted, it was obvious that “Gulf events have removed foreign barriers standing against the Hirawi government asking Syria to strike at the unnatural situation in East Beirut.”

Intensified Syrian-American consultations culminated in the 13 September visit of Secretary of State James Baker to Damascus. Assad provided troops to sit in Saudi Arabia and in late September, clearly at Baker’s request, made his first personal visit to Tehran to “secure continuation of Iran’s adherence to [U.N.] sanctions [against Iraq].” In exchange for involvement in the Gulf, Damascus expected and got approval to settle things in Beirut, by whatever means.

In late August the U.S. ambassador to Syria gratified Syrian officials and the Hirawi regime by publicly stating that “we [the U.S.] want to see immediate implementation of Taif.” American reservations about Syria’s association with “terrorism” temporarily vanished. The only American requirements, completely coincident with Syria’s own approach, were that the operation must be swift and by invitation of the Hirawi government, to counter comparisons with Iraqi behavior concerning Kuwait. Curiously, in mid-September the Israelis seemed convinced that Syria was too busy with the Gulf crisis to open “an additional front” in Lebanon, this after the U.S. had already assured Lebanese officials, and by extension the Syrians, that Israel would not interfere “provided there is no movement southward.” The question arises as to whether the U.S. sought to neutralize Israel by deliberately misleading the Israelis about American-Syrian understandings.

Coordinated activities by the Hirawi government and Syria went ahead slowly as Assad wanted to give Aoun a last chance to submit. The LF-Kateab camp in East Beirut threw in its lot with the regime: Assad was so pleased with Kata’ib leader George Sa’ada at a late July audi-ence that he asked him “not to stay away from us too long.” On 21 August, parliament met with the necessary two-thirds quorum, courtesy of the LF, and voted through the Ta’if constitutional amendments. The National Assembly approved, and President Hrawi signed into law, constitutional amendments embodying the political reform aspects of the Taif agreement. These amendments gave some presidential powers to the council of ministers, expanded the National Assembly from 99 to 108 seats, and divided those seats equally between Christians and Muslims. This completed the formal legal base of the regime, at least to the satisfaction of its partisans. On 23 September, LF and Syrian delegations had a productive session in the Beqaa and on 26 September the LF handed over the crossing points on Aoun-LF fronts to Hirawi government troops.

On 28 September, the Taif regime committed its prestige and existence to a successful showdown by imposing a siege on the Aoun area, blocking food supplies to the population.

13th October 1990

In October 1990, the Syrian military supported by a few Lebanese troops loyal to Hrawi launched an attack against General Aoun. The attack came just after 7:00 a.m. on the 13th October and started with an air raid by Syrian Soukhoi fighter bombers against the Palace and the Ministry of Defence. For many years a no fly zone over the whole of Lebanon had been enforced by the Israelis preventing the Syrians from using their airforce, on this day however, the Syrians were allowed to fly by the United States as reward for their joining the NATO coalition against Iraq in the Gulf crisis. Immediately before the assault, Syrian aircraft overflew the Matn to test the efficacy of American intervention with Israel.

The air attacks lasted 13 minutes after which Syrian special forces troops advance under massive artillery cover, LF artillery joined Syrian artillery and fired on the Lebanese Army. The French considered intervention through their fleet positioned off the Lebanese coast, but after this did not materialize, General Aoun realizes that he cannot win and at 8:45 a.m. announces his surrender from the nearby French embassy in order "to avoid even more bloodshed, limit the damage and to save what remains." The surrender is broadcast on all radio stations throughout the day as General Aoun personally contacts his field commanders to orders that they "obey the orders of the commander in chief of the Army, General Emile Lahoud." At 10:00 a.m. the Syrians enter the Palace but despite this, many units of the Lebanese Army initially refuse to surrender and heavy fighting continues, a Lebanese Army unit counter attacks Deir al-Qalaa, at Beit-Mery, and manages to oust Syrians special forces that had occupied the monastery by force at the very start of the day. The Lebanese unit finds that some of the monks in the monastery had been killed by the Syrian troops. At Douar, on the Bekfaya front, the elite commandos engaged Syrians tanks and caused heavy damage. On the hill of the Prince, at Souk al-Gharb, the cadets of the military Academy, assisted by regulars of the 10th Brigade put up a very hard fight. In Souq al-Gharb itself, Aoun’s Lebanese army units, with only a fraction of their pre-February 1990 hardware, killed about 400 Syrians before the front was overrun. The Lebanese Army headquarters at Yarzé even refused to give the ceasefire order finally announcing it 12:30 p.m. It was fortunate that Aoun had managed to directly speak to many of his units and so prevent much bloodshed.

Disaster did strike however at Dahr el-Wahesh, village between Aley and Kahaleh, where the 102nd unit of the Lebanese 10th Brigade had been positioned. The 10th Brigade had been rather thinly deployed throughout the front line and during the battle some of its units had been unable to communicate with their headquarters and those at soldiers at Dahr el-Wahesh, numbering less than one hundred had not heard the radio broadcasts. Details of the events that followed are rather vague due to the lack of survivors. It seems that heavy fighting had occurred from the outset around the village with Syrians taking heavy losses. After the ceasefire was announced, around one thousand Syrian soldiers along with a handful of troops from the Lebanese 6th Brigade which was traditionally loyal to Amal, approached the village from Aley during what they believed was a ceasefire. The Lebanese soldiers unaware of the ceasefire fired upon the Syrian column with light artillery. The Syrians were caught in the open and in panic some Syrians ran straight towards the Lebanese positions and some ran into a mine field. A Lebanese officer of the 6th Brigade informed the defenders of Dahr el-Wahesh that the fighting was over and that they should surrender. The officer commanding the 102nd and his men would only surrender to a Lebanese Army unit and not to the Syrian Army. The Syrians however would not pull back and a fight to the death followed.

Estimates of Syrian losses ranged from 160 to 450 in the battle that followed and it seems that the 102nd fought on until their ammunition ran out refusing to let Dahr el-Wahesh, which overlooks the Palace, fall into Syrian hands. Later that afternoon some 80 bodies of soldiers of the 102nd would be brought to a Baabda mortuary, most had their hands tied behind their backs and had been shot in the back of the head, some had been stripped down to their underpants before being executed. The Syrians executed one of the officers, Emile Boutros, by forcing him to lay down on the road and then driving a tank over him. At least 15 civilians were executed by Syrian soldiers in Bsous after having been rounded up from their homes, and another 19 people, including three women, were reported to have been killed in cold blood in al-Hadath. Around the Presidential Palace another 51 Lebanese Army soldiers were stripped and excecuted.

It was also reported that at least 200 supporters of General Aoun, most of them military personnel, were arrested by the Syrian forces in east Beirut and its suburbs, these men simply disapeared.

Father Suleiman Abu Khalil and Father Albert Sherfan, two priests, also ''disappeared'' during the events of 13 October 1990. Father Albert Sherfan was the head of the Deir al-Qalaa Monastery in Beit Meri and Father Suleiman was the treasurer. On 13 October 1990 it was reported that the Syrian forces took up a position near the monastery, after a long battle which claimed the lives of 25 Syrian soldiers, because of its strategic position overlooking the Metn districts and other areas. These two priests, who had not been killed in the battle, ''disappeared'' on the same day together with some soldiers of the Lebanese army who had apparently taken refuge in the monastery. The brother of Father Suleiman Abu Khalil recalls:

''On 13 October 1990 the monastery was occupied by the Syrian forces. I tried to obtain an authorization to go and see Suleiman but I couldn't. At about 10am a Syrian officer asked to enter the monastery to have a drink of water. Father Suleiman appeared at the balcony and at the same time another monk came out to see what was happening. The Syrians apparently were surprised to see that there was more than one monk in the monastery and became suspicious that people might be hiding there. Accordingly, the Syrian officers rang all the Lebanese authorities they could reach to allow them to enter and search the monastery. When they went in they found Lebanese soldiers in civilian clothes. They arrested everyone they found and took them away, the soldiers in a lorry and the two monks in a Range Rover. All were taken first to Anjar and then to Far Falastin in Damascus. We contacted a lot of people to intervene on their behalf but all our efforts came to nothing.''

The Murder of Dany Chamoun

Over the next few days after the surrender of General Aoun, Syrian agents moved into East Beirut and many Aoun supporters were arrested. Opposition was put down. On 21st October 1990, Dany Chamoun, the leader of the National Liberal party, who was against Syrian presence in Lebanon and had been a strong supporter of General Aoun's policies was killed in cold blood by uniformed gunmen who broke into his apartment in the early hours. His wife and his two young boys, aged 5 and 7, were also killed in the most disgraceful of ways. The scale of the horror and the savagery of the killings were barbaric even by Lebanese standards. The housekeeper took Dany's baby daughter and hid in the attic, they were the only survivors. What is not surprising is that nothing has been done to find the assassins.

On December 24, 1990, Omar Karami was appointed Lebanon's Prime Minister. General Aoun remained in the French embassy until August 27, 1991 when a "special pardon" was issued, allowing him to leave Lebanon safely and take up residence in exile in France. 1991 and 1992 saw considerable advancement in efforts to reassert state control over Lebanese territory. The militias were dissolved in May 1991 with the important exception of Hizballah and units of Amal so that they can carry on the fight to oust the Israelis from Lebanon, and the armed forces moved against armed Palestinian elements in Sidon in July 1991. In May 1992 the last of the western hostages taken during the mid 1980s by Islamic extremists was released.

The Election of 1992

A social and political crisis, fuelled by economic instability and the collapse of the Lebanese pound, led to Prime Minister Omar Karami's resignation May 6, 1992. He was replaced by former Prime Minister Rashid al Sulh, who was widely viewed as a caretaker to oversee Lebanon's first parliamentary elections in 20 years. The elections were not prepared and carried out in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus.

The turnout of eligible voters in some Christian locales was extremely low, with many voters not participating in the elections because they objected to voting in the presence of non Lebanese forces. There also were widespread reports of irregularities. The electoral rolls were themselves in many instances unreliable because of the destruction of records and the use of forged identification papers. As a consequence, the results do not reflect the full spectrum of Lebanese politics.

Elements of the 1992 electoral law, which paved the way for elections, represented a departure from stipulations of the Taif agreement, expanding the number of parliamentary seats from 108 to 128 and employing a temporary districting arrangement designed to favour certain sects and political interests. According to the Taif agreement, the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were to agree in September 1992 to the redeployment of Syrian troops from greater Beirut. That date passed without an agreement.

Trouble in the South, Operation Accountability, Operation Grapes of Wrath and the Qana Massacre

Fighting continued in the south between Hizballah and the Israelis to various degrees of intensity. During the escalation in the fighting in July 1993 known as "Operation Accountability" in Israel and the "Seven Day War" in Lebanon, some 120 Lebanese civilians were killed and close to 500 injured by a ferocious Israeli assault on population centres in southern Lebanon, an offensive which also temporarily displaced some 300,000 Lebanese villagers. The stated goals of the Israeli operation were not only to punish Hizballah, but also to inflict serious damage on villages in southern Lebanon and create a refugee flow in the direction of Beirut so as to put pressure on the Lebanese government to rein in the guerrillas. Hizballah, in retaliation, indiscriminately fired a number of Katyusha rockets across the border into northern Israel during that week, killing two and injuring twenty four civilians.

To end the fighting in July 1993, the United States brokered an unwritten agreement between Israel and Hizballah, the July 1993 "understandings." The agreement supposedly prohibited attacks on civilians, but both sides understood the agreement to mean that if one side broke the rules, the other side could do so as well. As a result, between July 1993 and April 1996, both sides have accepted civilian casualties whenever their side had attacked civilians first.

In April 1996, the agreement that had ended the July 1993 fighting broke down under the weight of cumulative violations by both sides. Civilians in Lebanon and Israel were dying. On April 9, Israeli officials declared that "these rules of the game are not good and cannot remain," and that "residents in south Lebanon who are under the responsibility of Hizballah will be hit harder, and the Hizballah will be hit harder." Within forty eight hours, Israel launched what it referred to as "Operation Grapes of Wrath." Between 160 and 170 Lebanese civilians were killed during the sixteen day offensive and over 350 wounded. Fourteen Hizballah fighters were killed. Estimates of the number of displaced civilians range from 300,000 to 500,000 civilians, including well over 150,000 children. In the single most lethal event of the operation, on April 18, 1996, at least seventeen Israeli high explosive artillery shells hit a UNIFIL compound near the village of Qana, in which over 800 Lebanese civilians had taken shelter. Some 102 civilians were killed. A U.N. inquiry found that it was "unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors," strongly suggesting that the base had been deliberately targeted. According to the Isrealis "At 1352 and 1358 hours, respectively, Israeli locating radar had identified two separate targets in Qana from where fire had originated. The first target was located 200 metres or so south-west of the United Nations compound. The second target was located some 350 metres south-east of the compound. The data had been sent automatically to the Northern Command and to an artillery battalion located on the Israel-Lebanon border, about 12 kilometres from the sea. The battalion comprises three batters with four guns each. It is equipped with M-109A2 guns (15-millimetre calibre). When the battalion received the data, it checked the targets on a map and found that one of the two locations was between 200 to 300 metres from the United Nations position at Qana. The commanding officer had therefore sought instructions from Northern Command, which rechecked the data and gave permission to fire. This decision had not been taken lightly; officers of some seniority had been involved. When the order to fire came, the first target had been engaged by one battery, using all four guns. Thirty-eight shells (high-explosive) had been fired, about two thirds with impact fuses and one third with proximity fuses. (Proximity fuses cause a round to explode in the air above the target; they are often used for anti-personnel fire.) The two types of fuses had been employed in random order. Convergence fire had been used so that the impacts would be concentrated in the target area. Regrettably, a few rounds had overshot and hit the United Nations compound."

A UN team questioned a number of witnesses on the activities of Hezbollah fighters in Qana prior to the incident. The following was found:

(a) Between 1200 and 1400 hours on 18 April, Hezbollah fighters fired two or three rockets from a location 350 metres south-east of the United Nations compound. The location was identified on the ground.

(b) Between 1230 and 1300 hours, they fired four or five rockets from location 600 metres south-east of the compound. The location was identified on the ground.

(c) About 15 minutes before the shelling, they fired between five and eight rounds of 120 millimetre mortar from a location 220 metres south-west of the centre of the compound. The location was identified on the ground. According to witnesses, the mortar was installed there between 1100 and 1200 hours that day, but no action was taken by UNIFIL personnel to remove it. (On 15 April, a Fijian had been shot in the chest as he tried to prevent Hezbollah fighters from firing rockets.)

(d) The United Nations compound at Qana had taken a large number of Lebanese seeking shelter from Israeli bombardments. By Sunday, 14 April, 745 persons were in the compound. On 18 April, the day of the shelling, their number is estimated to have been well over 800. When the Fijian soldiers heard the mortar being fired not far from their compound, they began immediately to move as many of the civilians as possible into shelters so that they would be protected from any Israeli retaliation.

(e) At some point (it is not completely clear whether before or after the shelling), two or three Hezbollah fighters entered the United Nations compound, where their families were.

The UN findings were that the distribution of impacts at Qana shows two distinct concentrations, whose mean points of impact are about 140 metres apart. If the guns were converged, as stated by the Israeli forces, there should have been only one main point of impact. The pattern of impacts is inconsistent with a normal overshooting of the declared target (the mortar site) by a few rounds, as suggested by the Israeli forces. The findings conclude "While the possibility cannot be ruled out completely, it is unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors."

The Israeli offensive in April 1996 ended with a cease-fire agreement, brokered by the U.S., that was an improvement over the July 1993 understandings. This time, the agreement was contained in a public written document that included a commitment by both Israel and "armed groups in Lebanon" to "insuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks." The agreement also established a group consisting of Lebanon, Israel, Syria, France and the United States to monitor compliance with the agreement. However the agreement did not stop the fighting altogether, it only toned it down carrying on in a low intensity form for the next couple of years without major incident.

Hit and run attacks by Hizballah and ambushes against the Israelis and the SLA caused high casualties and in 1999 the SLA were no longer able to maintain their positions in and around Jezzine and so in the last few days of May 1999 they withdrew. The SLA moved south but some 250 SLA militiamen chose to remain behind and surrendered to Lebanese authorities, they were then jailed for various terms ranging from one year to ten.

Over the next few weeks fighting between Hizballah, the Israelis and the SLA intensified and slowly began to target civilians. On the 23rd June 1999, three civilians were wounded, including a 12 year old boy, in Israeli artillery attacks on Qabrikha and Yater, and on the 24th June, shells fired from the Israeli occupied enclave wounded a woman in Qabrikha. Hizballah listed 21 attacks on 11 Lebanese villages between June 19 and June 23 1999 and said it had on several occasions fired warning mortar rounds at border outposts, but when the Israelis failed to get the message it was compelled to fire deeper into Israel. Citing a marked increase in assaults targeting civilians in south Lebanon, Hizballah gunners unleashed four volleys of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel on the afternoon of the 24th June 1999 as a “warning message” to Israel to halt its violations of the April 1996 Understanding. Twenty nine rockets were fired. In Israel, military sources claimed five people suffered mild wounds or were treated for shock. The Israeli response was heavy. Israeli fighter-bombers on the night of 24th June blasted power plants, bridges, telephone exchanges, and other infrastructure facilities across Lebanon causing millions of dollars of damage. At least seven people were killed and more than 35 wounded. In response, Hizballah unleashed more volleys of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, killing two Israeli civilians.

Dinnieh Uprising

On New Year's eve 1999, as Lebanon entered the year 2000 full of hope and joy, attention was quickly turned away from south Lebanon as a group of Sunni fundamentalist militants went on the rampage in north Lebanon.

The mountainous area of Dinnieh northeast of Tripoli suffered a 4-day "war" between Lebanese Army units and a group of 150-200 Sunni fundamentalist militants, in which 11 troops(including one officer), 5 civilians and 27 attackers were killed, and 6 soldiers, 12 civilians and 20 attackers wounded. The events started when the militants ambushed an army unit in the village of Assoun, killing five soldiers and army Major Milas Naddaf was kidnapped. The militants belonged to the "At-Takfir wal-Hijra" organization. The ambush and abduction triggered the largest military operation since the end of the civil war, involving 4,000 troops, tanks and helicopters, and the fighting extended to the village of Kfar Habou, where the rebels leader Bassam Kanj was killed after a battle. In the house where Kanj took refuge, the body of Major Naddaf was found with his throat slit, along with the mutilated bodies of two hostages, 21-year-old Sarah Yazbeck and her mother Salwa Raad both of whom had been brutalised before being murdered. By January 5th 2000 security forces said that the operation was over and that 67 Islamic fighters had been captured.

The group's membership was extremely multifaceted. Although most were from Lebanon, there were also a significant number of Palestinians, Syrians, and others from elsewhere in the Arab world. Most had been previously affiliated with anti-Syrian Sunni Islamist movements such as Jama'a al-Islamiyya and Al-Tawhid al-Islami. The Lebanese-born leader of Takfir wa al-Hijra, Bassam Ahmad Kanj (also known as Abu A'isha), and many of its members reportedly fought with the Afghani mujahidin against occupying Soviet forces in the 1980's. It seems that Kanj received financial support from fellow Afghan veteran Osama bin Laden through bank accounts in Beirut and north Lebanon.

While the Dinnieh clashes were under way, on January 2, a gunman claiming to be "a martyr for Grozny" fired several rocket-propelled grenades at the Russian embassy in Beirut, killing a security guard and wounding several others before he was kileed by Lebanese security forces. Lebanese officials publicly dismissed the man, a Palestinian named Ahmad Raja Abu Kharroub (alias Abu Ubeida) as a psychologically unstable individual. However, according to reports, Abu Kharroub was a member of Usbat al-Ansar (the Partisan League), a Sunni Islamist Palestinian group linked to Takfir wa al-Hijra, based in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon. The leader of Usbat al-Ansar, Abd al-Karim al-Sa'di, is said to have sent members of group to Beirut and other areas of Lebanon in November to avenge Russian atrocities in Chechnya. Usbat al-Ansar is also suspected of responsibility for a grenade attack against a Lebanese army checkpoint near the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp that wounded a soldier on the same day. The following week, four unidentified gunmen disguised as Army soldiers attempted to launch another attack on the Russian embassy from the neighboring Bohsali building, but the plot was foiled by security forces.

South Lebanon flared up soon after and during January and February 2000 seven Israeli soldiers were killed in guerrilla attacks. Israel retaliated by bombing three power stations in Lebanon, wounding 15 civilians and causing $20 million in damage.

Israel Withdraws

As part of Ehud Barak's election campaign he promised to withdraw Israeli troops from Lebanon by July 7 2000. As the deadline approached the SLA began to collapse with many of its troops abandoning their positions.

As the deadline for ending the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon neared, fighting intensivied with ten people being wounded on May 18th 2000. The injured included two Israeli soldiers, two members of the Israeli-run South Lebanon Army (SLA) militia, a Hizbollah guerrilla, four Lebanese civilians and a U.N. peacekeeper. The exchanges of artillery fire and Israeli air raids on suspected guerrilla targets continued into the night.

With this, the causualty toll in fighting in the year 2000 stood at eight Israeli soldiers dead and 25 wounded, 24 SLA members killed and 37 injured, 10 guerrillas dead and eight hurt, five Lebanese civilians dead and 61 wounded, one Lebanese soldier injured and two U.N. peacekeepers wounded.

On 20th May 2000, the Israeli airforce attacted a military base of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) near Deir al-Ghazal in the Bekaa Valley. The Israelis destroyed 10 T-55 tanks killing a handful of Palestinian guerrillas in the process.

It was becoming obvious that the Israelis were going to pull out well ahead of the July 7 deadline and over the next couple of days dozens of Israeli allied Lebanese militiamen fled to Israel's border, asking for asylum after their military outposts fell to Hezbollah guerrillas. The SLA did put up a fight in some places with SLA fire claiming six Lebanese lives on May 22.

On the night of the 22nd May 2000, under cover of darkness the Israelis began their final pullout which was complete by the 24th.

SLA units throughout the security zone began to disintegrate almost immediately after Israeli troops began pulling out of the central sector and abandoned large stocks of heavy weapons and armored vehicles to advancing Hezbollah guerrillas, forcing the Israeli Airforce to divert aircraft from ground support missions to the destruction of SLA arms caches. Within 24 hours of the start of the pullout the SLA had completely collapsed.

The speed of collapse of the 2500 man strong SLA was surprising with some 1700 surrendering and the rest, along with their relatives, taking refuge in Isreal. While the speedy collapse of Shiite SLA units was expected, IDF military planners had assumed that predominantly Druze and Christian units in the more heterogeneous eastern and western sectors would remain intact. The rapid collapse of the SLA appears to have been a result of several factors. Firstly, a threat made by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to "liquidate" all SLA members who fail to surrender when the Israelis pull out was taken very seriously by the SLA rank and file. Secondly a secret deal reportedly negotiated in advance by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Nasrallah resulted in most Druze SLA units surrendering en masse to Hezbollah, this left the remaining units isolated and demoralized. Thirdly, General Lahd traveled to France in mid May for an extended visit with his family, the last opportunity to do so, he thought, before the situation in south Lebanon heated up prior to the scheduled withdrawal of Israeli forces by July 7. His abscence caused a tremendous drop in the morale of SLA troops. After belatedly learning of the turn of events in the south, Lahd quickly flew back to Tel Aviv and drove up to the border, only to discover that there was no South Lebanon Army left for him to lead.

The conduct of the Hizballah guerrillas in the areas previously held by the SLA was most honourable. Revenge killings, mass murders, and massacres that many feared would take place did not occur.

The Lebanese government welcomed the pullout but demanded that Israel abandon the Shebaa farms that were captured in 1967. Israel claims that these farms were Syrian but the Lebanese and the Syrians both claim that the farms are Lebanese. The matter was investigated by the UN and it was decided that the pullout was complete.

The Shebaa Shambles

On October 7th 2000, in an operation which had been planned for months, three Israel army technicians conducting a routine check of the border fence near the village of Shebaa suddenly came under rocket and machine gun fire from a team of Hezbollah guerrillas. During the fifteen-minute clash, in which all three of the soldiers were wounded (one of them seriously), another team of guerrillas proceeded to cut through the border fence and abduct the soldiers, while nearby Hezbollah units launched a heavy artillery bombardment of neighboring Israeli outposts to pin down IDF reinforcements, wounding six Israeli soldiers. The captured men, later identified as Omar Suwad, 25, Benyamin Avraham, 20, and Adi Avitan, 20, were shoved into two (or three) get away cars on the Lebanese side of the border which sped off in different directions, while an estimated 400 guerrillas deployed in forward positions in neighboring villages to prepare for an Israeli ground offensive.

Israeli television stated that "a severe ultimatum" threatening to "retaliate very forcefully" unless the soldiers were returned had been issued to the Lebanese government, while the Lebanese media reported that the Israel threatened to bomb Beirut if Hezbollah failed to release them within four hours. Although Israeli air force planes penetrated Lebanese air space after the abduction (which had been meticulously avoided since the IDF pullout in May), no retaliatory action was forthcoming.

On October 15, speaking before a joint session of the Arab and Islamic Nationalist Conferences at the Carlton Hotel in Beirut, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced the capture of a fourth Israeli, later identified as Elhanan Tennenbaum, a 54-year-old reserve air-force colonel. "God help the prime minister today," he added, turning to Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss and other government officials in attendance, "in dealing with the many phone calls he will get from Albright."

Nasrallah later said that Tennenbaum was an undercover Israeli intelligence operative who had been attempting to infiltrate the group. According to this account, he was lured to Lebanon by the prospect of meeting with a senior Hezbollah official (with whom he had established contact through an intermediary) and was seized upon entering the country. Israeli officials insisted that Tennenbaum was a civilian employed by a consulting firm linked to two prominent Israeli electronic and military communications companies, Tadiran and Rafael, and that he was kidnapped in the Swiss city of Lausanne.

Israel held Syria responsible for the incidents and threatend retaliation against Syrian interests in Lebanon. Diplomatic efforts to gain the release of the prisoners which continued for months but were interupted as Hizbollah struck again four months later on February 16, 2001. In an anti tank missile ambush one Israeli soldier was killed and two others wounded when Hizbollah guerrillas destroyed a patrolling Hummer jeep in the Shebaa farms area. Israel shelled south Lebanon in retaliation to a Hizbollah guerrilla attack and again said that it held Syria responsible but did not retaliate against Syria as Isreal was still trying to secure the freedom of its captured soldiers.

On April 14 2001 Hizbullah fighters destroyed an Israeli tank in a cross-border missile ambush, prompting Israeli jets, helicopter gunships, tanks, and artillery to blast the outskirts of Shebaa and Kfar Chouba in south Lebanon with sustained fire. Hezbollah guerrillas hit the Israeli Merkava tank with a Sagger missile and killed an Israeli soldier and wounded three others in the Shebaa Farms area, where the borders of Lebanon, Syria and Israel meet. A special U.N. envoy said the next day that the rocket attack that killed an Israeli soldier in a disputed border zone violated the U.N.-drawn boundary between Lebanon and Israel. Again Israel said it would hold Syria responsible for the attack.

In the very early hours of April 16th Israel struck Syrian positions in Lebanon. Israeli jets bombarded a Syrian radar station in the mountainous region of Dhar al Baydar, 45 kilometres (27 miles) east of Beirut, at 12.30 am Monday (2130 GMT Sunday). The planes also fired at a Syrian anti-aircraft position two kilometres away in the Mdeirej-Hammana region near the Beirut-Damascus highway. Israel said the raid on a Syrian radar station in Lebanon was a clear message to Syrian leaders that they would pay if they did not drop support for Hizbollah guerrillas.

Security sources said four Israeli planes carried out three successive runs, firing six rockets on the Syrian radar station and one on a nearby Syrian position. The Israeli warplanes killed at least three Syrian soldiers and wounded six others in the attack. One of the Syrian soldiers killed was an officer.

The Assassination of Elie Hobeika

At 9:30 AM on January 24, 2002, Hobeika and three bodyguards left his apartment on Kamel Asaad street in suburban Hazmieh southeast of the capital en route to his office in Sin al-Fil. Shortly after their departure, the blue Range Rover they were driving slowed down to pass by a white Mercedes 280 parked on the side of a narrow road. As Hobeika's car passed the Mercedes, an estimated 22 kilos of high explosive in the Mercedes was detonated apparently by remote control. Hobeika and his bodyguards, Dmitri Ajram, Walid Zein and Faris Suedan, were instantly killed. The explosion reportedly catapulted Hobeika's body over sixty meters from the wrecked SUV. The explosion injured six bystanders. The blast blackened neighboring apartment buildings, destroyed dozens of cars parked nearby, and even shattered glass windows up to one kilometer away from the scene.

There was no claim of responsibility for the mid-morning blast, but also no shortage of possible suspects. Lebanon was quick to accuse Israel, claiming that 45-year-old Hobeika was killed to prevent him from testifying in an impending court case against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Belgium. The prosecution in the case holds Sharon directly responsible for 1982 massacre in Sabra and Shatilla. Although Hobeika's lasting claim to notoriety was his during the 1982 massacre, in July 2001, Hobeika broke his characteristic silence over the Sabra and Shatila massacre to plead innocent of any involvement, claiming to have documents and tapes that proved he was not in the vicinity of the camps at the time. In a secret meeting in Beirut with two visiting Belgian senators on January 22nd 2002, Hobeika reportedly informed them that he feared for his life. One of the senators, Josy Dubie said in Brussels on the day of the assassination that when he asked Hobeika if he felt threatened, he replied: "I feel threatened. I have revelations to make." The senator also said, "I then asked why he did not make these revelations now and he replied to me: 'I am saving them for the trial.' "

Since Israel has carried out similar assassinations of its enemies in Lebanon in the past (e.g. the January 1979 assassination of Abu Ali Hassan Salameh, the commander of Yasser Arafat's Force 17), it might have been able to carry out the assassination of Hobeika, either directly or through Lebanese proxies, even in an area like Hazmieh.

In the aftermath of September 11, Hobeika attempted to win American support by contacting the CIA to offer his help in locating and capturing Imad Mughniyah, the former head of special overseas operations for Hezbollah who is listed on the Bush administration's most wanted terrorist list. Hobeika had collaborated with CIA operatives in Lebanon in the early 1980s and attended a training course at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia in 1982. His services would have been a valuable asset in the hunt for Mughniyah. Hobeika owned one of the largest private security firms in Lebanon (in effect, a small militia made up of bodyguards with legally-registered weaponry and skilled intelligence operatives) that has a presence in the largely Shi'ite southern suburbs of Beirut - the most likely location of Mughniyah.

By late 2001, the Syrians had completely withdrawn their protection of Hobeika and instructed the Lebanese judiciary to take action against him, or at least threaten to do so. Given the timing of the judicial moves, it appears likely that the Syrian intelligence learned about his attempts to approach the CIA and this would have given them a strong motive to eliminate him, or allow others to eliminate him, before he could do so. The event could serve as a pretext for a massive crackdown on opponents of the Syrian occupation in Lebanon. More generally, the assassination, which bore an uncanny resemblance to killings during the war, lent support to Syria's claim that a withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon would lead to internal violence and instability.

During the last month of his life, Hobeika was extremely distraught due to the steadily escalating measures taken against him by the Syrian-backed regime in Beirut and became wildly paranoid. During the funeral of a close ally and confidante, former MP Jean Ghanem, who died on January 14 from injuries sustained in a car crash in Hazmieh, Hobeika told several people that the latter's death was not accidental.

Hezbollah's political leadership has its own grudge against Hobeika dating back to the March 1985 car bomb attack against Fadlallah, as does the movement's main external sponsor, Iran, for his role in the deaths of four Iranian diplomats during the civil war. A more immediate motive for eliminating Hobeika would have been the desire to preempt his assistance to the CIA in locating Imad Mughniyah, the head of Hezbollah's Foreign Operations Branch (jihaz al-amaliyyat al-kharijiyya).

In light of the large numbers of Palestinians that Hobeika was responsible for killing during the war in Lebanon, the possibility that an armed Palestinian faction carried out the assassination cannot be discounted. In 2001, a senior official of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement in Lebanon, Bassam Abu Sharif, threatened to kill Hobeika.

Another possible culprit is the radical wing of the LF. In 1991, according to the Lebanese authorities, LF operatives loyal to Samir Geagea carried out a 1991 bombing which destroyed Hobeika's car and killed one of his bodyguards. In June 1998, the Lebanese authorities claimed to have uncovered a plot by former LF intelligence operatives to assassinate Hobeika, as well as Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, the chief of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, and then-Interior Minister Michel Murr. The 13 alleged members of the cell who were arrested by security forces reportedly received their orders via the Internet from an LF office in Australia. However, as the above failures illustrate, radical LF factions have been thoroughly penetrated by Lebanese and Syrian intelligence over the last ten years. It is highly unlikely that any anti-Syrian faction of the LF could have undertaken an operation of this complexity in Hazmieh unless it was coordinating with the Syrians - which seems unlikely.

Hobeika's enemies had many reasons to despise him. He betrayed his people to the Syrians and was seen as a mass murderer by the Palestinians. For many, he was first an Israeli agent, and later a Syrian agent. For others still, he was a double agent and a hated and dangerous man.

The assassination was quickly forgotten as events in the south took center stage.

To date, Hizballah continues to attack Israeli positions in the Shebaa Farms and Isreal retaliates with artillary and aircraft. The Lebanese Army has not deployed in the liberated regions of south Lebanon with security being handled by various armed militias, including those of Hizballah, Amal, and the SSNP.

The Syrians still occupy Lebanon.